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FOREWORD 
Our wills and fates do so contrary run 
That our devices still are overthrown. 
Our thoughts are ours, their ends none of our own. 
(Hamlet, 3.2, Player King) 
 
Our world faces unprecedented environmental challenges. Globally, economies have 
expanded meteorically, bringing increased affluence, quality of life, and life spans, but also 
vastly increased consumption and environmental impacts. The desire of people around the 
world to aspire to European or U.S. levels of consumption is understandable but 
thermodynamically untenable—the world cannot sustain 7 billion Americans. Global carbon 
dioxide emissions, which warm our atmosphere and acidify our oceans, have increased by a 
factor of three since 1970, and continue to increase each year by 1 billion tonnes (the weight 
of about 100,000 large cruise ships). With business-as-usual policies, climate scientists 
project we will see global temperatures increase 2-4°C by 2100.a Last month, Science 
published that the 182,000-square-kilometer Thwaites Glacier in Antarctica has begun a 200-
year, irreversible slide into the ocean, which will flood and melt the entire West Antarctic Ice 
Sheet, raising global sea levels by more than three meters.b Exploitation of tar sands and 
shale oil has depressed energy prices, encouraging further consumption and discouraging 
transitions to renewable sources. Changing weather patterns and threats to habitat are causing 
species extinction levels estimated at several thousand times the natural extinction rate.c 
The (more) shocking thing is that all this is set to a backdrop of seemingly increased 
environmental awareness and concern on the part of individuals, and increased 
environmental policies and actions on the part of governments and business. Recycling 
programs are now ubiquitous, canvas shopping bags adorn every checkstand, hybrid and 
electric cars are becoming more prevalent, high-efficiency lighting and appliances are 
spreading. Meanwhile, governments increasingly set vehicle efficiency targets and regulate 
toxic wastes, and companies continually assert their commitments to sustainability. It is hard 
to imagine that many of us actively desire to harm nature—rather, many of us express an 
ardent desire to help the environment—yet we damage it further every day. 
Where have we gone wrong? 
We have gone wrong by focusing on programs. Things like recycling and cap and 
trade are programs; plastic bag bans are programs; national parks and wildlife refuges are 
programs. They are seatbelts on an airplane without wings at 30,000 feet—they feel like 
safety but do nothing to avoid inevitable disaster. Daniel Quinn wrote in Beyond Civilization 
that if humanity is saved, “it will not be by old minds with new programs but by new minds 
with no programs at all.” We don’t need seatbelts; we need a new airplane. If we find one 
that can fly, the programs will be superfluous. 
I have realized over the course of my PhD studies how true this is. I have learned 
troubling things, like that energy efficiency can increase impacts by encouraging increased 
usage, or that a canvas shopping bag must be used over 100 times before it has a lower per-
use impact than a plastic bag. I have contributed to other troubling discoveries, like that 
                                                 
a Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) (2014). Fifth Assessment Report 
b Sumner, T. (2014). No Stopping the Collapse of the West Antarctic Ice Sheet. Science vol. 344 p.683 
c Kolbert, E. (2014). The Sixth Extinction: An Unnatural History. New York: Henry Holt & Co. 
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ABSTRACT 
 
Net Green: The Impact of Corporate Social Responsibility 
on the Natural Environment and Employee Satisfaction 
 
by 
 
Trevor Brady Zink 
 
Human activities continue to degrade the natural environment in myriad ways, and at 
the heart of the problem is industrial activity—the extraction of resources, production, 
transportation, and use of goods, and the eventual disposal or recycling of materials. Yet, 
opportunities exist to engage industrial activity in creative, strategic ways that will actively 
improve the natural environment and help restore it to a state that can sustain human and 
nonhuman life into the future. This dissertation is intended to be a step toward that future by 
progressing our understanding in three separate but related topics in the context of corporate 
social responsibility (CSR). 
In the first chapter I reenvision what is meant by “green business.” Although the 
literature on business strategy and the environment frequently discusses whether, why, and 
when companies profit from “greenness,” surprisingly little has been said—and no consensus 
has been reached—on what businesses can do that counts as “green.” Despite the growing 
importance of environmental concerns to managers, stakeholders, and policy makers, the lack 
of a structured and practical definition of green business leaves well-intentioned 
xi 
 
 
entrepreneurs and corporate environmental managers without useful guidance on how best to 
make environmentally relevant business decisions. In this chapter, therefore, I propose a new 
definition for greenness, which states that it is the net balance of the environmental 
consequences caused by an activity that determines whether or not the activity is “net green.” 
To demonstrate the usefulness of the definition, I apply it to four case studies centered on 
pollution control and prevention activities, which seem prima facie green. Some of these 
activities turn out not to be net green after all; for others, the green intuition is correct, but 
with caveats. 
The core outcome of the first chapter is that one of the most important factors 
determining whether an activity results in net environmental improvement or damage centers 
on the concept of “displaced production.” The second chapter, therefore, analyzes the 
displaced production mechanism in the context of recycling and develops a methodology to 
estimate displacement rate. The typical assumption made in environmental assessments of 
product systems that include recycling is that secondary materials displace primary 
equivalents on a one-to-one basis. However, displaced production is a complex phenomenon 
governed by market mechanisms, and the one-to-one displacement assumption was 
heretofore untested. Chapter 2 advances the understanding of displacement by presenting a 
displacement rate estimation methodology based on partial equilibrium market modeling. 
First, I develop a basic market model that explains the underlying price mechanisms of 
displaced production and identifies key parameters affecting displacement rate. Results from 
the basic model suggest that one-to-one displacement occurs only under specific parameter 
restrictions that are unlikely in a competitive commodity market. Next, the modeling 
methodology is demonstrated by developing an econometric model of the U.S. aluminum 
xii 
 
 
industry. The aluminum market model corroborates the basic model and suggests that U.S. 
aluminum displacement rates are likely to be below 100%. 
The third chapter shifts focus from what a business can do to be sustainable to the 
more common question in environmental strategy: why a firm would want to be socially and 
environmentally sustainable. One explanation posited in the literature is that corporate social 
responsibility leads to higher employee satisfaction, which increases worker productivity and 
profitability. Yet, empirical evidence for the relationship between CSR and satisfaction is 
scarce. Using a novel dataset, I test this relationship for 3,121 U.S. firms from 1998 to 2012 
and find that a company’s performance in six out of seven CSR dimensions can explain 
whether it is rated by its employees as one of the best places to work in the country. I 
disaggregate the seven CSR dimensions into forty-four individual CSR measures, and from 
those identify ten measures that are most likely to affect employee satisfaction—six areas in 
which to improve (employee ownership plans, family benefits, gay and lesbian policies, 
charitable giving, conscientious labor rights, and product innovation) and four areas in which 
to reduce negative impacts (toxic emissions, workforce reductions, poor labor rights, and 
deceptive marketing). 
This dissertation contributes to the literature in industrial ecology and life cycle 
assessment by clarifying the displacement mechanism and suggesting improved ways to 
estimate displacement rate, as well as to the business strategy and the environment literature 
by crystallizing what is meant by “green business” and furthering our understanding of how 
CSR is likely to increase a firm’s economic success. 
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CHAPTER 1 
NET GREEN BUSINESS ACTIVITIES: 
A NEW DEFINITION OF GREENNESS WITH FOUR CASE STUDIES 
 
ABSTRACT 
A prominent question in environmental business strategy literature is whether it “pays 
to be green.” Much has been said on whether, why, and when it is profitable for firms to 
engage in “green” activities, but this scholarly debate has been stymied by the lack of a 
consensus definition of what counts as “green.” A similar lack of definitional clarity exists in 
the practical business world, leaving managers and entrepreneurs without guidance on how to 
create environmental companies. In an attempt to provide structure and guidance to 
environmental business scholarship and strategy, in this chapter I propose a rigorous 
definition for “greenness” rooted in industrial ecology and consequential thinking: A business 
activity is green if and only if it produces net environmental benefit. I discuss the theoretical 
underpinnings of net environmental impact, and then demonstrate the usefulness and insights 
of the new definition in four case studies—one for each of the four categories of pollution 
control and prevention activities. Although pollution control and prevention activities appear, 
at least on the surface, to be green, by applying the net green definition I demonstrate that no 
pollution prevention or control activities are guaranteed to produce net environmental 
benefit; indeed, some are all but guaranteed to increase impacts. Several common themes 
emerged from the case studies: that the displacement of harmful activities is the key to 
generating net environmental benefit, that determining what counterfactual alternative is 
displaced by an activity has potentially large bearing on the net green determination, that 
determining how much of an alternative activity is displaced is also important and difficult to 
determine, and that managers have some control over how their firms’ activities affect 
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markets and create or fail to create net environmental benefit. Implications for corporate 
managers, entrepreneurs, and researchers are discussed. The net green definition provides 
rigor and clarity to what counts as a green activity that will greatly assist researchers in 
industrial ecology and environmental business strategy, and will also provide guidance and a 
proactive goal for corporate environmental managers and environmental entrepreneurs. The 
methodology is demanding, but applying it allows us to ensure that efforts in environmental 
management are not mere lip service, but result in real, measurable improvements in the 
quality of the natural environment. The ultimate value of the new definition of greenness is 
not simply to enable the labeling of some things as green and others as not, but to create a 
fundamental shift in our thinking, moving from things that seem environmental to things that 
actually improve the environment. 
 
 
  
3 
1 INTRODUCTION 
Over the past twenty years, scholarly research has increasingly investigated how 
businesses interact with and impact the natural environment. This research has been 
conducted primarily within two distinct disciplines: industrial ecology and business strategy 
and the environment (BS&E). Industrial ecology stems from engineering and 
thermodynamics and seeks to describe the physical nature of environmental impacts from 
industrial activities by studying flows of materials to and from the natural environment as 
they pass through the industrial system (Ayers & Ayers, 2002). BS&E stems from economics 
and strategic management and seeks to understand why businesses might engage in 
environmental management, what the financial consequences of that engagement are, and 
how best to leverage corporate environmentalism as a source of competitive advantage (Kim 
& Lyon, 2011; Lyon & Shimshack, 2012; Reinhardt & Stavins, 2010). 
One prominent line of inquiry within BS&E literature is whether, when, how, and 
why there is a financial benefit for a firm’s environmental actions, which has become known 
as the “pays to be green” (PTBG) literature (Berchicci & King, 2007). The traditional view 
held that “the business of business is business”; that is, that any investment by firms to 
reduce negative environmental externalities stands in direct opposition to the managerial duty 
to maximize shareholder wealth (Friedman, 1970). Michael Porter and Claas van der Linde 
(1995) famously provided a competing perspective, later termed the “Porter hypothesis”: 
namely, that well-designed environmental regulation can spur innovation and allow 
opportunities for companies to leverage their environmental strengths as competitive 
advantage. Scholars began to realize that environmental performance could be a core 
competency of a firm that creates value for customers, shareholders, and external 
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stakeholders (Hart, 1995; Sharma & Henriques, 2005). Many authors later argued that 
environmental problems are the result of a variety of market failures, including unpriced 
externalities and asymmetric information (e.g., Reinhardt, 1999b), and as such provide 
opportunities for firms to offer profitable solutions and innovative products to capture value 
(Dean & McMullen, 2007). 
Gradually, the PTBG debate expanded from simply asking whether it pays to be 
green to examining when it pays to be green (King & Lenox, 2001a). Reinhardt (1999a) 
argued that firms can use the environment as a source of competitive advantage by 
differentiating environmental products, setting private standards that raise competitors’ costs, 
saving costs by reducing waste, reducing costly environmental risks such as spills, and 
opening new environmentally conscious markets, but that not all of these are viable all the 
time or for all companies. Ambec and Lanoie (2008) later synthesized the PTBG literature in 
terms of when and how it might pay to be green, outlining four opportunities to reduce costs 
and three opportunities to increase revenues by engaging in environmental activities. 
However, what has been absent from the BS&E literature is the question, what is 
meant by “green”? Much has been said on whether, why, and when to be green, but 
surprisingly little has been said—and no consensus has been reached—on what a firm can do 
that counts as green. Montiel and Delgado-Ceballos’s (2014) review of corporate 
sustainability yielded seventeen different definitions among scholarly and practitioner 
management journals. These seventeen definitions have little agreement among them, and 
there are yet others in the broader corporate social responsibility (CSR) literature (of which 
corporate environmentalism is a subset). Reinhardt and Stavins (2010), for instance, follow 
Elhauge (2005) in defining CSR as “sacrificing profits in the social interest.” This definition 
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was useful for their purpose, which focused on the legal and moral issues of companies 
sacrificing profits, but it says little about what an activity “in the social interest” truly is. A 
recent review of environmental entrepreneurship research (Lenox & York, 2011) suggests 
that the field has sidestepped the issue almost entirely, focusing on how and why 
environmental entrepreneurship has developed rather than what it aims to accomplish or 
whether or not it is (environmentally) successful. Dean and McMullen (2007) define 
environmental entrepreneurship only as “the process of defining, evaluating, and exploiting 
economic opportunities that are present in environmentally relevant market failures,” but say 
nothing about what is required for the activities of such entrepreneurs to be considered green. 
Lyon’s (2009) introduction to the special issue of the Journal of Economics and 
Management Strategy on management strategy and the environment conveys the idea that 
environmental strategy scholars are concerned with 1) how firms can best respond to 
pressures from environmental consumers, activists, and regulators, 2) how to effectively 
differentiate “environmental” products, and 3) how environmental pressures affect supply 
chain management. Berchicci and King (2007), in their review of BS&E literature, suggest 
that the two most important topics in the field are 1) whether firms can compete more 
successfully by protecting the environment, and 2) whether firms can create competition 
whereby protecting the environment leads to financial success. What is not discussed in 
either of these reviews is how managers, policy makers, and stakeholders can ensure that 
seemingly environmental choices do, in fact, “protect the environment.” 
Even when authors have examined specific examples of companies engaging in 
seemingly green activities, the question of whether an activity is truly environmentally 
beneficial is largely ignored. For example, Reinhardt (1999a) illustrated how firms may 
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profit from encouraging stricter environmental regulations by recounting how California oil 
refiners encouraged California legislators to require the use of methyl tertiary butyl ether 
(MTBE) as an additive to reduce smog. The point he made is that California refiners enjoyed 
a period of reduced competition from out-of-state firms once MTBE use was mandated. 
However, the more important question from an environmental standpoint is whether 
encouraging the use of MTBE is an environmentally responsible choice in the first place. 
Reinhardt conceded that MTBE offers a tradeoff in that it reduces air pollution but leaks into 
groundwater; what was missing was a discussion about whether or not the strategy by 
California refiners ended up being a green and profitable decision or merely a profitable one. 
Were the activities by California refiners green, or not green? In an example of cost savings, 
Reinhardt discussed the use of recycled packaging materials by hotel chains and the design-
for-environment practices of Xerox. In Reinhardt’s discussion, these activities are taken for 
granted to be environmentally beneficial; as we will see in this article, whether this is true is 
not straightforward. 
Such untested assumptions of greenness or vague definitions of what counts as a 
green activity are common in BS&E literature. Berrone et al. (2013) tested the effect of 
regulation on environmental innovation, measuring environmental innovation as the number 
of patents in areas of chemistry identified by the U.S. EPA Green Chemistry program; no 
attempt was made to determine whether these patents are, in fact, environmentally beneficial. 
Kim (2013) studied the effects of deregulation on firms’ greenness, measuring greenness 
using firm entrance into renewable energy generation. Other authors measure greenness 
using the Toxics Release Inventory (TRI) (e.g., Berrone & Gomez-Mejia, 2009; Kassinis & 
Vafeas, 2006; King & Lenox, 2001b), proprietary weighted single-score indicators such as 
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Trucost (e.g., Delmas & Nairn-Birch, 2011), third-party certifications such as USDA Organic 
(e.g., Delmas & Lessem, 2012), company disclosures and sustainability reports (e.g., Lyon & 
Shimshack, 2012), or simplistic assumptions about what seems intuitively “green” (e.g., 
York, 2008). 
Unfortunately, these measures are at best related to—but do not capture—the true 
environmental impact of a business activity. Some, such as corporate sustainability reports 
and patents, are very distant from actual environmental impacts, as they merely signal the 
firm’s intentions and self-assessment rather than physical flows of emissions. Others, such as 
TRI emissions, at least represent actual emissions, but only incorporate internal activities and 
ignore their products’ life cycle impacts. As we will return to later, scholars in industrial 
ecology have recognized for over two decades that the majority of a firm’s impacts come not 
from its internal activities but from the upstream supply chain and downstream use-phase 
impacts of its products (Finnveden et al., 2009). Management researchers, on the other hand, 
“have rarely looked beyond the boundaries of the firm when evaluating environmental 
performance” (Delmas & Nairn-Birch, 2011). Moreover, these measures are yardsticks 
without a benchmark, and therefore are unable to define the notion of greenness. What is a 
green level of TRI emissions? How many and what kind of third-party certifications must a 
firm obtain to be green? Such questions have not been adequately discussed, much less 
settled. 
Admittedly, the lack of a concrete concept of greenness can be attributed to the fact 
that determining what is green is not strictly within the purview of environmental strategy 
research. However, even if such discussions have been traditionally out of the scope of 
BS&E, the usefulness of research in BS&E to environmentally minded entrepreneurs and 
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sustainability managers is limited by the fact that the physical realities of corporate 
environmental impact—the stuff of industrial ecology—are not well understood or 
incorporated into strategy research. Consequently, definitions of what exactly constitutes 
green business are missing, misguided, or unusably vague. Rather than asking the primary 
question “what makes a firm’s actions environmental?” many authors in the green business 
literature have skipped a step and assumed there is an unambiguous set of ways that a 
business can act in sustainable manner—that sustainability vs. non-sustainability in business 
is clearly delineated and well known—and the only question left to the manager is whether 
and when to engage in sustainable activities. As I will demonstrate throughout the course of 
this article, this is not the case. All business activities, even those that seem intuitively green, 
can cause a variety of effects with concomitant environmental consequences. 
Therefore, a concise and meaningful definition of whether or not an industrial activity 
is green is needed so that managers and scholars can determine whether a proposed activity is 
actually environmentally beneficial. 
I thus propose a new definition for “greenness,” rooted in fundamental concepts of 
industrial ecology, and argue that it is the net balance of the environmental consequences 
caused by an activity that determines whether or not the activity is “net green.” This new 
definition provides rigor, clarity, and direction to both BS&E and industrial ecology. Armed 
with this definition, managers can assess a set of alternatives based not only on their financial 
outcomes, but also on whether they will cause net damage or net benefit to the environment; 
scholars can pursue the question of whether it pays to be green with a clear definition of what 
is meant by “green.” To demonstrate the usefulness of the definition, in this article I apply it 
to four different case studies focusing on industrial activities that, at least on the surface, 
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seem intuitively green. Some of these activities turn out not to be net green after all; for 
others the green intuition is correct, but with caveats. 
This article is organized as follows: In Section 2 I present and develop the new 
definition of greenness. In Section 3 I introduce the four types of pollution control and 
prevention (PCP) activities that serve as the basis for the four case studies in Sections 4–7. 
For each case study, I briefly explain the PCP activity before considering a representative 
case study that illustrates the key factors determining net environmental impact. In Section 8 
I draw together general conclusions, lessons for improving our understanding of greenness, 
and general principles to help maximize the net environmental benefit of business activities. 
2 NET GREEN 
Progress in research on corporate greenness has been mired and its applicability to 
managers limited by the lack of a principled definition of a green business activity. I 
therefore propose a new definition of a green business activity: 
A business activity is green if and only if it produces net environmental 
benefit. 
To more fully develop this definition, in this section I will discuss what is meant by 
environmental impact (and conversely, environmental benefit), the importance of life cycle 
thinking, how a business can actually create net environmental benefit, and a mathematical 
formulation of the definition. 
2.1 Environmental impact and life cycle thinking 
The condition of the environment at any given moment is the environmental status 
quo. Reductions from the status quo in the quality of the environment (broadly defined) 
represent environmental impacts or damage. Conversely, increases from the status quo in the 
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quality of the environment represent environmental benefit. Because the current 
environmental status quo is one of degradation from its natural (pre-industry) state due to 
ongoing environmental impacts, one way to produce environmental benefit is to reduce these 
ongoing impacts.4 
Environmental impacts arise from flows of physical materials to and from the natural 
environment at a faster rate than they are able to be regenerated or metabolized. All else 
equal, the higher the quantity or harmfulness of materials that flow to and from the 
environment, the more damage is done to the environment. Thus, when we consider the 
greenness of a business or business activity, we are concerned only with actual 
environmental impacts—physical material extraction and emission—and not “environmental 
policies” or “environmental practices” except to the extent that they cause or reduce physical 
environmental impacts. 
Nearly every conceivable business activity at some point causes the extraction of raw 
materials from the earth or the release of substances into the environment. At the very least, 
any activity that uses electricity or fuel energy relies on the extraction and combustion of 
coal and oil, even if the electricity used is directly supplied by renewables such as solar or 
wind. Even the most seemingly benign activities require materials and energy and cause 
emissions to the environment. 
At the heart of this realization is “life-cycle thinking,” or the idea that a company’s 
environmental impacts arise not only from internal activities, but from the upstream and 
                                                 
4 Environmental benefits and environmental impacts can be—but are not by definition—opposites. Reducing 
impacts is only one way to create environmental benefit. For instance, stopping deforestation is a reduction in 
impacts that creates environmental benefit. On the other hand, planting trees produces environmental benefit but 
does not reduce ongoing environmental impact. Industrial activity rarely, if ever, takes the form of pure 
environmental benefit (what business exists solely to plant trees?), so I focus in this article on impact reduction 
with the recognition that impact reduction activities are but a subset (yet, an important subset) of activities that 
produce environmental benefit. 
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downstream activities throughout the life cycle of its products. Many companies in the 
developed world have low-impact internal operations only because they have largely 
exported dirtier stages of the supply chain—material extraction and manufacturing—to 
developing economies (Jackson & Clift, 1998). Yet, these dirty activities in the developing 
world occur as a result of companies selling products in the developed world. Life cycle 
assessment (LCA), a tool of industrial ecology, is a process of quantifying environmental 
impacts of the entire life cycle of a product system. Consequential life cycle assessment 
(CLCA) is an extension of LCA that recognizes that changes in products and processes—or 
in businesses’ activities—can cause further changes that ripple throughout the global 
economy, meaning life cycles are effectively expanded to include environmental impacts 
from processes that occur as a result of the initial change (Earles & Halog, 2011). 
The core of the net green definition is rooted in CLCA thinking: The net 
environmental effect of a business activity is the sum of the impacts from all the changes that 
occur as a result of the initial activity, as they ripple outward through the economy. For 
instance, a corn ethanol company might increase demand for corn, which raises its price and 
induces farmers in Brazil to deforest more Amazon rain forest land. In this case, the net 
impact of the corn is equal to the direct impacts as well as the downstream effects, including 
the carbon released by the felled rain forest trees. Only by examining the entire consequential 
life cycle of an activity—the consequences of that activity as they ripple through cause-effect 
chains in the global economy—can we grasp a complete picture of its environmental impact. 
2.2 Environmental benefit through market competition: Netflix vs. Blockbuster 
Given the fact that business activities necessarily involve upstream and downstream 
processes that cause physical environmental damage, and that net impact includes the totality 
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of causally connected impacts, it may seem as though net green status under this definition is 
unattainable. How can a business activity possibly cause environmental benefit? The answer 
is that causally connected effects can be both environmentally harmful and environmentally 
beneficial. The creation of net benefit occurs when causally connected benefits outweigh 
causally connected impacts. 
As an example, consider the rise of online and on-demand video services, and the 
subsequent demise of Blockbuster Entertainment Inc. Blockbuster was a runaway success in 
the 1980s and 1990s, defining a new industry of video and game rental. Yet, with the rise of 
on-demand and Internet entertainment in the late 2000s, notably from Netflix Inc., cable and 
satellite providers, and video piracy, Blockbuster was unable to compete and in 2010 filed for 
bankruptcy before liquidating its last store in November of 2013. 
Blockbuster, by using brick-and-mortar retail stores and physical media for movies, 
had significant environmental impacts. Aside from the impacts associated with creating, 
maintaining, and powering more than 4,000 physical stores (at the company’s peak) and 
causing the production of countless millions of physical VHS cassettes, DVDs, and plastic 
cases, the Blockbuster model also required two individual automobile trips per rental (one to 
pick up and one to return). By contrast, on-demand videos and online entertainment require 
no travel by the consumer, although they do require Internet infrastructure and large amounts 
of energy to power datacenters (Chang, Meza, Ranganathan, Bash, & Shah, 2010). 
Some studies have attempted to quantify the tradeoff between physical stores, media, 
and automobile trips versus datacenter electricity and infrastructure; the emerging consensus 
is that digital delivery systems reduce primary energy demand and carbon dioxide emissions 
as compared to physical delivery systems (Weber et al., 2008; Weber, Koomey, & Matthews, 
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2010). A recent study has confirmed that media streaming creates lower GHG than DVD 
delivery (Shehabi, Walker, & Masanet, 2014). This means that the closure of Blockbuster 
reduced net environmental damage, and this represents a case where a company, Netflix, was 
able to create net environmental benefit through Schumpeterian creative destruction 
(Schumpeter, 1976) by competing with and eliminating a business that had higher impacts 
than its own. 
2.3 Net environmental impact and benefit 
The key to achieving net environmental benefit rests in the ability of one activity to 
reduce the activity level of other activities. That is, even though every business activity 
inevitably causes environmental damage, there are some activities that might also prevent, or 
“displace,” even greater environmental damage by reducing the activity level of more 
harmful activities. The sum, or net, of all the environmental impacts caused or displaced by 
an activity is its net impact or benefit. Only those that result in net environmental benefit can 
be considered net green.5 
To introduce more formality to the concept of net impact, we can think of a business 
activity (ܣଵ) as having two environmentally relevant components. The first component is the 
direct environmental impacts of the activity (ܧଵ), which are a function of the activity: 
ܧଵ ൌ ܧଵሺܣଵሻ. Second, we can think of the business activity as being part of a chain of cause 
and effect, such that every business activity has consequences that ripple throughout its 
economic environment and influence the activity levels of other activities (ܣଶ, ܣଷ, …). For 
instance, the activities of Netflix had impacts on the activities of Blockbuster (namely, to 
                                                 
5 Net greenness is always attainable provided there is some ongoing environmental impact that can be reduced 
or eliminated. If society were to achieve an environmental state that matched the pre-industrial state, net green 
would become unattainable because all activities would result in net impact rather than benefit. However, if we 
reach such a state then this distinction will, fortunately, be irrelevant. 
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point that allows for the possibility of net environmental benefit and the realization of the net 
green definition. If an activity avoids more impacts than it creates, it reduces net impact. 
Specifically, the net impact of activity ܣଵ is the sum of the direct impacts ܧଵ and the 
higher-order impacts ܧ௜: 
 
ܧ௡௘௧ሺܣଵሻ ൌ෍ܧ௜
௡
௜ୀଵ
 (2.1)
where ܧ௜ ൌ ܧ௜ሺܣ௜ሻ. 
Under the net green definition presented above, business activity ܣଵ is green if and 
only if ܧ௡௘௧ሺܣଵሻ ൏ 0, which is possible because connected higher-order ܣ௜ can be negative. 
2.4 Impact category tradeoffs 
Thus far I have referred to “environmental impacts” as though all impacts are 
identical. Of course this is not the case. Environmental impacts can be classified into impact 
categories according to the type of environmental concern they represent: global warming 
impacts, water acidification impacts, human and ecotoxicity impacts, and so forth. An 
important theme throughout this paper will be that these impact categories occasionally 
conflict: An activity that reduces global warming impacts, for example, may increase toxicity 
impacts. How to handle these impact category tradeoffs remains a significant challenge for 
environmental assessment in general (Ayers & Ayers, 2002). Single-score weighting, multi-
criteria decision analysis, and other methods have been proposed to assist in decision making 
in the face of tradeoffs (Seppälä, Basson, & Norris, 2001; Seppälä & Hämäläinen, 2001; 
Tuomisto, Hodge, Riordan, & Macdonald, 2012). However, it remains unequivocal that there 
is no scientifically objective way to compare impacts across different categories. The net 
green definition, therefore, cannot provide a solution to the problem of impact tradeoffs. 
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Nonetheless, two points are worth making regarding tradeoffs and their relevance to 
the net green definition. First, there are many instances in which tradeoffs exist but are less 
important because one impact category is clearly the impact of interest. For instance, 
environmental assessments of energy or transportation systems predominantly focus on 
greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions since global warming is the most prominent environmental 
impact of these systems; environmental assessments of agriculture tend to focus on 
eutrophication and water toxicity from runoff, since these are topics central to current debates 
about organic, traditional, and genetically modified farming; assessments of consumer 
products tend to focus on human toxicity and carcinogens, since these are topics that most 
concern consumers. 
Second, tradeoffs are not inevitable. There are countless examples of activities in a 
wide range of industries that do not create impact category tradeoffs. It has been shown, for 
example, that light-emitting diode (LED) lightbulbs have lower life cycle impacts than 
incandescent lightbulbs in every impact category (except toxic landfill impacts, which are of 
questionable importance) (Scholand & Dillon, 2012); electric hand driers have lower impacts 
in all categories than paper towels (Montalbo, Gregory, & Kirchain, 2011); underground 
power distribution networks have higher impacts in all categories than overhead systems 
(Bumby et al., 2010). The fact that such cases exist suggests that the most effective 
environmental activities are those that are able to reduce impacts in the category of interest 
without tradeoffs. It may be that the presence of significant impact tradeoffs is an indication 
of a suboptimal environmental option; if focus-area impacts can only be reduced with higher 
impacts in other categories, perhaps another option exists that can avoid the tradeoff. This 
also suggests that the focus of environmental research should not be on interpreting or 
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making decisions in the presence of tradeoffs, but rather on finding other solutions that avoid 
them entirely. One conclusion from this paper will be that some types of activities are more 
likely than others to avoid tradeoffs.  
3 POLLUTION CONTROL AND PREVENTION ACTIVITIES 
If one were to look for a set of industrial activities that would be commonly 
accepted—at least on the surface—to be green, one could do worse than to turn to the broad 
umbrella called “pollution control and prevention” (PCP) activities. These activities have 
arisen over the past century in response to increasing evidence of the impact humans have on 
the environment. From smokestack filters to complex material cycling networks, hundreds of 
different business activities that are meant to protect the environment can be classified as 
PCP activities. Under the Pollution Prevention Act, the U.S. EPA definition of pollution 
prevention activities includes “equipment or technology modifications, process or procedure 
modifications, reformulation or redesign of products, substitution of raw materials, and 
improvements in housekeeping, maintenance, training, or inventory control” (42 U.S.C. 
§13101 et seq., 1990). This list, together with traditional pollution controls, can be distilled 
into four categories (Jackson, 1996): 
1. End-of-pipe pollution control 
2. Reuse and recycling 
3. Material or technology substitution 
4. Dematerialization 
Activities that fall into these four groups undeniably have the ring of greenness. 
However, simply because an activity can be classified into one of the four PCP groups does 
not mean that it necessarily produces net environmental benefit, and therefore—by the new 
definition of net greenness—it is not necessarily truly green. To demonstrate the new net 
green definition and to illustrate how activities that seem to be green may or may not create 
18 
environmental benefit, I examine each of the four types of PCP activities through the lens of 
the net green definition. 
In each case study, I first describe what is meant by the PCP category. I then 
introduce the relevant background details about the subject activity, and identify the key 
environmental forces that potentially decrease environmental impact and those that 
potentially increase environmental impact. The question in each case will then become to 
determine which of these forces is the strongest, or to what degree they necessarily result in 
tradeoffs (between different types of impacts, for instance). I identify the most important 
research questions one would need to answer to know how these forces are likely to manifest, 
and then I briefly outline the state of knowledge on the questions. To the extent that it is 
feasible within the scope of the article, I provide research methodologies and, where possible, 
answers to these key questions. 
The objective of these case studies is not to conclusively determine whether any of 
the activities described are “net green”; such an endeavor would require deeper research into 
each subject. Rather, the objective is threefold: firstly, to demonstrate the usefulness and 
applicability of the new definition of net green; namely, that if one is interested in assessing 
the true greenness of an activity, the net green definition requires that one follow cause-effect 
chains and consider environmental impacts that arise throughout. This ensures that all 
possible environmental consequences of an activity are accounted for. Second, to highlight 
that even though all of these PCP activities may seem green, some of them are likely to result 
in net environmental benefit while others are not. In many cases, there are inherent tradeoffs 
that make determining the net greenness of an activity difficult or subjective. This finding 
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will further demonstrate that the new definition gives us useful insight into best practices for 
corporate environmental management. 
4 POLLUTION CONTROLS 
Traditionally, one of the simplest environmental business activities has been to install 
end-of-pipe pollution control technologies such as scrubbers, filters, or purification plants. 
These technologies are installed at the physical end of a chain of industrial processes, for 
instance on smokestacks and effluent outlets, in order to reduce impacts from emissions.6 
Pollution controls can range in complexity from simple mesh or cloth filters, to chemical 
catalyst scrubbers, to using constructed wetlands to filter effluent and return clean water to 
aquifers. 
Pollution controls can be mildly or extremely effective at reducing impacts and have 
largely solved some past environmental impact priorities, such as reducing acid rain by using 
coal power plant sulphur oxides (SOx) filters. However, producing and running these end-of-
pipe pollution controls requires energy and material inputs which cause environmental 
impacts. Additionally, captured wastes can still present a disposal problem. For instance, a 
chemical plant that captures end-of-pipe effluent can effectively divert pollutants away from 
rivers, but collected effluent must be treated and stored, which requires energy and could 
potentially leak to groundwater. Sometimes collected waste can be reused as an industrial 
input, as in the case of calcium sulfite SOx scrubbing, which creates gypsum used for 
drywall. In other cases, the waste is hazardous and must be carefully stored. 
                                                 
6 Pollution controls are sometimes said to “reduce emissions.” In reality, conservation of mass dictates that 
emissions are not reduced in mass. Rather, they are transformed to a different, less harmful state. Therefore, 
more precisely, pollution controls transform emissions and thereby reduce impacts from emissions, not 
emissions themselves. 
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The potential for pollution controls to create net environmental benefit is that the 
avoided impacts from the sequestered emissions may be greater than the incurred impacts of 
producing and running the controls and disposing of by-products. As we will see in the 
following case study, it is not straightforward that this will always be the case. 
4.1 Case study: Coal-fired electricity with carbon capture and storage 
4.1.1 Background 
In 2012, U.S. electricity generation was responsible for about 2 Gt of carbon dioxide 
(CO2) emissions, or roughly 39% of total U.S. energy sector emissions, with coal-fired power 
plants contributing 37% of total electricity generation (U.S. Energy Information 
Administration, 2014a). The most recent U.S. Energy Information Administration (EIA) 
projections predict that coal will continue to supply roughly 32% of U.S. electricity through 
the year 2040. However, coal produces the highest CO2 emissions of any current electricity 
generation source, emitting 94.6 g CO2/MJ electricity, as compared to 77.4 g CO2/MJ for 
residual fuel oil or 56.1 g CO2/MJ for natural gas (Intergovernmental Panel on Climate 
Change, 1997).7 
Combustion of coal is therefore a major contributor of CO2 emissions and radiative 
forcing that leads to global warming (Metz, Davidson, Coninck, Loos, & Meyer, 2005). In 
response to mounting pressures to reduce CO2 emissions, technologies have been proposed 
and prototyped to capture and store carbon emissions from coal and other major combustion 
sources such as cement plants, a process known as carbon capture and storage (CCS)—
sometimes referred to as “clean coal.” The basic idea of CCS is to capture the carbon 
emissions from fossil fuel—primarily coal—combustion and store the carbon underground 
                                                 
7 These figures are emissions factors from combustion only based on net calorific value; they do not account for 
life cycle emissions such as extraction, processing, and transportation. 
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industrial scale, but there are currently three emergent carbon capture technology types: post-
combustion, pre-combustion, and oxy-fuel capture systems. 
Post-combustion technologies are most common, and operate using either absorption 
of CO2 into a solvent, adsorption onto a solid surface, gas separation membranes, or 
cryogenic distillation (for a review of these technologies, see J. C. M. Pires, Martins, Alvim-
Ferraz, & Simões, 2011). Post-combustion systems generally require large amounts of energy 
either for changing pressure, temperature, or for solvent regeneration. Additionally, solvent 
regeneration can create toxic by-products, and expired solvents present a disposal concern 
(Haszeldine, 2009). However, post-combustion technologies are most common because they 
have the advantage that they can be retrofit onto existing coal power plants. I will confine 
this discussion to post-combustion technologies both because they are most likely to be 
developed in coming years, and because they represent true end-of-pipe emission controls, 
which are the subject of this section. 
Carbon dioxide transport is a mature technology in that similar processes are 
currently used to transport a variety of gases, and transport of CO2 by pipeline occurs 
currently as part of enhanced oil recovery (Metz et al., 2005). To transport by pipeline, ship, 
or tanker truck, CO2 is purified, dewatered, and compressed to a supercritical state (80–150 
bar), requiring between 90 and 120 kWh/tonne CO2 (Aspelund & Jordal, 2007). 
Carbon dioxide can be stored in several ways: geological formations, ocean storage 
by injection dissolving or ocean-floor deposition, mineralization into carbonates, and, in 
small quantities, utilization as an industrial input (Metz et al., 2005; J. C. M. Pires et al., 
2011). Mineralization involves catalyzing a reaction of CO2 with metal oxides for permanent 
storage. However, this process is highly energy intensive and also problematic, because it 
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requires intense surface mining for silicate rock and still presents a disposal challenge for the 
carbonate minerals. Ocean storage can either be performed by injecting gaseous or liquid 
CO2 into shallow oceans, where it will dissolve and enter the global carbon cycle, or by 
injecting liquid CO2 below depths of 3 km, where it will be denser than water and will sink to 
form “lakes” on the ocean floor. These lakes are thought to delay the dissolution of the CO2 
into the surrounding water, although only laboratory-scale tests have been conducted (J. C. 
M. Pires et al., 2011). Both of these methods have potential problems, because increased 
levels of CO2 in ocean water increase water acidity causing death to marine life forms and 
potential damage to marine ecosystems, and because the storage is not permanent but will 
slowly reach equilibrium with atmospheric CO2 concentration (Herzog, Caldeira, & Adams, 
2001). Industrial uses of CO2 are expected to be small and, because of the high energy costs 
of obtaining the CO2, do not necessarily reduce net carbon emissions (Metz et al., 2005). 
Geological storage is considered the most economically and environmentally viable 
option and can take place in depleted oil and gas reservoirs, saline aquifers, unusable coal 
seams, and as the primary input to enhanced oil recovery (EOR) (J. C. M. Pires et al., 2011). 
Geological storage is performed by compressing CO2 and pumping it to a depth of at least 
800–1,000 m, where atmospheric pressure retains it in a supercritical state (Celia & 
Nordbotten, 2009; Gibbins & Chalmers, 2008). 
The obvious risks associated with geological storage (without EOR) are those of 
leakage, both above ground and to groundwater. Carbon dioxide is dangerous to humans at 
concentrations greater than 0.5–1.5% by volume of air, and lethal in concentrations greater 
than 7–10% (Metz et al., 2005; J. C. M. Pires et al., 2011). Carbon dioxide is heavier than air 
at sea level, so any leaks from geological storage will flow downhill and remain in valleys. In 
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a tragic example of these risks, in Cameroon in 1984 a large quantity of CO2 trapped at the 
bottom of Lake Nyos was rapidly released. The gas flowed down into nearby populated areas 
and killed 1,700 people (Kling et al., 1987). 
Rapid leakage is most likely to occur through failed wells and would present serious 
health risks to any surrounding human, plant, or animal populations. Slower leaks through 
undetected faults or fractures pose a risk of elevated CO2 levels in subsoil, which may be 
lethal to subterranean animals and plants, and may also contaminate groundwater (J. C. M. 
Pires et al., 2011). It has also been recognized that due to the structure of geological 
formations, small-scale leaks may combine to form larger releases (Celia & Nordbotten, 
2009). Any CO2 leaked from storage will reenter the atmosphere, decreasing the overall 
effectiveness of CCS. Additionally, it has been suggested that pressure buildup of stored CO2 
could trigger seismic events (Metz et al., 2005; J. C. M. Pires et al., 2011; Zoback & 
Gorelick, 2012). 
Using captured CO2 in EOR has potential benefits and risks of its own. EOR is a 
practice that increases recovery of oil and gas from depleted or highly viscous wells by 
pumping fluids into neighboring wells. The injected “drive liquid” loosens and mixes with 
the oil or gas, reducing viscosity and surface tension and allowing it to be pumped through an 
adjacent well. Since the 1970s, oil companies have used CO2 and water as a drive liquid in 
EOR (Klara, 2004). Traditionally, CO2 used in EOR has come from natural sources; recently, 
however, the possibility of using EOR in connection with carbon storage has been proposed. 
The process of EOR would remain unchanged except that the CO2 would come from carbon 
capture plants as discussed above. 
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The primary risks of EOR using CO2 are common to any EOR process: During the 
injection/recovery process, large quantities of brine are brought to the surface. Called 
“flowback” or “produced water,” this brine often contains toxic metals, radioactive 
substances, and very high concentrations of salt (U.S. Environmental Protection Agency, 
2012). These substances make disposal of produced water environmentally sensitive, and 
disposal is regulated by the U.S EPA. Typically, produced water is injected into Class II 
wells; however, in some areas these wells are not available or there are too few, so produced 
water is impounded at the surface (Vidic, Brantley, Vandenbossche, Yoxtheimer, & Abad, 
2013). Class II wells are regulated in their construction, operation, monitoring, testing, 
reporting, and closure, and are intended to keep disposed materials from reaching drinking 
water aquifers. However, there are a non-trivial number of recorded cases of groundwater 
contamination from injection wells (Vidic et al., 2013), and it has been shown that certain 
characteristics of injection wells (such as the net balance in injected and withdrawn liquid) 
can cause them to induce seismic events. CCS in particular has been singled out as a 
particular concern for creating large seismic events because of the large volumes of injected 
fluids (Hitzman, 2013). 
4.1.2 Key environmental factors and key questions 
Previous authors have detailed the numerous technical, economic, and political 
difficulties facing the large-scale commercial viability of CCS (e.g., Haszeldine, 2009; 
Kirchsteiger, 2008). Some have claimed that CCS is a set of false promises that alleviates 
political pressure on coal energy generators while actually achieving no change (Rochon et 
al., 2012). It has also been pointed out that the current rate of CCS development will push the 
actual deployment of CCS well beyond the 2020 carbon reduction requirements to limit 
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climate change to a 2°C rise (Haszeldine, 2009). This has led some authors (e.g., Haszeldine, 
2009; Mack & Endemann, 2010) to push for streamlined regulations, institutionalized 
development of infrastructure, and more efficient carbon markets to incentivize the 
development of CCS. In response, the U.S. Department of Energy has actively encouraged 
research into improved carbon storage programs, particularly in connection with EOR (U.S. 
Department of Energy, 2013a). 
However, according to the net green definition, before we begin to address the 
roadblocks to CCS or incentivize its development with public money, we must first 
determine if CCS is in fact likely to reduce net environmental damage; before we ask “Is 
CCS a viable technology?” we must ask “Is CCS a net green technology?” If it is net green, 
we should work to hasten the commercial rollout of CCS; if it is not net green, we should 
abandon the endeavor. 
The preceding discussion highlighted key aspects of CCS that determine its 
environmental impact, summarized in Table 1.1. The table shows that the environmental 
impact of CCS rests on several factors: the net balance between incurred and captured 
emissions (including storage leakage), the extent to which stored CO2 (whether through 
dissolution into seawater or leaks from geological storage) may present health risks for 
humans and ecosystems, and the economic consequences of increased CCS on the 
persistence of coal-fired energy and on the development and deployment of renewable 
energy technologies. 
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 Potential environmental benefit Potential environmental damage 
1. CCS may capture and store CO2 emissions that 
would otherwise be released to the atmosphere. 
The capture, transport, and storage of CO2 requires 
energy that creates emissions of its own, which may be 
greater or less than the emissions reduced by CCS. 
2. Geologically stored CO2 may safely remain in 
storage for thousands or millions of years. 
Stored CO2 may leak through inactive wells and faults 
or due to seismic activity, negating the effects of 
capture; additionally, leaks may poison terrestrial plants 
and animals, contaminate groundwater, and in large-
scale leaks, may be toxic to humans. 
3. CO2 stored in oceans may safely remain out of 
the atmosphere for thousands of years. 
CO2 stored in oceans may equilibrate with atmospheric 
levels negating the effects of capture; additionally, it 
may increase acidity, causing mortality among aquatic 
organisms and damage to ecosystems. 
4. CCS may provide cleaner base-load energy that 
enables the transition to renewable energy 
technologies. 
CCS may shift economic incentives from development 
and deployment of renewable energy technologies to 
that of coal-fired energy using CCS. 
Table 1.1: Key factors determining the environmental impact of carbon capture and storage 
We can organize these key factors into three main focus questions: 
1) Does CCS increase or decrease net CO2 emissions? 
2) Does CCS lead to tradeoffs in other impact categories? 
3) How does CCS affect the future role of renewable energies by changing the socio-
economic-political landscape? 
Next, we will address each of these questions in turn: 
1) Does CCS increase or decrease net CO2 emissions? 
a. What are the CO2 emissions of producing CCS equipment and infrastructure? 
b. How are direct power plant CO2 emissions affected by CCS? 
c. How are upstream fuel delivery emissions affected by CCS? 
 
CCS requires capture equipment, extensive pipelines, and storage equipment such as 
drilling rigs and tanker ships. Manufacturing this equipment requires energy, which will be 
supplied by the marginal energy mix of the geographic region where the equipment is built, 
and will produce CO2 emissions according to the type of generation technology and fuel 
used. Therefore, even before a CCS plant is operational it faces a significant “carbon debt,” 
the amount of additional carbon emissions created simply to bring the CCS equipment on-
line. Because the extent and type of infrastructure required as well as the marginal generation 
technology and fuel are situation-specific, it is not possible to know how large the carbon 
debt will be in general. 
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Figure 1.3: Schematic showing how direct and upstream CO2 emissions differ between a 
CCS and reference plant 
CCS also changes a power plant’s direct CO2 emissions per unit output, known as the 
emission factor (Figure 1.3). CO2 capture equipment reduces emissions to air as a function of 
capture efficiency. Capture efficiency (ߟ௖௔௣) is the ratio of per-unit-output CO2 generated to 
per-unit-output CO2 captured. Generated CO2 is equivalent to CO2 emission factor of the 
reference plant (ܧ௥௘௙ௗ௜௥௘௖௧): 
 ߟ௖௔௣ ൌ
ܥܱଶ௖௔௣
ܥܱଶ௚௘௡
ൌ ܥܱଶ௖௔௣ܧ௥௘௙ௗ௜௥௘௖௧
 (4.1)
However, it is not the case that CO2 emissions from a CCS plant will be lower than 
those of a reference plant by the amount of the capture efficiency. Rather, the actual 
reduction will be lower because operating capture equipment requires energy, which is 
provided by the output from the plant itself. The energy that is used to power capture 
equipment rather than produce electricity is known as parasitic loss (ܺ) and can be expressed 
as one minus the ratio of energy output to energy production: 
 ܺ ൌ 1 െ ܯܬ௢௨௧௣௨௧ܯܬ௣௥௢ௗ௨௖௘ௗ  (4.2)
In order for the CCS plant to overcome the parasitic loss and achieve equivalent 
output to the reference plant, total production must be scaled up by the inverse of one minus 
29 
the parasitic loss (ሺ1/ሺ1 െ ܺሻ). For instance, in Figure 1.3, parasitic loss is 30%, so total 
energy production must be increased to (1/0.7) = 1.43 MJ in order to maintain 1 MJ 
electricity output. Scaling up total production also increases the total CO2 generated, so that 
the direct CO2 emissions per unit output for the CCS plant are equal to CO2 emissions of the 
reference plant scaled by the ratio one minus capture efficiency to one minus parasitic loss: 
 ܧ஼஼ௌௗ௜௥௘௖௧ ൌ ܧ௥௘௙ௗ௜௥௘௖௧ ൬
1 െ ߟ௖௔௣
1 െ ܺ ൰ (4.3)
Because parasitic loss requires plant production to be scaled up, the input fuel 
production must also be scaled up by 1/ሺ1 െ ܺሻ. In Figure 1.3, input coal must be increased 
from 2.5 MJ to 2.5 ൈ (1/0.7) = 3.57 MJ. Extracting, processing, and transporting this 
additional fuel requires energy and resources that create increased CO2 emissions 
(ܧ௨௣௦௧௥௘௔௠). The upstream emissions factor for the CCS plant is increased over the upstream 
emission factor for the reference plant by the inverse of one minus parasitic loss: 
 ܧ஼஼ௌ௨௣௦௧௥௘௔௠ ൌ ܧ௥௘௙௨௣௦௧௥௘௔௠ ൬
1
1 െ ܺ൰ 
 
(4.4)
Thus the total CO2 emission factor of the CCS plant is given by combining eqs. 4.3 
and 4.4: 
 ܧ஼஼ௌ௧௢௧௔௟ ൌ ܧ஼஼ௌௗ௜௥௘௖௧ ൅ ܧ஼஼ௌ௨௣௦௧௥௘௔௠
ܧ஼஼ௌ௧௢௧௔௟ ൌ ܧ௥௘௙ௗ௜௥௘௖௧ ൬
1 െ ߟ௖௔௣
1 െ ܺ ൰ ൅ ܧ௥௘௙
௨௣௦௧௥௘௔௠ ൬ 11 െ ܺ൰	
ܧ஼஼ௌ௧௢௧௔௟ ൌ
ܧ௥௘௙ௗ௜௥௘௖௧൫1 െ ߟ௖௔௣൯ ൅ ܧ௥௘௙௨௣௦௧௥௘௔௠
1 െ ܺ  
 
 
 
 
(4.5)
To arrive at the true total additional emissions caused by CCS, one would add these 
increased emissions from parasitic loss to the emissions from infrastructure creation. 
However, because CCS infrastructure is a one-time activity and parasitic losses are in terms 
of unit output, they are not convenient to sum. In order to do so, one would divide the 
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infrastructure creation emissions by an assumed lifetime plant output. For simplicity I will 
limit this discussion to only per-unit-output emissions. Thus, we can calculate the change in 
emissions due to CCS by subtracting the total CCS plant emission factor from the total 
reference plant emission factor: 
 ܧ஼஼ௌ௡௘௧ ൌ ܧ஼஼ௌ௧௢௧௔௟ െ ܧ௥௘௙௧௢௧௔௟	
ܧ஼஼ௌ௡௘௧ ൌ ൭ܧ௥௘௙ௗ௜௥௘௖௧ ൬
1 െ ߟ௖௔௣
1 െ ܺ ൰ ൅ ܧ௥௘௙
௨௣௦௧௥௘௔௠ ൬ 11 െ ܺ൰൱ െ ൫ܧ௥௘௙
ௗ௜௥௘௖௧ ൅ ܧ௥௘௙௨௣௦௧௥௘௔௠൯	
ܧ஼஼ௌ௡௘௧ ൌ
ܧ௥௘௙ௗ௜௥௘௖௧൫ܺ െ ߟ௖௔௣൯ ൅ ܺܧ௥௘௙௨௣௦௧௥௘௔௠
1 െ ܺ  
 
 
 
 
(4.6) 
If ܧ஼஼ௌ௡௘௧ ൏ 0, net CO2 emissions from CCS are reduced as compared to a reference 
plant. From eq. 4.6, we can see that the net balance of CO2 emissions from CCS relies on 
only three factors: capture efficiency, parasitic loss, and the relative sizes of direct and 
upstream emissions. For example, Rubin et al. (2005) calculated that a pulverized coal plant 
with CCS has parasitic loss of 27% and capture efficiency of 90%. From the Ecoinvent 2.2 
life cycle inventory database (Ecoinvent Centre, 2012), direct CO2 emissions from burning 
coal in a power plant in the Western Electricity Coordinating Council (WECC) region of the 
U.S. are 97 g/MJ electricity output, whereas upstream fuel supply emissions are 5.43 g/MJ. 
This means a CCS plant such as the one described by Rubin et al. (2005) would result in net 
CO2 emissions of: 
 ܧ஼஼ௌ௡௘௧ ൌ 97
ሺ0.27 െ 0.9ሻ ൅ 0.27 ൈ 5.43
1 െ 0.27
ܧ஼஼ௌ௡௘௧ ൌ െ81.7 g COଶ/MJ, 
 
 
 
(4.7) 
or an 80% reduction in CO2 emissions per MJ electricity. 
It turns out that this result is typical of CCS plants. Zapp et al. (2012) conducted a 
review of thirteen life cycle assessments (LCAs) of coal power using post-combustion CCS. 
Since this review, Volkart, Bauer, and Boulet (2013) completed an additional LCA of energy 
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generation from hard coal with and without CCS. There is a high degree of agreement among 
the fourteen studies that CCS can reduce life cycle CO2 emissions by roughly 65–90%. The 
largest area of variation between LCA studies of CCS is assumed fuel composition and 
origin, which can significantly affect upstream impacts (Zapp et al., 2012). 
Aside from fuel composition and origin, the second most important variable to the 
overall effectiveness of CCS is capture efficiency. Using eq. 4.6, and again assuming the 
above parasitic loss value from Rubin et al. (2005) and emission factors from Ecoinvent, a 
decrease in capture efficiency from 90% to 80% increases net CO2 emissions by 13.3 g/MJ, 
or 16% (see Figure 1.4). 
 
Figure 1.4: Sensitivity of net CO2 emissions to capture efficiency showing break-even 
capture efficiency and linear slope 
Considering the importance of capture efficiency, it is somewhat surprising that the 
LCA literature has paid little attention to leakage from storage. Even though leakage from 
storage does not happen at the time and site of energy generation, it nevertheless has the 
effect of reducing net capture efficiency; leaked CO2 lowers the numerator in eq. 4.1 and thus 
lowers capture efficiency (Koornneef, van Keulen, Faaij, & Turkenburg, 2008). Previous 
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authors have recognized that before proceeding with a large-scale carbon storage project a 
risk assessment should be completed, centering on the risk of leakage (Celia & Nordbotten, 
2009). Yet, only two of the studies reviewed by Zapp et al. (2012) consider leakage from 
long-term storage (Khoo & Tan, 2006; Viebahn, Nitsch, & Fischedick, 2007); the rest of the 
studies overstate net capture efficiency to the extent that leakage may occur. Khoo & Tan 
(2006) assume 5% leakage over a 500-year time span, which (using the values from Figure 
1.4) would increase net CO2 emissions by ~8%. But they also acknowledge that ocean 
storage is likely to exhibit leakage of roughly 20% over 300–1,000 years (Herzog et al., 
2001), which would increase net CO2 emissions by ~32% relative to a scenario without 
leakage. 
In the case of geological storage, it is thought that good site selection for qualities 
such as sufficient permeability of the injection medium, an impermeable “caprock” to seal 
the CO2, and high enough fracture pressure, along with continuous monitoring, can mitigate 
these risks. However, many decades of oil exploration and drilling mean that many otherwise 
suitable caprocks have been compromised, and the risks of improperly sealed wells are 
considerable (Celia & Nordbotten, 2009). Wilson and Monea (2004) estimate that 0.005–
1.3% of stored CO2 will likely leak over 5,000 years, but this estimate depends on many 
geologic factors; another risk assessment suggests that in the unlikely event of a well leak, 
60% of stored CO2 could be emitted to the atmosphere (Kreft et al., 2007). Given the range 
of realistic on-site CO2 capture efficiencies (i.e., without counting potential leakage) of 65–
90% (Zapp et al., 2012), a leak of the magnitude suggested by Kreft et al. could reduce net 
CO2 capture nearly to zero (Koornneef et al., 2008). 
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One way to assess the importance of leakage is to calculate break-even capture 
efficiency (ߟ௖௔௣஻.ா.) by setting ܧ஼஼ௌ௡௘௧ ൌ 0 and solving for ߟ௖௔௣: 
 
ܧ஼஼ௌ௡௘௧ ൌ
ܧ௥௘௙ௗ௜௥௘௖௧൫ܺ െ ߟ௖௔௣൯ ൅ ܺܧ௥௘௙௨௣௦௧௥௘௔௠
1 െ ܺ ൌ 0
ܧ௥௘௙ௗ௜௥௘௖௧൫ܺ െ ߟ௖௔௣൯ ൌ െܺܧ௥௘௙௨௣௦௧௥௘௔௠ 
ߟ௖௔௣஻.ா. ൌ ܺ ൭1 ൅
ܧ௥௘௙௨௣௦௧௥௘௔௠
ܧ௥௘௙ௗ௜௥௘௖௧
൱ 
 
 
 
 
(4.8)
The higher the ratio of upstream to direct impacts and the higher the parasitic loss, the 
higher capture efficiency will need to be to break even. Again using the above parasitic loss 
value from Rubin et al. (2005) and emission factors from Ecoinvent, we arrive at: 
 ߟ௖௔௣஻.ா. ൌ 0.27 ൬1 ൅ 5.4397 ൰ ൌ 0.285 (4.9)
This means for the assumed fuel and CCS efficiency penalty, net capture efficiency 
must be greater than 29% in order for CCS to reduce net CO2 emissions, as depicted in 
Figure 1.4. CCS LCAs typically agree that capture efficiency is expected to be around 90%, 
not counting leakage (Zapp et al., 2012), meaning that leakage would only lead to net 
increased CO2 emissions if it were over 61%. Some risk assessment studies on CCS suggest 
that leakage of this magnitude is unlikely (Celia & Nordbotten, 2009; Gasda, Bachu, & Celia, 
2004; Kreft et al., 2007; Wilson & Monea, 2004). However, low-probability, large-scale 
leaks could result in significant global warming impacts as well as potentially catastrophic 
human casualties (a point to which we shall return). This, in combination with the fact that 
injecting CO2 into geological storage sites can cause seismic instability (Metz et al., 2005), 
has caused some scholars to caution that CCS is an “extremely risky strategy for achieving 
significant reductions in greenhouse gas emissions” (Zoback & Gorelick, 2012, p. 10167). 
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Nonetheless, taken as a whole, the preceding evidence allows us to answer key 
environmental question #1: Assuming common efficiencies and reasonable leakage rates, 
CCS is likely to capture more CO2 emissions than it creates, leading to a net reduction in 
global warming impacts. However, this result is sensitive to assumed parasitic loss rates and 
long-term leakage rates, indicating that these are areas of focus for further research. 
2) Does CCS lead to tradeoffs in other impact categories? 
a. What are the impacts of CCS implementation in other impact categories? 
b. What is the extent of ocean acidification from oceanic CO2 storage? 
c. What is the higher priority between global warming and other impacts? 
Thus far in the discussion of CCS, we have focused on CO2 emissions and their 
attendant global warming potential. However, a general shortcoming of end-of-pipe emission 
controls is that they tend to reduce emissions in the impact category of focus by shifting 
impacts to other impact categories, to other life cycle stages, or to other geographic regions 
(Jackson, 1996). 
LCA evidence shows that CCS is no exception. To understand why this should be the 
case, consider that CCS is a system that reduces net energy efficiency of a power plant and 
therefore requires more fuel to be extracted, processed, transported, and combusted, and at 
the same time introduces new capture, transport, and storage equipment and infrastructure 
that must be built and operated. These processes cause considerable impacts in many 
categories. In the case of global warming, the extra impacts are outweighed by captured CO2, 
but no such offset occurs in other impact categories. Therefore we should expect that net 
impacts are increased across the range of other impact categories. 
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large or small relative to the increases in other categories. Normalized global warming 
impacts are reduced 8% from the no-CCS baseline, while each of the other impact categories 
are increased less than 1.5%. Although the relative decrease of global warming impacts is 
larger than any one of the increases in other impacts, it is apparent that a tradeoff between 
GWP and other impacts is inevitable. 
Additionally, the impacts in other categories, particularly eco- and human toxicity, 
are likely to be understated since they ignore factors such as ocean acidification and potential 
leakage. As discussed in the introduction to CCS, oceanic CO2 storage increases ocean 
acidity (decreases pH) and may harm aquatic ecosystems. By one estimate, adding 1,300 Gt 
of carbon (roughly 200 years’ worth at current emission rates) to the ocean would lower pH 
by 0.3 units; for comparison, ocean pH has decreased 0.1 units since the industrial revolution 
(Herzog et al., 2001). Moreover, slow leakage from geological storage can be lethal to 
subterranean organisms, while rapid leaks caused by well failure or seismic activities can be 
fatal to humans, plants, and animals (Metz et al., 2005; A. Pires & Martinho, 2012). 
However, our understanding of these phenomena is lacking, and thus far no LCA of CCS has 
incorporated these types of impacts. 
In terms of determining whether the CO2 reduction is worth the increase in other 
impact categories, this ultimately is a matter of subjective values that may vary across 
individuals, time, and geography. Climate change is a slow-burning environmental problem 
with global scope, whereas toxicity, smog, acidification, and eutrophication are acute, local 
issues, which makes prioritizing impact categories difficult. Furthermore, it has been pointed 
out that with a shift in impact categories and life cycle stages comes a shift in geographic 
location of impacts (Zapp et al., 2012). This introduces an environmental justice dimension 
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to CCS in that global, chronic impacts (global warming) are traded for local, acute impacts 
(toxicity, smog). These tradeoffs introduce complexity to the net green definition that we will 
return to shortly. 
3) How does CCS affect the future role of renewable energies by changing the socio-
economic-political landscape? 
a. Is CCS actually working as a bridge technology to renewables, or does it prolong 
the use of fossil fuels and delay the transition to renewables? 
b. How does developing CCS technology affect the political, public, and economic 
landscape for coal-fired energy? 
c. How does increasing or maintaining status-quo levels of coal-fired energy 
production affect development and deployment of renewables relative to 
decreases in coal energy? 
d. How does investing in CCS affect energy prices; how do changes in energy prices 
affect development and deployment of renewables? 
The third key question—that of determining the long-term socio-economic-political 
consequences of investing resources in CCS—is exceedingly complex. There are countless 
arguments in both directions by a range of individuals including executives, politicians, 
scientists, and NGO leaders. One issue at the heart of the argument is the idea that coal with 
CCS can be a “bridge fuel.” The bridge fuel argument is critical because, even to the extent 
that CCS reduces CO2 emissions compared to coal power without CCS, it is by no means the 
lowest-emitting source of energy available. Renewables (wind, solar, and hydro) and nuclear 
energy have much lower per-MJ electricity carbon emissions than even the most advanced 
CCS coal plant (Raadal, Gagnon, Modahl, & Hanssen, 2011). 
Thus, on one hand proponents of CCS would like to appeal to environmental values, 
but on the other hand, CCS competes for resources with renewables that are cleaner. One 
way CCS proponents thread this needle is by suggesting that CCS will provide cleaner fossil 
fuel base-load power in the interim, to allow time for renewables to develop to a point where 
they can meet most energy demand (Hansson & Bryngelsson, 2009). According to the 
Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) Third Assessment Report, fossil fuels 
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are expected to dominate until at least 2050 (Metz et al., 2005), and CCS is proposed as a 
way to reduce CO2 emissions from fossil fuel use during this time. 
Yet, detractors of CCS express concerns that CCS shifts financial, political, and 
social focus from renewables to what is at best an interim solution, and may contribute to 
“carbon lock-in” (Bäckstrand, Meadowcroft, & Oppenheimer, 2011; Rochon et al., 2012). As 
Christian Kirchsteiger of the European Commission summarizes the argument, 
If the key energy issue of coming generations … is not the abundance 
of fossil resources but rather an unacceptably high probability of global 
warming due to GHG emissions, then the solution should not include any 
massive hiding of the emissions but entirely focus on [their] avoidance based 
on improved technology in power plants and other industrial installations. 
(Kirchsteiger, 2008, p. 1149) 
Investment in full-scale CCS installations has been slow for a variety of reasons 
(Bowen, 2011), but large contributors are cost and uncertainty. CCS is extremely costly to 
implement and operate, nearly doubling per-kWh operating costs (Rubin et al., 2005), and 
fluctuating energy and carbon markets lead to uncertainty and volatility (von Stechow, 
Watson, & Praetorius, 2011). In response, scholars have proposed and governments have 
experimented with a variety of financial policies to incentivize CCS development 
(Bäckstrand et al., 2011; Gerlagh & van der Zwaan, 2006; Kirchsteiger, 2008). 
However, government resources are finite and CCS competes directly for these 
financial incentives with renewable energy companies. Thus, every dollar spent incentivizing 
investment in CCS means less investment in renewables. CCS detractors point out that CCS 
is unproven, uncertain, potentially risky, and—most importantly—not even the best available 
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solution in terms of reducing GHG emissions (Kirchsteiger, 2008). Why, they ask, should we 
incentivize a suboptimal solution in favor of what even CCS proponents acknowledge is the 
long-term solution? 
I will not attempt here to determine the likely counterfactual future or how CCS is 
likely to change it, as such an analysis is much too involved for this study. The subquestions 
of key question #3 above provide a starting point for such an analysis, which would be 
largely socioeconomic in nature. Rather than attempt to settle the argument one way or the 
other, my goal in summarizing these arguments is to suggest that applying the net green 
definition to this debate provides a useful way to frame the issues. 
This brings up an important point to which we shall return in the conclusion: The 
determination of whether an activity is net green depends on the comparison one makes. If 
one compares a CCS plant to a non-CCS plant—that is, a comparison directly before and 
after CCS is implemented—it reduces CO2 emissions. However, if one compares a CCS-
based future to a counterfactual future without CCS—that is, forecasting the future with vs. 
without CCS—it may look quite different. In the latter case, the comparison depends heavily 
on what one assumes as the counterfactual, baseline future: If one assumes a business-as-
usual, fossil-fuel-dependent future, then the deployment of CCS can be seen as reducing 
overall CO2 emissions at the expense of increased impacts in other categories. But if one 
assumes that—in the absence of CCS—pressures against CO2 emissions would raise the 
costs of fossil fuel use to a point where renewables were cost-competitive, then CCS can be 
seen as delaying these pressures and drawing out the dependence on fossil fuels. 
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4.1.3 Is carbon capture and storage net green? 
In this case study, instead of asking the more common question of whether CCS is 
physically or financially feasible, we instead asked whether CCS is environmentally 
beneficial by subjecting it to the definition of net green. The discussion highlighted that 
answering this question is complex, but rests on three key determinations: 
1) Does CCS increase or decrease net CO2 emissions? 
2) Does CCS lead to tradeoffs in other impact categories? 
3) How does CCS affect the future role of renewable energies by changing the socio-
economic-political landscape? 
We determined that with respect to the first question, assuming current plant 
efficiencies and reasonable leakage rates, CCS will likely capture more CO2 emissions than it 
incurs. In terms of the second question, we determined that the reductions in CO2 emissions 
come at the price of increased emissions in every other impact category, with impact shifts 
across life cycle stage and geographic location. With respect to the third question, we 
summarized prominent arguments from both sides of the debate and outlined some basic 
questions that would be at the core of answering this piece. 
The global warming results are favorable in terms of CCS being net green, but they 
must be weighed against the increases in other impacts. The issue of tradeoffs in category, 
life cycle stage, and geographic location of impacts is a complex one that the field of 
environmental assessment has struggled with for decades. Ultimately, to choose among such 
tradeoffs requires one to assign relative weights to different types of impacts; this decision is 
necessarily subjective and cannot be arrived at purely scientifically. As I pointed out in 
Section 2, the presence of tradeoffs is often a sign of a suboptimal environmental solution. 
Nonetheless, this discussion reveals one limitation of the net green definition: It cannot, on 
its own, solve the problem of impact tradeoffs without external judgments about the relative 
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importance of different types of impacts; it can, however, bring these tradeoffs to the surface 
and frame them in a way that is objective in order to facilitate healthy debate. 
Is coal-powered electricity with carbon capture and storage net green? At least 
partially, it depends on the state of technology, on one’s values, and on the counterfactual 
future of renewable energy (i.e., without CCS). The application of the net green definition 
framed the discussion, helped divide the purely subjective questions from objective ones, and 
moved the debate a good deal closer toward specific research inquiries that will lead to a 
definitive answer. 
CCS is representative of end-of-pipe pollution controls. A similar analysis to the one 
presented could be employed to determine the net green status of any number of pollution 
control technologies in a range of applications and industries, with results that are likely to 
have similar themes. Pollution controls for chemical plants, for instance, require the 
production of chemicals themselves, and trade water toxicity impacts for energy use and land 
toxicity (Jackson, 1996). It is for these reasons—efficiency losses and the inevitability of 
tradeoffs—that end-of-pipe pollution controls are considered the lowest on the waste 
management hierarchy, and starting in the 1970s started to lose favor relative to pollution 
prevention practices such as reuse and recycling. 
5 REUSE AND RECYCLING 
Reuse and recycling have been heralded as a solution to environmental problems 
since the 1980s, and many companies have taken up the call. Many companies exist to 
collect, refurbish, and resell used cell phones. Metals recycling has long been a standard 
practice, and plastics recycling is growing increasingly more profitable. Many businesses 
stress internal recycling initiatives for office pack, cardboard, and beverage containers. 
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Figure 1.6 shows how reuse or recycling can potentially create environmental benefit. 
Starting at the left of the figure, a primary product is produced and used, creating 
environmental damage ܧ௣௥௜௠ ൅ ܧ௨௦௘. If the product is collected for reuse or recycling, it 
undergoes additional reprocessing, creating environmental impacts ܧ௥௘௖. To be worthwhile, 
reuse and recycling must therefore have some environmental benefit that exceeds these 
additional impacts. The potential environmental benefit of reuse and recycling is often 
mistakenly thought to be that these activities divert materials from landfill. This view is 
mistaken for two reasons: First, modern landfills are well-lined and heavily monitored for 
groundwater leaching. They are also well-sealed and allow for nearly zero decomposition 
(Borglin, Hazen, Oldenburg, & Zawislanski, 2004), and are increasingly being required to 
capture methane and carbon dioxide emissions for energy recovery (e.g., California Code of 
Regulations, 2010). In fact, modern landfills are better characterized as semi-permanent 
holding zones rather than releases of materials to the environment. Thus, environmental 
impacts from landfilling—particularly for many of the most recycled materials such as 
metals, glass, and aluminum—are typically negligible. Second, it is not necessarily true that 
recycling diverts material from landfill; as I will discuss below, recycling may also simply 
delay landfill of materials rather than prevent it. 
 
Figure 1.6: Schematic of a typical reuse or recycling system; environmental benefit is created 
when recycling displaces more harmful primary production 
The true environmental benefit of reuse and recycling comes from the potential of 
secondary (recycled or reused) materials to prevent or “displace” primary material 
Avoided landfill 
(ܧ௟௔௡ௗ) 
Displaced production 
(ܧௗ௜௦௣) 
Collection and 
reprocessing (ܧ௥௘௖) 
Material & product
markets
Material use Primary production (ܧ௣௥௜௠) 
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production that has higher impacts. In Figure 1.6, this “displaced production” of primary 
materials is shown with a dotted line, indicating that this production—and the associated 
impacts—would have occurred but for recycling. Displaced production of primary materials 
by secondary materials can create environmental benefit because most recycled materials 
take a fraction of the energy to collect and recycle as they do to create from raw resources. 
For instance, to create secondary aluminum ingot from scrap takes roughly 1/10 the energy 
of producing primary aluminum from bauxite (Ecoinvent Centre, 2012). However, these 
impacts are only avoided to the extent that primary production is displaced by secondary 
production. 
Similarly, landfill is also only avoided if primary production is displaced (and 
therefore exists less material to eventually be disposed of). For instance, if a polyethylene 
terephthalate (PET) bottle is recycled into a lower-quality clamshell container and later 
discarded, the landfilling of the material has merely been delayed, not avoided; only if 
primary material is avoided does recycling the bottle prevent landfill. The quantity and type 
of material landfill avoided is identical to the quantity and type of primary production 
displaced; therefore, for the remainder of the discussion, but without loss of generality, I 
ignore landfill impacts. 
To formalize the effect of displacement on the benefit of recycling and reuse, I refer 
to the fraction of primary production avoided by reusing or recycling additional material as 
the “displacement rate,” ݀. Thus, the net benefit of reuse or recycling is given by:8 
 ܧ௡௘௧ ൌ ܧ௥௘௖ െ ݀ሺܧௗ௜௦௣ െ ܧ௟௔௡ௗሻ (5.1)
Note that displacement rate is independent from both collection rate and recycling 
yield. Collection rate simply affects the relative sizes of flows from the use phase to landfill 
                                                 
8 Chapter 2 provides a much more in-depth discussion of the nature of the displacement relationship. 
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or recovery, while recycling yield governs the size of the outflow from recovery relative to 
the inflow. Displacement rate, on the other hand, is determined downstream of both of those 
rates and governs how changes in the flow of recovered materials affects the supply of 
primary material production.9 
From Figure 1.6 and eq. 5.1, we see that reuse and recycling require processing that 
produces environmental impact ܧ௥௘௖. Therefore, the only way reuse and recycling can 
produce environmental benefit is if they prevent even greater impacts, ܧௗ௜௦௣, from displaced 
production of primary materials. However, it is by no means guaranteed that displacement 
will occur. As we will see in the following case study, determining what primary production 
is displaced and to what extent can be complicated. 
5.1 Case study: Recycling office pack 
5.1.1 Background 
Companies can engage in a number of activities that fall under the category of reuse 
and recycling. One example is encouraging the recycling of internally created wastes by 
providing receptacles for recyclable materials such as aluminum, plastic, glass, and paper. 
Paper office pack is a nontrivial output of many office environments. Roughly 42 million 
tonnes of paper was collected in the U.S. in 2011 of the 64 million tonnes produced, 
representing a collection rate of 66% (U.S. Environmental Protection Agency, 2014). A large 
component of this waste and recovery stream is printer paper from office use, known as 
office pack.  While companies may engage in office pack recycling for a variety of reasons, 
one of them may be that it appears to be an activity that is intrinsically good for the 
                                                 
9 See Chapter 2, Appendix A.1 for a more detailed distinction between collection rate, recycling yield, and 
displacement. 
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environment. According to the net green definition, however, office pack recycling is only 
green if it produces actual environmental benefit. 
Production of paper consists of two stages: pulping and paper making, though nearly 
all paper production occurs in integrated plants (Schmidt, Holm, Merrild, & Christensen, 
2007). Pulp can be produced either from virgin (primary) wood fiber or post-consumer 
materials (Wang, Templer, & Murphy, 2012), and virgin pulp can be created through a 
variety of chemical and thermo-mechanical processes (Schmidt et al., 2007). Thermo-
mechanical pulping tends to have higher energy requirements for machinery and pulp drying. 
The paper-making phase varies in energy requirements according to the type of paper 
produced. Additionally, energy requirements for creating different grades of paper from 
virgin or recycled pulp vary according to output grade and production technology (Wang et 
al., 2012). For this case study, but without loss of generality in the approach, we will focus 
only on energy requirements (as energy requirements are very closely linked with global 
warming impacts) and will ignore impacts from landfilling. However, it is worth noting that 
impact category tradeoffs similar to those discussed in the CCS case study likely exist. 
5.1.2 Key environmental factors and key questions 
As discussed above, the potential for office pack recycling to create environmental 
benefit rests in its potential to displace the production of virgin paper. From eq. 5.1, the net 
energy savings of recycling depends on the energy cost of recycling, the energy cost of 
primary production, and the displacement rate (again, ignoring landfill impacts), with 
possible outcomes summarized in Table 1.3. 
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 Potential environmental benefit Potential environmental damage 
1. Recycling paper may use less energy than 
primary production of the types of paper it 
might displace. 
Recycling office pack may use more energy than primary 
production of other types of paper it might displace. 
2. Recycled office pack may displace the 
production of more energy-intense primary 
paper. 
Recycled office pack may displace the production of less 
energy-intense primary paper. Alternatively, displacement 
may not occur at a high enough rate, or at all. 
Table 1.3: Key factors determining the environmental impact of office pack recycling 
We can organize these key factors into two main focus questions with several 
subquestions: 
1) Are the energy requirements of recycling office pack higher or lower than those 
of primary products recycled office pack may displace? 
2) What primary products, and how much of each, does recycled office pack actually 
displace? 
1) Are the energy requirements of recycling office pack higher or lower than those of 
primary products recycled office pack may displace? 
a. What are the energy requirements of recycling office pack? 
b. What products might office pack potentially displace? 
c. What are the energy requirements for primary production of those products? 
Not all pulp, whether virgin or recycled, is suitable for producing all types of paper. 
Office pack, for instance, is usually created from chemically produced virgin pulp due to 
high brightness and strength requirements. While post-consumer content does appear in some 
office pack, recycled pulp is more suitable to make newsprint, fine paper (also known as 
“woodfree paper”), cardboard, and sanitary paper (COST E48, 2010; Laurijssen, Marsidi, 
Westenbroek, Worrell, & Faaij, 2010; Merrild, Damgaard, & Christensen, 2008; Wang et al., 
2012). Therefore paper recycling is very often an “open-loop” recycling system; that is, the 
product is not recycled back into another nearly identical product but into a different product. 
Collected office pack will most likely not be recycled back into office pack, but into 
newsprint, fine paper, cardboard, or sanitary paper. Thus, the relevant energy requirement 
comparisons are between primary and secondary production for these products. 
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Table 1.4 shows energy requirements for production of 1 kg of six primary material 
production processes from extraction of raw materials to the factory gate and four recycling 
processes from scrap to factory gate. From the data available, recycled office pack can be an 
input to the four recycling processes at the bottom of the table. Note that the data come from 
differing reference years. Additionally note that the type of pulping process is a larger 
determinant of energy requirements than final product; for instance, even though fine paper is 
a higher-quality product than newsprint or sanitary paper, thermo-mechanical pulping of the 
latter products requires more energy than chemical pulping. 
Pulp process (output: 1 kg paper) Product Year Input energy [MJ]a
Virgin production   
Chemical, total chlorine free (TCF) b Fine paper 2010 1.98
Chemical, elementary chlorine free (ECF) c Fine paper 2001 4.32
Chemo-thermo-mechanical c Cardboard 2001 3.41
Thermo-mechanical c Newsprint 2001 9.43
Thermo-mechanical d Printing paper 2011 9.44
Thermo-mechanical e Sanitary paper 2009 9.83
Recycling   
Waste newsprint and magazine recycling c Newsprint 2001 1.13
Mixed paper and corrugated board recycling c Cardboard 2001 1.77
Recycled paper pulping e Sanitary paper 2009 3.26
Waste mixed paper recycling c Fine paper 2001 3.84
a Electricity inputs only. Does not include steam or natural gas energy as these were not available for 
some materials. 
b Stora (2010), cited in Wang et al. (2012) 
c Frees et al. (2005), cited in Wang et al. (2012) 
d Skogsindustrierna (2011), cited in Wang et al. (2012) 
e Laurijssen, Marsidi, Westenbroek, Worrell, & Faaij (2010)
Table 1.4: Energy requirements for selected pulping and paper production processes 
Table 1.4 shows that producing newsprint, cardboard, or sanitary paper from recycled 
office pack requires significantly less energy than primary production of these products. The 
comparison for recycling office pack into fine paper, however, depends on the primary 
production process assumed to be displaced: Recycling requires less energy than elemental 
chlorine-free (ECF) fine paper production, but more energy than total chlorine-free (TCF) 
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fine paper production.10 Therefore, even before considering the more complicated matter of 
displacement rate, Table 1.4 shows that the potential environmental benefit of office pack 
recycling depends heavily on assumptions about what product it will be recycled into and 
what production process it may displace. This corroborates prior research finding that the 
impacts of paper recycling depend heavily on the choice of virgin paper manufacturing data 
(Merrild et al., 2008). Given the data in Table 1.4 and for the time being assuming full 
displacement (݀ ൌ 1), there are four potential scenarios for net energy savings from office 
pack recycling: From eq. 1, where ܧ௡௘௧ is the net impact per kg of recycled product (such 
that ܧ௡௘௧ ൏ 0 represents environmental benefit and ܧ௡௘௧ ൐ 0 represents environmental 
damage), 
ܧ௡௘௧ ൌ ܧ௥௘௖ െ ܧௗ௜௦௣ ൌ ൞
3.84 െ 1.98 ൌ 1.86						if	recycled	office	pack	displaces	TCF	fine	paper	
3.84 െ 4.32 ൌ െ0.48			if	recycled	office	pack	displaces	ECF	fine	paper
1.77 െ 3.41 ൌ െ1.64														if	recycled	office	pack	displaces	carboard
3.26 െ 9.83 ൌ െ6.57			if	recycled	office	pack	displaces	sanitary	paper
 
  
Note that the second, third, and fourth scenarios result in net environmental benefit, 
whereas if recycled office pack displaces TCF fine paper, net environmental damage is 
actually increased by 1.86 MJ/kg. Recycling office pack into sanitary paper requires the 
second-highest amount of energy, but also has the potential to avoid virgin production with 
the highest energy impacts. This may be counterintuitive, as it may seem that the highest and 
best use of used office pack is not to turn it into single-use toilet paper; however, if doing so 
can avoid primary sanitary paper production it can actually create the highest energy savings. 
This illustration highlights that knowledge about what specifically is avoided by recycling is 
crucial to understanding whether recycling office pack (or, indeed, anything else) is net green 
or not, and introduces the second key environmental question: 
                                                 
10 This may be a result of the fact that the ECF process data is almost ten years old. 
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2) What primary products, and how much of each, does recycled office pack actually 
displace? 
Clearly the question of what is displaced by recycled office pack is an important one. 
Unfortunately, it is not straightforward to answer. The fate of collected post-consumer paper 
is largely determined by the level of contaminants in the paper, recovery and sorting 
technologies, acceptable levels of impurities in the finished pulp, and pulp and paper prices 
(Grossman, 2007). Much of these considerations are outside the control of a paper recycler, 
as they have to do with how consumers dispose of the paper and the collection and sorting 
process. Furthermore, post-consumer paper is collected, sorted, and traded on a global 
commodity market, such that forces of supply and demand and prevailing prices will 
determine where a given unit of collected end-of-life paper will go and how it will be 
reprocessed. Some collectors engage in more extensive sorting than others, meaning office 
pack is sometimes segregated and other times bundled with lower-quality scrap. After 
reprocessing, the finished pulp can again be traded on a global commodity market, meaning 
that the ultimate use of the pulp is also uncertain. 
Thus, the issue is one of both technical quality and recovery processes as well as one 
of global economics. For instance, growth in the economies of Asian countries during the 
1990s increased global demand for recovered paper, which increased prices worldwide, 
causing European recyclers to increase production and raising the lower bound of 
economically viable recovered paper quality, such that lower grades of scrap were recycled 
(COST E48, 2010; Grossman, 2007). Fluctuations such as this can change the fate of 
recycled paper as some uses become more profitable than others, depending on global supply 
and demand. The problem of global paper recycling is so complex that a major European 
industry-scientific research partnership was formed to investigate the myriad forces that 
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govern the effectiveness and limits to paper recycling (COST E48, 2010). One outcome of 
this project was a determination of the average utilization of various grades of recovered 
paper in Confederation of European Paper Industries (CEPI) member countries, summarized 
in Table 1.5. 
 Paper scrap source 
End utilization 
Mixed grades 
(kt) 
Corrugated & 
kraft 
(kt) 
Newsprint & 
magazines 
(kt) 
High grades 
(kt) 
Newsprint 319 3% 0 0% 8670 65% 98 2% 
Graphic papers 144 1% 83 0% 2433 18% 952 18% 
Cardboard & packaging papers 8600 88% 18001 93% 1205 9% 2003 39% 
Household & sanitary paper 333 3% 49 0% 912 7% 1915 37% 
Other 402 4% 1290 7% 113 1% 185 4% 
Total (kt) 9798 100% 19423 100% 13333 100% 5153 100% 
Table 1.5: End utilization of recovered paper for different paper grades in 2005 CEPI 
countries (source: COST E48, 2010, p. 89) 
Using the nomenclature of the COST E48 report, office pack is closely aligned with 
“high grade” paper, and fine paper fits into “graphic papers.” To determine the likely fate of 
office pack, then, we are interested in the final column of Table 1.5. Only 2% of recycled 
office pack will be recycled into newsprint, mainly because newsprint has a high tolerance 
for impurities, so high-quality paper is more profitable elsewhere (COST E48, 2010). 
Eighteen percent of recycled office pack will be utilized in making fine (graphic) paper, 39% 
will be utilized for cardboard, and 37% will be used in making household and sanitary 
papers. An additional 4% will be used for various other papers. However, caution should be 
used with these figures as they are nearly a decade out of date and reflect European 
conditions, which may be different for other, particularly developing, countries. 
According to the data in Table 1.5, 76% of collected post-consumer office pack is 
likely to be turned into either cardboard or sanitary paper. Both of these fates at least have the 
potential to create environmental benefit by displacing their more energy-intensive virgin 
counterparts. 
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One question remains regarding what is likely displaced by recycled office pack: Of 
the 18% of recycled office pack that will be turned into fine paper, which fine paper 
production method is more likely to be displaced, ECF or TCF? Answering this question is 
considerably more straightforward, as regional and global statistics exist for production 
capacity of both processes, including future projections (Alliance for Environmental 
Technology, 2012). Figure 1.7 shows world and North American production capacity for 
ECF, TCF, and all other production processes. ECF is clearly the dominant technology at 
either scale, with less than 5% of production at the global level and less than 1% in North 
America; TCF is prominent only in Scandinavia (from data not shown).11 
 
  
Figure 1.7: Production capacity for different pulp-making processes worldwide and in North 
America (Alliance for Environmental Technology, 2012) 
If one were unsure about future trends, one could apply a probabilistic displacement 
model at this point, assuming that secondary material would displace each material according 
to its share of production. However, in this case we can go further and predict the future 
technology that is most likely to be displaced, because 10 million tonnes of new capacity is 
projected to come on-line by 2015 in China, Russia, Uruguay, Brazil, and Indonesia, all of 
                                                 
11 Despite the input energy savings shown in Table 1.4 (which, as mentioned in footnote 10, may simply be a 
matter of reference dates), ECF dominates due to a lower chemical input cost and higher production yield than 
TCF (Alliance for Environmental Technology, 2012). 
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which will be ECF (Alliance for Environmental Technology, 2012). Future trends are 
important to consider because increases in recycling will only displace marginal production, 
not average production (Weidema, 2003). That is, increases in recycling will prevent the next 
unit of virgin production that would have occurred had the increase in recycling not taken 
place. Given the current and projected pulp-making technologies, we can safely assert that to 
the extent that recycled office pack displaces fine paper, it will displace ECF production. 
From the discussion so far, we can conclude that recycled office pack at least has the 
potential to create net environmental benefit, at least in terms of energy consumption. 
However, simply knowing what products and production technologies are most likely to be 
avoided by increased office pack recycling is not enough to determine whether office pack 
recycling is a net green activity. Earlier we made the naïve simplification of full 
displacement—that every kilogram of office pack that is recycled avoids the production of 
one kilogram of production from virgin pulp. In reality, there is no reason why this should 
always be the case. The next relevant question therefore is how much primary production of 
each type of product is displaced; what is the displacement rate for each product? 
The key insight of Figure 1.6 is that the relationship between the supply of recycled 
paper and the supply of primary paper is not determined by engineering relationships but by 
market forces of supply and demand. These forces are explained in detail in Chapter 2 of this 
dissertation; for the time being, I will simply state that the actual displacement rate—the 
amount of primary production avoided by producing an additional unit of recycled 
material—is complex and by no means guaranteed to equal unity. 
For this discussion, I leave the displacement rate as an open parameter, ݀, and 
recognize that ܧ௡௘௧ as calculated in eq. 5.1 depends on this parameter. For instance, imagine 
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Figure 1.8 for all four potentially displaced products. Given the impacts of recycling and the 
impacts of avoided production, the break-even displacement ሺ݀஻ாሻ rate can easily be 
calculated by setting the equation for ܧ௡௘௧ ൌ 0 and solving for ݀: 
 ܧ௡௘௧ ൌ ܧ௥௘௖ െ ݀஻ா൫ܧௗ௜௦௣൯ ൌ 0 
݀஻ா ൌ ܧ௥௘௖ܧௗ௜௦௣ 
(5.2)
Using eq. 5.2, we can see that the break-even displacement rate is different for all 
four products because they have different primary production and recycling impacts. If 
recycled office pack is recycled into and displaces sanitary paper, the break-even 
displacement rate is ݀஻ா௦௔௡௜௧௔௥௬ ൌ ଷ.ଶ଺ଽ.଼ଷ ൌ 0.33; if it is recycled into cardboard the displacement 
rate is ݀஻ா௖௔௥ௗ௕௢௔௥ௗ ൌ ଵ.଻଻ଷ.ସଵ ൌ 0.52; if it is recycled into fine paper and displaces ECF 
production, the displacement rate is ݀஻ா௙௜௡௘	௣௔௣௘௥	ሺா஼ிሻ ൌ ଷ.଼ସସ.ଷଶ ൌ 0.89; if it is assumed to 
displace fine paper from TCF production, the displacement rate is ݀஻ா௙௜௡௘	௣௔௣௘௥	ሺ்஼ிሻ ൌ ଷ.଼ସଵ.ଽ଼ ൌ
1.94. A break-even rate greater than one indicates that recycling in this scenario will never 
result in net environmental benefit, even under full displacement, as illustrated in Figure 1.8 
by the fact that TCF net energy demand is positive across all levels of displacement. 
5.1.3 Is office pack recycling net green? 
In this case study, I started from the idea that the environmental benefit of reuse and 
recycling comes from the potential for secondary materials to displace production of primary 
materials. I stated that in order for office pack recycling to be net green, it must prevent 
greater impacts than it creates. By applying the net green definition to the issue, I determined 
that the answer rests with several key questions: 
1) Are the environmental impacts of recycling less than the environmental impacts 
of a displaced primary alternative? 
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2) What kind of and to what extent primary production is actually displaced by 
recycled office pack? 
Limiting the discussion to energy demand, I answered the first question using 
preexisting life cycle assessment studies of paper recycling and primary paper production. I 
determined that whether recycling requires more or less energy than a primary alternative 
depends on what primary product is compared. I answered the second question in part by 
determining what production is most likely to be displaced by looking at first average 
utilization of recycled office pack and then at marginal fine paper production technologies. I 
determined that recycled office pack at least has the potential to create environmental benefit 
as it is most likely to compete with primary materials that have higher production impacts. 
To fully answer the second question would require one to determine the actual displacement 
rate of sanitary paper, primary cardboard, and ECF fine paper. This analysis would be more 
involved and is out of the scope of this case study, though I develop and demonstrate a 
methodology for doing so in Chapter 2. Nonetheless, we were able to place lower bounds on 
the displacement rate required for office pack recycling to be net green by calculating break-
even displacement rates for each of the potentially displaced products. 
From this discussion we learned that the environmental impacts of reuse and 
recycling depend on assumptions about what products will be displaced. This not only 
highlights the need to understand the relevant materials markets, it also suggests that the net 
environmental benefit of reuse and recycling could be increased if secondary materials were 
recycled in a way that was more likely to displace products with higher impacts. For 
instance, from Table 1.4 we can see that if office pack could be recycled back into printer 
paper, which requires 10.3 MJ/kg for primary production, the potential environmental 
savings might be even greater (depending, of course, on the energy demand of the waste 
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paper-to-printing paper process). Improved sorting and processing could improve the quality 
of recycled pulp and allow it to compete more directly with primary pulp for printer paper, 
increasing the net environmental benefit. Additionally, the fact that currently 42% of 
American recovered paper is processed in China, where environmental controls are lower 
(U.S. Environmental Protection Agency, 2014), suggests that even factors such as where a 
product is reprocessed—or where a displaced product would have been produced—can have 
significant implications for the net greenness of reuse and recycling activities. 
Office pack is not unique among recycled materials. These same principles apply to 
reuse and recycling in general. It is not a given that these activities result in net 
environmental benefit; their status as net green activities depends on the impacts of 
reprocessing, the impacts of displaced production, and how much primary production is 
actually displaced. Overall, the lessons of this case study show that designing a collection, 
sorting, and reprocessing system in a way that maximizes the displacement potential of 
recycled or reused products can drastically increase the net environmental benefit of reuse 
and recycling activities.   
6 MATERIAL OR TECHNOLOGY SUBSTITUTION  
Material or technology substitution refers to the practice of identifying problematic 
materials or processes and replacing them with different, ideally cleaner, safer, or more 
efficient alternatives. Technological development and increasing understanding of toxic 
impacts drive these changes, often pushed by entrepreneurs and firms with cutting-edge 
research and development. A classic example of material substitution is the replacement of 
lead with methyl tertiary butyl ether (MTBE, which was later found to contaminate 
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groundwater) as an antiknock agent in gasoline, while an example of technology substitution 
is the phase-out of carbureted engines in favor of direct injection engines. 
The new replacement material or technology has impacts of its own; in order for 
material or technology substitution to create net environmental benefit, the new impacts from 
the substitute must be lower than those of the old alternative. There are two complications in 
determining whether a new alternative is cleaner or dirtier. First, if impacts are merely shifted 
from one life cycle stage to another (e.g., from the use phase to disposal), or if one type of 
impacts are traded for another (e.g., ozone depletion for toxicity), then it is not clear that any 
environmental benefit occurs. We will see in the following case study that these tradeoffs can 
be difficult to predict because they often involve complex social and macroeconomic forces, 
a theme that will be further explored and quantified in Chapter 2. Second, as we will also see 
in the case study, determining the most appropriate baseline against which to compare a new 
alternative is not always obvious. For instance, when studying energy from natural gas, is the 
most appropriate comparison against coal, or against renewables? Additionally, the baseline 
changes over time—for instance, at one time petroleum was seen as a clearly superior option 
to coal for powering machinery; now petroleum is being challenged by a variety of 
renewable energy sources. 
6.1 Case study: Corn ethanol 
6.1.1 Background 
Biofuels are increasingly being produced in response to a need for low-carbon fuels 
(and for other reasons, such as national energy security). They are intended as a direct 
competitor to liquid fuels and as such they represent an ideal case study for material 
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substitution activities.12 Biofuels can be produced from sugar or starch plants through 
fermentation to produce ethanol, while oily plants can be directly burned or processed to 
produce biodiesel. Nearly all fuel ethanol is produced from starch- and sugar-based 
feedstocks, the majority of which comes from corn (U.S. Department of Energy, 2013b). In 
2012, 4.5 billion bushels of corn representing 40% of U.S. corn production were used for 
ethanol production in the U.S. (US Department of Agriculture, 2013). Therefore, I will focus 
this discussion on ethanol from corn. However, I would be remiss not to point out that a wide 
variety of alternative biofuels and production methods are currently in use and under 
development, some of which show greater promise to meet GHG reduction goals (see 
Fargione, Plevin, & Hill, 2010; Tilman, Hill, & Lehman, 2006). 
A range of problems with corn ethanol have been discussed, including that it 
reengages degraded and environmentally sensitive land that was previously taken out of 
production under the Conservation Reserve Program and Soil Conservation Act (Gelfand et 
al., 2011), that it reduces biodiversity both in the U.S. and abroad (Fargione et al., 2010), and 
that it presents several socioeconomic issues. Most common among the latter is that diverting 
food crops to biofuels raises the price of food commodities that form a substantial nutritional 
basis for many poorer people (BBC News, 2007; de Gorter, Drabik, & Just, 2013; Fortenbery 
& Park, 2008; Maxwell & Davison, 2014; McPhail & Babcock, 2012). Despite these issues, 
the environmental argument for corn ethanol rests on the claim that it reduces GHG 
emissions, so for the present discussion I will focus solely on net GHG emissions of corn 
ethanol as compared to gasoline. 
                                                 
12 Bioethanol is most commonly blended with fossil fuels; however, because biofuels replace fossil fuels in the 
blend, they can be seen to directly compete. 
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The environmental argument for biofuels is that they are less carbon intensive than 
fossil fuels, or are even carbon neutral (Baker, Ochsner, Venterea, & Griffis, 2007; Blanco-
Canqui & Lal, 2008; Verma et al., 2005). Biofuel is derived from plants that sequester carbon 
from the air through photosynthesis during growth, such that the amount of carbon released 
to the atmosphere upon combustion is equal to the amount of carbon removed from the 
atmosphere during growth. In principle, therefore, combustion of biofuels is carbon neutral. 
However, two drawbacks have been proposed and discussed at some length, both related to 
land use change (LUC). The first is direct land use change (DLUC), which refers to changes 
to land from a previous use to corn-planted agricultural use. Such changes require the 
operation of equipment, can release carbon stored in soil during tillage, and can remove 
highly carbon-retaining plants (Fargione, Hill, Tilman, Polasky, & Hawthorne, 2008). The 
second is indirect land use change (ILUC), which refers to changes to physically distant 
lands—principally deforestation of native rain forests—caused by changes in global 
commodity prices (Searchinger et al., 2008). Diverting corn from food to fuel uses increases 
demand and raises prices, inducing farmers worldwide to bring previously native forests 
under cultivation, releasing vast carbon stores. 
Furthermore, comparing internal combustion vehicles (ICVs) using corn ethanol to 
ICVs using fossil fuel may not be the most appropriate comparison. Similar to the case of 
coal-fired electricity with carbon capture and storage, how one defines the baseline 
comparison technology can change the net green assessment, and with biofuels it may be that 
the more appropriate comparison is against other emerging technologies. For instance, corn 
ethanol could be seen to directly compete with fossil fuels, but in order to be competitive it 
also requires land and government subsidies (Maxwell & Davison, 2014) that could 
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alternatively be allocated to development and deployment of photovoltaic (PV) solar energy 
coupled with battery electric vehicles (BEVs) (Geyer, Stoms, & Kallaos, 2013). Therefore, 
whether such competition occurs and how it affects net GHG emissions is also a 
consideration. 
6.1.2 Key environmental factors and key questions 
From the above discussion, three forces emerge that determine the net green status of 
corn ethanol, summarized in Table 1.6. 
 Potential environmental benefit Potential environmental damage 
1. Corn ethanol can cause lower fuel cycle GHG 
emissions than gasoline. 
Corn ethanol can cause higher fuel cycle GHG 
emissions than gasoline. 
2. Corn ethanol direct and indirect land use 
change impacts may be outweighed by fuel 
cycle GHG emission reductions. 
Corn ethanol requires conversion of land to corn 
production, and also diverts food and feed corn to fuel 
uses; the production of food and feed corn may be 
displaced elsewhere with higher land use change 
impacts. 
3. Corn ethanol may reduce dependence on fossil 
fuels and contribute to a transition toward 
renewable energy. 
Corn ethanol may directly compete for resources and 
land with photovoltaic solar energy; if solar energy 
offers lower life cycle GHG emissions, this competition 
leads to net GHG increases over widespread solar 
deployment. 
Table 1.6: Key factors determining the environmental impact of corn ethanol 
We can organize these key factors into three main focus questions: 
1) Does corn ethanol have lower fuel cycle impacts as compared to gasoline? 
2) How large are potential impacts from direct and indirect land use change? 
3) Does corn ethanol investment and development compete with development of 
other, more environmentally benign energy alternatives? 
1) Does corn ethanol have lower fuel cycle impacts as compared to gasoline? 
Fuel cycle emissions, sometimes referred to as well- or field-to-wheels emissions, 
include all upstream energy inputs required to extract (or in the case of bioethanol, grow), 
refine, and deliver fuel to a combustion source, in addition to emissions from combustion of 
the fuel. Significant research has been conducted in the past decade to quantify the fuel cycle 
emissions of corn ethanol. Table 1.7 presents a selection of GHG emissions for corn ethanol 
as well as gasoline for reference. 
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Fuel Qty Units Source 
Gasoline 96.9 g CO2-eq/MJ Hill, Nelson, Tilman, Polasky, & Tiffany (2006) 
Gasoline 96 g CO2-eq/MJ Fargione et al. (2010) 
Gasoline 94 g CO2-eq/MJ Geyer, Stoms, & Kallaos (2013) 
Corn ethanol 77–94 g CO2-eq/MJ Coelho, Goldemberg, Lucon, & Guardabassi (2006) 
Corn ethanol 84.9 g CO2-eq/MJ Hill et al. (2006) 
Corn ethanol 76 g CO2-eq/MJ A. E. Farrell et al. (2006)a 
Corn ethanol 30.6–76 g CO2-eq/MJ Liska et al. (2009)b 
Corn ethanol 70 g CO2-eq/MJ ANL (2009)c 
Corn ethanol 66–69 g CO2-eq/MJ Fargione et al. (2010) 
Corn ethanol 74 g CO2-eq/MJ Geyer et al. (2013) 
a EBAMM model (“ethanol today” scenario) 
b Lower range is based on a hypothetical closed-loop anaerobic digestion plant 
c GREET model 
Table 1.7: Representative fuel-cycle GHG emissions for gasoline and corn ethanol 
Variation between studies in Table 1.7 is primarily due to differing assumptions about 
corn production yields, refining fuel sources, and refinery technology. Some studies have 
developed future scenario projections to determine lower bounds for corn ethanol fuel cycle 
emissions (Liska et al., 2009), while a recent study has incorporated spatially explicit life 
cycle assessment methods to account for differing crop yields across the U.S. (Geyer et al., 
2013). Despite the variability in the figures, the data indicate that corn ethanol can reduce 
fuel cycle emissions by roughly 20 g CO2-eq/MJ as compared to gasoline. 
2) How large are potential impacts from direct and indirect land use change? 
Growing corn for ethanol requires additional land to be planted, converting that land 
from its prior use to agricultural use (Wicke et al., 2012). The effects of this direct land use 
change are typically discussed in terms of the effect on biodiversity and ecosystems (e.g., 
Fargione et al., 2010; Fthenakis & Kim, 2009; Geyer et al., 2013), but the conversion of 
certain types of land to agriculture can also have large GHG impacts. Plow tillage farming 
reduces soil organic carbon storage in the upper soil layers, and agricultural use changes 
methane (CH4) fluxes, requires nitrogen inputs that release the potent GHG dinitrous oxide 
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(N2O), and foregoes future soil carbon sequestration (Blanco-Canqui & Lal, 2008; Crutzen, 
Mosier, Smith, & Winiwarter, 2008; Gelfand et al., 2011). 
This means that land conversion to biofuel production creates initial releases of 
carbon to begin biofuels production, called a “carbon debt,” which according to a recent 
estimate can range from 68 to 222 Mg CO2-eq/ha (for soybean-corn rotation without tillage 
and corn-only with tillage, respectively) (Gelfand et al., 2011). This debt can eventually be 
repaid by the lower fuel cycle GHG emissions discussed above, but the repayment periods 
for the above debt figures range from 29 to 123 years, respectively (Gelfand et al., 2011). 
Thus, converting land to biofuel production today essentially locks U.S. energy policy into a 
commitment to biofuels until the middle of the twenty-first century at best or the beginning 
of the twenty-second century at worst. We will return to this point in addressing the third key 
question. 
Emissions from direct land use change are an important consideration, but biofuels 
research increasingly demonstrates that a potentially greater concern is that of indirect land 
use change (ILUC) (Searchinger et al., 2008). ILUC refers to a phenomenon where land use 
changes in one region can affect land development decisions in another region, with the 
original use being displaced to the second region. The primary mechanism for this effect is 
price changes in the global commodity market (Sanchez et al., 2012). As corn is diverted 
from food uses to fuel, food corn prices rise, inducing farmers around the world—but 
particularly in developing regions in South America—to increase food corn production. This 
often means clearing old-growth forests or converting pasture land which is itself displaced 
to old-growth forests. When these native forests are cleared, the amounts of carbon they store 
are released to the environment, creating an even larger carbon debt. 
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conversion; as more productive lands are exhausted, land supply becomes less elastic and 
rents rise. This ensures that biomass production will not displace only agricultural or only 
pasture land, but some combination of the two. As shown in the diagram, the non-biofuels 
agricultural area decreases from ܺ hectares to ܻ hectares. 
Indirect land use change occurs as a result of the displaced non-biofuel agriculture. 
Introducing biofuels diverts crops from food to fuel, which raises food commodity prices 
(Serra, Zilberman, Gil, & Goodwin, 2011) and induces more food production either through 
increasing yields (termed “intensification”) or planting more land elsewhere 
(“extensification”). Tilman et al. (2002) have demonstrated that the ability to further intensify 
crop yields in the developed world is extremely limited. Instead, a likely consequence of 
increased prices from unmet food demand is that pasture and old-growth forest in the 
developing world will be converted to agriculture. This effect is shown in the lower-right 
portion of Figure 1.9. Land is converted according to its rent; the most productive and 
cheapest land is converted first. Because yields are lower in the developing region than in the 
developed region (Tilman et al., 2002), it is very likely that a greater area of land will be 
converted in the developing world than was displaced in the developed world (the added area 
is shown in the diagram as ܭ hectares). 
The effects of ILUC are both economic and biophysical. Food exports from the 
developing region will increase while food exports from the developed region decrease 
(Searchinger et al., 2008). Land-conversion activities in the developing region are poorly 
regulated, and therefore likely more environmentally harmful than those in the developed 
region. Much more importantly, when old-growth forests are clear-cut and burned or left to 
decompose they release their stored carbon, which can be fifteen times greater per hectare 
65 
than that of grassland (Searchinger et al., 2008). For corn ethanol grown in the U.S., these 
indirect releases have been estimated between 30 and 100 g CO2-eq/MJ electricity (Sanchez 
et al., 2012; Searchinger et al., 2008). Like direct land use changes, these GHG emissions 
represent one-time releases; however, they add considerably to the carbon debt repayment 
period, potentially pushing it well into the twenty-first or twenty-second centuries. 
ILUC is a particularly difficult problem to manage, for two reasons. First, it is 
difficult to quantify. Complex computable general equilibrium (CGE) or partial equilibrium 
(PE) models (Wicke et al., 2012) including spatially explicit components (Lapola et al., 
2010) have been developed to attempt to model the global effects of changing economic 
incentives. The state of the art in these models is such that they require expert users, and the 
results are increasingly opaque to laypeople such as policy makers. ILUC is even more 
complicated to show empirically, although a recent article has provided statistical evidence 
for ILUC in the case of soybeans (Arima, Richards, Walker, & Caldas, 2011). According to 
this study, a 10% increase in U.S. soybean expansion into pasture lands results in a 40% 
increase in deforestation in the Brazilian Amazon. 
3) Does corn ethanol investment and development compete with development of other, 
more environmentally benign energy alternatives? How does this change net GHG 
emissions? 
Comparing corn ethanol to gasoline is reasonable because both are liquid fuels used 
in ICVs. However, corn ethanol also represents a sun-to-wheels energy conversion pathway; 
that is, corn ethanol is a method of harvesting energy from the sun through photosynthesis 
and converting it to drivetrain power. Therefore it is also reasonable to compare corn ethanol 
to another viable sun-to-wheels conversion pathway: photovoltaic energy to power battery 
electric vehicles. Both pathways require land, and since they are nascent technologies, both 
may benefit from government subsidy support to spur investment and innovation. To the 
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extent that they compete for land and financial resources, government support for one 
technology could be seen to hamper development of the other. Additionally, to the extent that 
there are carbon payback periods associated with each, investment in one pathway today may 
lock society in to that pathway for many years to come. 
To determine whether corn ethanol slows the development of PV-powered BEVs—
and, if so, whether that makes it more or less green—we need to know three things: first, 
which sun-to-wheels pathway creates lower GHG emissions; second, whether biofuels 
receive and grow because of subsidies or tax breaks; third, whether this money could have 
otherwise been used to increase PV and BEV investment, development, and deployment. 
With respect to the first item, a recent study compared five different sun-to-wheels 
conversion pathways including corn ethanol for ICVs and PV to BEVs (Geyer et al., 2013). 
Using spatially explicit county-level data on crop yields and solar insolation, the study 
quantified the life cycle land use and GHG emissions resulting from driving 100 km, 
including vehicle production. Corn ethanol burned in an ICV was found to create between 
20.9 and 32.5 kg CO2/100 km (where the range is due to varying corn yield) including only 
direct impacts, and could be as high as 55.2 kg CO2/100 km assuming upper-end ILUC 
impacts. The PV-BEV pathway, on the other hand, was found to create only 5.9 kg CO2/100 
km. Additionally, the corn ethanol ICV pathway required between 26.1 and 68.9 m2/100 km 
of land use (up to 55.2 m2/100 km including ILUC), as compared to only 0.12–0.18 m2/100 
km for PV BEV (where the range is due to varying insolation). To meet the entirety of U.S. 
transportation energy needs, 1.1 million ha of cadmium-telluride PV would be required; by 
contrast, if 100% of 2009 U.S. corn production were converted to ethanol it would displace 
only 15.7% of U.S. gasoline consumption. These results are in line with nonspatially explicit 
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results from prior studies (Jacobson, 2009; McDonald, Fargione, Kiesecker, Miller, & 
Powell, 2009). Furthermore, the PV-BEV pathway has the additional advantage that it does 
not divert food crops to fuel, so it does not cause the aforementioned socioeconomic 
difficulties associated with raising food prices. Therefore, the evidence strongly favors the 
PV-BEV pathway to the corn ethanol ICV pathway. 
For the second item—whether biofuels received and benefited from subsidies—the 
answer is fairly clearly affirmative. Biofuels production was heavily subsidized from 1978 to 
the end of 2011 through the Volumetric Ethanol Excise Tax Credit (VEETC), with tax 
credits ranging from $0.10 to 0.60 per gallon of ethanol (Maxwell & Davison, 2014). Tax 
credits were reduced with the passage of the 2008 Farm Bill and ended entirely in December 
2011. The tax credit amounted to $5.4 billion in 2010, and cost an estimated $20 billion over 
its lifetime (NPR, 2012; U.S. Government Accountability Office, 2011). Considerable 
evidence suggests that the rapid expansion of the ethanol market had much to do with this 
subsidy. The Renewable Fuels Association, an ethanol industry group, reported that ending 
the subsidy would result in a 38% reduction in U.S. biofuels production (Urbanchuk, 2010). 
Economic models predict that the subsidy has allowed more firms to remain competitive in 
the industry than would have been possible without it (Schmit, Luo, & Conrad, 2011), that 
more firms entered the industry and face less risk because of the subsidy, and that firms 
would exit the industry if the subsidy were removed (Maxwell & Davison, 2014). Indeed, the 
production of fuel ethanol peaked at an average 890,000 barrels per day in 2011, with 
production declining for the first time in 2012 to an average 860,000 barrels per day (U.S. 
Energy Information Administration, 2014c). Whether this trend continues in the absence of 
the subsidy remains to be seen; thus far production has been buoyed by stable and high corn 
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prices (U.S. Energy Information Administration, 2014b). Overall, we can safely conclude 
that the VEETC subsidy bolstered the corn ethanol industry over what it would have done 
naturally. 
The third item—whether governmental support for biofuels was mutually exclusive to 
support for PV and BEV development—is more difficult to determine with certainty, since it 
relies on counterfactual reasoning. Namely, we must answer the question, where would PV 
BEV technology be today if we had focused governmental support on it instead of corn 
ethanol? PV and BEV demand has been bolstered by subsidies in the form of consumer tax 
credits for plug-in electric, plug-in hybrid, and (until 2010) hybrid vehicles (U.S. Department 
of Energy, 2014). Given that increased demand increases prices and therefore investment and 
R&D incentives, and given that government funds are finite, it is at least plausible that if 
funds had been allocated to PV and BEVs instead of corn ethanol, the PV and BEV 
industries would be further developed than they are today. It could be possible to test this 
theory using an econometric model of the renewable energy industry, but such an endeavor is 
well beyond the scope of this article. 
6.1.3 Is corn ethanol net green? 
This case study collected much of the most prominent scientific research on corn 
ethanol and organized it by applying the definition of a net green activity. Three questions 
emerged that determine whether corn ethanol is net green: 
1. Does corn ethanol have lower fuel cycle impacts as compared to gasoline? 
2. How large are potential impacts from direct and indirect land use change? 
3. Does corn ethanol investment and development compete with development of 
other, more environmentally benign energy alternatives? 
The scientific evidence shows that while corn ethanol does indeed have lower fuel 
cycle GHG emissions, these gains are overwhelmed by increased GHG emissions from land 
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use change, both directly at the site of production and worldwide by raising commodity corn 
prices. We determined that photovoltaic energy to drive battery electric vehicles represents a 
vastly superior option to internal combustion vehicles powered by corn ethanol, and prima 
facie reasoning suggests that investment in corn ethanol comes at least partially at the 
expense of investment in PV and BEV technology, though to determine this with certainty 
would require more extensive study. 
One thing that is relatively certain is that the long carbon debt repayment period of 
corn ethanol has already locked society in to a future of biofuel production if we ever hope to 
make prior investments in corn ethanol net carbon negative. However, to continue to invest 
in corn ethanol simply to repay this debt may not be the best environmental decision 
according to the net green definition: The carbon debt of already-produced corn ethanol 
represents a sunk cost; what we must decide now is where to focus efforts in order to 
maximize marginal carbon reductions. This very well may mean taking a net loss on existing 
corn ethanol in order to reallocate funds, resources, and intellectual capital to other, greener 
options. 
7 DEMATERIALIZATION 
Dematerialization is the practice of fulfilling human needs and desires with reduced 
production and disposal of material products. One aspect of dematerialization is simply 
increased material efficiency. If improved materials can reduce the amount needed to create a 
product, or if products can be made more durable or easily repairable, less material needs to 
be produced to perform the same function. Another, perhaps more powerful aspect of 
dematerialization, however, is the concept of “servicizing.” Servicizing leverages the idea 
that people are not usually interested in material products themselves, but rather the function 
70 
they provide. If these functions can be met with a service rather than a dedicated product, 
there are opportunities for material reduction. 
For instance, very few people are actually interested in owning carpeting for its own 
sake; rather, they value the service it provides: floor covering that is soft, warm, and 
attractive. Interface Inc. has recognized this fact, and rather than selling carpeting, it sells 
floor-covering services on a contractual basis. Customers purchase several years of floor 
covering services, selecting quality, color, and other preferences, and Interface then provides 
carpet. When the carpet wears out, Interface replaces it and recycles the old carpet into new 
product. Because there is a large financial incentive for Interface to make the carpet easily 
and efficiently recyclable, there is very little waste in this system. The consequence is that 
virtually no carpeting is landfilled, and less carpeting is needed to fulfill customers’ needs—a 
classic example of dematerialization. 
The potential net environmental benefit of dematerialization is that material 
production and disposal can be reduced, usually with few additional impacts. However, 
dematerialization can sometimes require new infrastructure or reverse logistics, and often 
requires an underlying shift in consumer behavior. These can be difficult to achieve, or in 
some cases perhaps impossible. Additionally, there is risk of a “rebound effect” if material 
cost savings lead to reduced purchase prices and therefore increased demand. As we will see 
in the following case study, these are complex considerations. When it works, however, the 
benefits of dematerialization can be dramatic. 
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7.1 Case study: Car sharing  
7.1.1 Background 
A car sharing service provides cars for hire around a city. Members of the service can 
use the cars at any time, paying for usage time, mileage, and in some cases a monthly fee. 
Car sharing represents one way to servicize personal transportation, with the user paying only 
for the service of driving, not for the car itself. Car sharing services typically offer a flat rate 
for time and/or mileage, and gas is often included in the price. Shared cars can be found in 
public parking lots, specially designated street-side parking stalls, and in the parking lots of 
participating businesses. Car sharing members typically reserve a car online for a specified 
period of time. They pick up the car from its indicated location, use the car for the duration of 
the rental period, and are usually required to return the car to its original location at the end 
of the rental period. 
Car sharing companies specifically market to a broad customer base including people 
who would like to shed their personal cars, people who are “carless” and currently use public 
transportation, people who occasionally need a second car, travelers, and small business 
owners. Car sharing companies often tout their services based on a number of benefits 
including “car-ownership freedom,” lower cost, and flexibility, but often a significant part of 
the marketing effort is focused on car sharing as an environmental transportation solution 
(e.g., Zipcar Inc., 2014b). Under the net green definition, in order for the environmental 
claim to be true, car sharing must result in a net environmental benefit. As in the previous 
case studies, I will limit the discussion here to energy or global warming impacts, as these are 
important impacts in the automotive sector. 
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7.1.2 Key environmental factors and key questions 
Car sharing can potentially reduce net environmental global warming impacts in four 
ways: 1) decreasing total vehicle miles traveled (VMT); 2) shifting travel from less efficient 
to more efficient vehicles; 3) shifting travel from personal vehicles to public transportation; 
and 4) preventing future production and disposal of personal vehicles. However, car sharing 
may also increase net environmental impacts by: 1) increasing total miles driven; 2) shifting 
travel from more efficient vehicles to less efficient vehicles; 3) shifting travel from public 
transportation to car travel; or 4) stimulating demand for personal vehicles. These key factors 
are summarized in Table 1.8. 
 Potential environmental benefit Potential environmental damage 
1. Car sharing may shift travel from less efficient 
to more efficient vehicles 
Car sharing may shift travel from more efficient to less 
efficient vehicles 
2. Car sharing may decrease total vehicle-miles 
traveled 
Car sharing may increase total vehicle-miles driven 
3. Car sharing may reduce public transportation 
usage 
Car sharing may increase public transportation usage 
4. Car sharing may reduce production and 
disposal of vehicles 
Car sharing may stimulate production and disposal of 
vehicles 
Table 1.8: Key factors determining the environmental impact of car sharing 
I will investigate these key environmental factors by asking four focus questions: 
1) Are shared cars likely to be more or less efficient than the personal cars with 
which they compete? 
2) What effect does car sharing have on total vehicle-miles traveled? 
3) What is the effect of car sharing on public transportation use, and how does that 
affect vehicle miles traveled? 
4) What is the total effect of car sharing on the production of new cars? 
Throughout the discussion, I will periodically cite findings from three articles based 
on a large survey-based car sharing study by Martin, Shaheen, and Lidicker (Martin, 
Shaheen, & Lidicker, 2010; Martin & Shaheen, 2011a, 2011b). Martin and his colleagues 
conducted a survey of 6,281 active car sharing households to assess their pre- and post-
membership driving behavior, their car ownership changes, what they would have done 
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otherwise in the absence of car sharing, and a host of demographic information. This survey 
is extremely helpful in determining the impact of car sharing, but several key aspects were 
not included in the study. Therefore, rather than simply repeat the results of the survey, for 
each question I will first present theoretical arguments before turning to Martin et al.’s car 
sharing survey for empirical support, where it exists. 
1) Are shared cars likely to be more or less efficient than the personal cars with which 
they compete? 
Because car sharing companies include gas in the price of the rental, they have an 
incentive to maximize the efficiency of their rental fleet. Additionally, shared cars must be 
comfortable, clean, and mechanically sound in order to entice users. Therefore, we should 
expect shared car fleets to be new and fuel efficient. Car owners also have an incentive to 
minimize fuel costs, but for many people the long payback times of most hybrid or electric 
vehicles make them a poor investment at this point. Car sharing firms, on the other hand, put 
many times as many miles on each vehicle in a year, which shortens the payback period for 
fuel-efficient vehicles substantially. We therefore would expect car sharing fleets to be more 
efficient than personal vehicles. 
These expectations are confirmed by Martin, Shaheen, and Lidicker (2010). As part 
of their car sharing survey, they collected data on the year, make, and model of each 
household’s vehicles before joining a car sharing service as well as that of the shared car 
model they used most often. Matching survey responses with the U.S. Environmental 
Protection Agency’s fuel economy database, they found that the average fuel efficiency of 
participants’ owned cars before joining car sharing was 23.3 miles per gallon (MPG) (median 
= 23 MPG), whereas the average fuel efficiency of shared cars was 32.8 MPG (median = 31 
MPG), an increase of over 10 MPG, or 41%. Additionally, over 25% of shared cars feature 
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ultra-high fuel efficiency (46 MPG and above), in contrast to only 1% in the case of owned 
cars. Therefore, with respect to key question #1, we can conclude that car sharing is very 
likely to shift travel from less-efficient to more-efficient vehicles. 
2) What effect does car sharing have on personal vehicle-miles traveled (not counting 
shifts in public transportation use)? 
a. If both car sharing and personal car ownership are possibilities, under what 
circumstances will people choose to share rather than purchase a vehicle? 
b. Once people have selected to use car sharing or to buy a personal car, will they 
drive more or less as a result? 
This question is complex, as it is inherently behavioral-economic in nature. As 
indicated by the subquestions above, this question rests on two behavioral decisions: First, 
when will people use car sharing instead of purchasing a car, and second, will they drive 
more or less as a result of their decision? I will explore this question in two ways: By 
developing a discrete choice model utility maximization model, and then by using data 
provided by Martin et al. 
The behavioral model assumes people have the option to either purchase a personal 
car or join a car sharing service. The two options have inherently different cost structures, 
and based on relative costs and individual preferences, will yield different optimal amounts 
of travel. The general approach I take is to derive a general utility function and budget 
constraints for both vehicle scenarios. I find the level of utility that derives from the optimal 
amount of travel under each scenario, and stipulate that individuals will choose the option 
that yields the highest utility for a given set of prices and preferences. Then, once the method 
of travel has been selected, I determine the optimal amount of travel under the selected 
option and determine whether more or less miles are traveled under the selected option than 
under the competing option. 
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Specifically, in this model people seek to maximize their utility, which they achieve 
by traveling in cars and consuming all other goods (more easily thought of as money spent on 
goods other than trips): 
 max்,௒ ܷ ൌ ݖ logሺ ௦ܶሻ ൅ logሺ ௦ܻሻ for the shared car scenario	
max்,௒ ܷ ൌ ݔ logሺ ௢ܶሻ ൅ logሺ ௢ܻሻ for the owned car scenario 
(7.1)
where ௦ܶ and ௢ܶ are the number of miles driven in a shared car and owned car, respectively, 
and ܻ is the amount of all other consumption (the subscripts ௦ܻ and ௢ܻ are simply to 
distinguish ܻ under the shared car and owned car scenarios, respectively, but ܻ still 
represents the same kind of consumption in either case). ݖ ∈ ሾ0,∞ሻ and ݔ ∈ ሾ0,∞ሻ are the 
individual’s preferences for shared car travel and owned car travel, respectively, normalized 
to his preference for all other goods (i.e., the coefficient on consumption of ܻ is 1). 
Logarithmic utility is used to ensure concave preferences, declining marginal utility, and 
increasing marginal rates of substitution, properties which are not only useful mathematically 
but have a long tradition in economic theories of decision making: Concave preferences arise 
from the theory of expected utility maximization (Bernoulli, 1954; von Neumann & 
Morgenstern, 1953), which explains people’s tendency toward risk-aversion (see Varian, 
2009). 
Individuals choose the optimum level of trips and other consumption subject to their 
budget constraint, which is different based on whether they choose to take shared car trips 
( ௦ܶ) or purchase a car and take owned car trips ( ௢ܶ). The budget constraint is: 
 ܰ ൌ ௦ܲ ௦ܶ ൅ ௦ܻ 													for the shared car scenario
ܰ ൌ ௢ܲ ௢ܶ ൅ ௙ܲ ൅ ௢ܻ 		for the owned car scenario (7.2)
where ܰ is the individual’s income/endowment during a modeling period of interest (year, 
month, etc.), ௦ܲ and ௢ܲ are the marginal price per mile of driving in a shared car or owned 
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car, respectively, ௙ܲ is the fixed cost per period associated with purchasing a car, and the 
price of ܻ is one. 
Maximizing the utility function subject to the budget constraint leads to optimal 
levels of ܶ and ܻ for both scenarios. For the shared car scenario, maximizing eq. 7.1 subject 
to eq. 7.2, the optimal values are as follows: 
 
௦ܶ∗ ൌ ݖܰ௦ܲሺݖ ൅ 1ሻ
௦ܻ∗ ൌ ܰݖ ൅ 1 
(7.3)
For the owned car scenario, the optimal values are: 
 
௢ܶ∗ ൌ
ݔሺܰ െ ௙ܲሻ
௢ܲሺݔ ൅ 1ሻ
௢ܻ∗ ൌ
ܰ െ ௙ܲ
ݔ ൅ 1  
(7.4)
Comparing eq. 7.3 to eq. 7.4, individuals drive less and have lower consumption of 
other goods by the amount of ௙ܲ, all else equal. Individuals with higher income drive more 
miles and consume more of other goods under either scenario. Plugging these optimal values 
into the objective function in eq. 7.1, we can see that the two scenarios result in different 
levels of utility (again, to distinguish the cases, I use ௦ܷ and ܷ௢ for utility under the shared 
car case and owned car case, respectively): 
 
௦ܷ∗ ൌ ݖ log ൬ ݖܰ௦ܲሺݖ ൅ 1ሻ൰ ൅ log ൬
ܰ
ݖ ൅ 1൰
ܷ௢∗ ൌ ݔ log ቆݔ൫ܰ െ ௙ܲ
൯
௢ܲሺݔ ൅ 1ሻቇ ൅ log ൬
ܰ െ ௙ܲ
ݔ ൅ 1 ൰ 
(7.5)
From eq. 7.5, the optimal choice between shared car travel and owned car travel is a 
function of the ratio of mileage prices ( ௦ܲ ௢ܲ⁄ ), the ratio of trip type preferences ሺݔ/ݖ), and 
the owned car fixed costs relative to income. Based on these values, individuals will choose 
the vehicle option that delivers the highest level of utility. Once the decision about method of 
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travel has been made for that set of prices and preferences, we can return to eqs. 7.3 and 7.4 
to determine the number of miles that will be driven under the chosen and alternative travel 
method. From this, we can determine whether vehicle miles traveled increased or decreased 
as a result of the chosen travel method. 
To demonstrate, we will model one year of behavior for a person who has an annual 
net income of $50,000 and has the option to purchase a car for an annualized fixed cost of 
$6,000, which is the American Automobile Association (AAA) average annual ownership 
cost including financing, insurance, license, registration, and depreciation (American 
Automobile Association, 2012). Let us remain agnostic about her preferences for personal 
car travel vs. shared car travel, allowing the trip type preference ratio ݔ/ݖ to vary between 0 
and 2.5, with ݖ ൌ 0.05 (i.e., the person values traveling a mile in a shared car 1/20 as much 
as “other” consumption). Let us also explore a range of potential price ratios, letting ௦ܲ/ ௢ܲ 
range from 0.5 (shared car miles are half as expensive as personal car miles) to 5 (shared car 
miles are 5 times more expensive than owned car miles), with the own car mileage price set 
at the (AAA) estimate for operating costs of $0.167 per mile (American Automobile 
Association, 2012). 
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The portion of each plane that is “above” the other plane (i.e., higher on the z axis) in 
panel A makes up the consideration set:13 to maximize utility, the individual making the 
travel mode decision would evaluate her preferences and the actual prices of shared car and 
owned car travel, then choose the option corresponding to whatever plane is higher (i.e., that 
leads to more utility) at that point. For instance, for a price ratio of 3 and trip preference ratio 
of 2, owning a car provides more utility than a shared car; but for a price ratio of 3 and a trip 
value ratio of 0.5, a shared car provides more utility. The curve where the two utility planes 
intersect (marked on the figure) is the set of price and preference values for which the 
individual is indifferent between taking shared car trips and purchasing a car. This line is 
infinitesimally thin, however, so the probability of a price ratio–preference ratio combination 
leading to true indifference is zero. The indifference line can thus better be thought of as the 
set of decision cutoff points. 
Once the travel mode decision has been made, we can turn to panel B of Figure 1.10, 
which shows the optimal number of trips under each scenario, using an x-y axis and coloring 
identical to panel A. From panel B we can see that there are some price ratio–preference ratio 
combinations that result in more trips under the shared car scenario (where the yellow-pink 
plane is higher on the z axis than the rainbow plane), and some that result in more trips under 
the owned car scenario (the reverse). Similarly to panel A, the curve where the two trip 
planes intersect is the set of price ratio/preference ratio points where the two scenarios result 
in an equal number of trips (also marked on the figure). 
Combining Figure 1.10 panels A and B, there are four possible outcomes. Depending 
on the actual price ratio of owned vs. shared mileage and on individual trip type preferences, 
individuals can: 
                                                 
13 The portions of the planes not in the consideration set are slightly grayed-out in panel A. 
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 Choose a personal car and drive more as a result 
 Choose a personal car and drive less as a result 
 Choose a shared car and drive more as a result 
 Choose a shared car and drive less as a result 
We can use the two intersection curves from both panels of Figure 1.10 to determine 
the range of parameter values that will result in each of these outcomes. Figure 1.11 shows 
the intersection curves projected onto the x-y plane. The area above the utility intersection 
curve denotes points where the individual will choose a personal car, while the area below it 
denotes points where she will choose a shared car. The area above the mileage intersection 
curve denotes points where choosing an owned car will result in more mileage, while the area 
below this curve denotes points where choosing a shared car will result in more mileage. 
Thus, the figure is divided into four quadrants corresponding to the four outcomes listed 
above. For points in the upper left quadrant (white solid), the individual will choose to own a 
personal car and will consequently drive fewer miles than she would have if she were forced 
to car share. On the upper right (dotted), she will choose a personal car and will drive more 
than she would under car sharing. On the lower left (gray solid), the individual will choose a 
shared car and will drive more than she would have if she were forced to purchase a car; on 
the lower right (diagonal hash), she will choose a shared car but drive less as a result. 
There are several interesting general outcomes of Figure 1.11. One is to note that for 
the modeled parameters (income of $50k, fixed costs of $6k or 12% of income), individuals 
who are indifferent between shared cars and owned cars (i.e., the line at ݔ ݖ⁄ ൌ 1) will never 
opt to purchase a car, even if shared car mileage costs five times as much as owned car 
mileage. This is because buying a car effectively reduces total consumption by the amount of 
the fixed cost, lowering utility.  
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fewer miles is infeasible within the actual price region for this set of parameters). People with 
the assumed parameters who do not have a preference for owning a car (ݔ ݖ⁄ ൌ 1) will 
choose to share a car within this price region. Whether they choose to drive more or less with 
a shared car than they would have if car sharing were not an option depends on how much 
they value car travel in general and how much they value personal car travel to shared car 
travel. The general shape of these curves and results of the model are robust to variation in 
the parameters ܰ, ௙ܲ, and ݖ (see  the Appendix for more details). 
The behavioral model is useful because it shows how different relative mileage 
prices, fixed costs, and preferences can affect the decision of whether or not to use car 
sharing and how VMT can be affected as a result. From the range of real-life price ratios, we 
were able to see the set of feasible outcomes. However, this feasible set includes three of the 
four original possibilities: choose an owned car and drive more, choose a shared car and 
drive more, and choose a shared car and drive less. Therefore, without further information on 
car travel preferences (both relative to other consumption and each type relative to the other), 
the model was unable to determine with certainty which outcome will be realized. In 
principal, one could measure an individual’s preferences to determine where he or she falls in 
Figure 1.11. With enough individual observations, one could also establish a probability 
distribution of preferences, from which one could determine the various probabilities of each 
of the three feasible outcomes occurring. 
Following this approach, one could determine what proportion of a city’s population 
is likely to use car sharing if it were introduced, and the number of miles those people would 
drive as a result. From this information, the net green status of car sharing, with respect to net 
VMT, could be established. Suppose, for example, one discovered that in a city of 100,000 
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people, 40% would be likely to use car sharing instead of buying a car, and of those, half 
would drive an additional 1,000 miles each year while the other half would drive 1,500 less 
each year, on average. Then the net change in VMT would be 100,000 ൈ 0.4ሺ0.5 ൈ 1000 െ
0.5 ൈ 1500ሻ ൌ 20 ൈ 10଺ െ 30 ൈ 10଺ ൌ െ10M vehicle miles. 
The model only describes the own-or-share decision.15 This, of course, is one of many 
possible decisions facing urban travelers. Nonetheless, the model demonstrates how, with 
more complexity, these kinds of behavioral decisions could be modeled in order to determine 
the net effect car sharing has on vehicle miles traveled and, in general, the net green status of 
a dematerialization activity (of course recognizing the inherent limitations and 
simplifications of model-based approaches). 
Another possibility to answer focus question #2 is to survey car sharing users and ask 
them about their current driving behavior, their past driving behavior (before car sharing), as 
well as their projections of what they would have done if car sharing had not been available, 
which was the approach taken by Martin and Shaheen (2011b). These authors divide VMT 
changes into two categories: “observed” and “full.” Observed impacts are observable 
changes in VMT—simply the difference between VMT before and after a person joins car 
sharing. Full impacts are observed impacts minus any avoided impacts of foregone travel. 
Avoided impacts are impacts from mileage that a person would have traveled if he or she had 
purchased a car instead of joining car sharing. To estimate avoided VMT, Martin and 
                                                 
15 Although the discussion centered on the decision to buy or share a car, the model can equally be used to 
model the decision to continue to use an owned car or sell it to use a shared car. In this case, the decision would 
involve whether to eliminate the fixed cost associated with car ownership as well as increase income in the form 
of cash for the sold car. However, I will not derive the results of using the model in this way in this chapter. 
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Shaheen asked respondents how many cars they would have bought in the absence of car 
sharing, and how many miles they would have traveled with each.16 
     
Figure 1.13: How “observed” and avoided impacts are combined to calculate “full” impacts. 
Observed impacts are measurable changes in VMT before and after car sharing; avoided 
impacts are miles not traveled in vehicles not purchased as a result of car sharing. Full 
impacts are the sum of observed and avoided impacts. 
The two categories of impacts are illustrated in two hypothetical situations in Figure 
1.13. Panel A illustrates a household that sells a car upon joining car sharing. Since there is 
no avoided vehicle purchase, there are no avoided VMT and “full” impact is equal to 
“observed” impact, which is simply the difference between VMT before and after joining car 
sharing. Panel B illustrates a case of a household that would have bought a second car in the 
absence of car sharing. Before joining car sharing, they drove their owned car 200 VMT; 
after joining car sharing, they drive their owned car 150 VMT less, and drive a shared car 
300 VMT, for a net increase of 150 VMT. Additionally, because they joined car sharing, they 
decided not to buy a second vehicle, which they estimate they would have driven 400 VMT. 
Since they do not purchase the car, these 400 VMT are avoided. 
However, the situation in panel B is more complex than it may appear. A 
complicating factor—not discussed by Martin et al. but nonetheless crucial—is that the 
                                                 
16 Asking individuals to forecast their own counterfactual travel introduces considerable uncertainty; however, 
Martin and Shaheen conduct sensitivity analysis and determine that even significant (100%) overestimation of 
counterfactual travel would not change the overall results of the survey. 
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calculation of avoided impacts depends on the household’s assumed future behavior with 
respect to their owned car in the absence of car sharing (i.e., the counterfactual). As it is 
illustrated, there is an implicit assumption that the 150 VMT decrease in owned car usage 
was due to the household joining car sharing, and without car sharing the household would 
have continued to drive their owned car 200 VMT in addition to the 400 VMT of the second 
car. However, if the household would have decreased this car’s usage by 150 VMT even in 
the absence of car sharing, perhaps because they favor their new second car, then the full 
impact calculated as shown in the figure is overstated by 150 VMT. Instead, the 150 VMT 
decrease of the owned car must also be counted in the “buy a second car” counterfactual. 
“Full” impact is “what happened” minus “what would have happened”; if the owned 
car would have been driven less in either case it must be included in both parts of the 
equation. Thus, the true avoided impacts in this case are the 400 VMT of the foregone car 
less the 150 VMT of the decrease in the owned car. Therefore, the “full” impacts are the sum 
of the additional 300 VMT of the shared car, less the decreased 150 VMT of the first owned 
car, less the avoided VMT: 300 – 150 – (400 – 150) = –100 VMT. In other words, the effect 
of the decrease in the first owned car is canceled out of the net impact calculation since it 
occurs either with or without car sharing. This highlights a general point about the 
importance of the forecasted counterfactual future. In this case, different assumptions about 
the counterfactual can significantly change the “full” impact calculation. I will return to this 
important concept in the conclusion. 
Based on the survey data from Martin and Shaheen (2011b), 58% of car sharing 
households were previously carless and joined a car sharing service to gain access to a 
vehicle. Among these previously carless households, 100% reported increases in their vehicle 
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miles traveled by car (by definition). By comparison, 17% of the survey respondents shed at 
least one owned vehicle after joining car sharing, and an additional 8% decided to join car 
sharing instead of replacing or repairing a nonoperational vehicle. Among these households, 
88–93% reported reducing their vehicle travel, with the size of reductions depending on the 
number of vehicles shed (reductions were greater among households going from one car to 
none). The travel reductions in this group were much larger (often an order of magnitude) 
than the increases of those in the previously carless group. Thus, the increases of carless 
households driving shared cars was offset by the reductions of households driving less after 
shedding cars. The average direct VMT change after joining car sharing was െ1,081 miles 
per year (27% decrease), and the average full VMT change—including miles that would have 
been driven in the absence of car sharing—was െ1,728 miles per year (43% decrease). 
Considering these changes in vehicle miles traveled as well as changes in fuel 
economy from owned to shared vehicles, Martin and Shaheen calculate the average 
household “full” GHG impact according to the formula 
 ܩܪܩ௙௨௟௟ ൌ ܧܨሺܸܯ ௡ܶ௘௪ ൈ ܨܧ௡௘௪ െ ܸܯ ௢ܶ௟ௗ ൈ ܨܧ௢௟ௗ െ ܸܯ ௔ܶ௩௢௜ௗ ൈ ܨܧ௔௩௢௜ௗሻ	 (7.6)
where ܧܨ is the EPA emission factor for combustion of gasoline, ܸܯ ௢ܶ௟ௗ and ܸܯ ௡ܶ௘௪ are 
vehicle miles traveled before and after joining car sharing, respectively, ܨܧ௢௟ௗ and ܨܧ௡௘௪ are 
the fuel efficiencies of vehicles used before and after joining car sharing, respectively, and 
ܸܯ ௔ܶ௩௢௜ௗ and ܨܧ௔௩௢௜ௗ are the number of miles and fuel efficiency not driven on foregone 
vehicles (i.e., the avoided “full impact” emissions). Direct GHG emissions are identical 
except they omit the avoided emissions. Not included in the GHG calculation were vehicle 
production and disposal emissions and emissions from public transportation use. The GHG 
formula was applied to each survey respondent, and the results were binned into a histogram 
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because they represent larger increases or decreases). Thus, the survey results of Martin and 
Shaheen (2011b) show that, in aggregate, car sharing reduces VMT in personal vehicles and 
associated GHG emissions, but this decrease is not uniform across all car sharing users: A 
minority of users who exhibit large VMT reductions compensate for the majority of users 
who increase VMT. 
3) What is the effect of car sharing on mileage shifts to and from public transportation? 
Answering key question #2 focused on VMT changes resulting from the decision to 
buy a personal car or use a shared car, and how much to drive a personal car versus a shared 
car. However, also at issue is the effect that car sharing can have on various modes of public 
and alternative transportation. Changes in public transportation usage are important because 
they reduce the size of the VMT changes discussed in the previous section, as illustrated in 
Figure 1.15. 
In panel A of the figure, the increases in car VMT from previously carless households 
gaining access to shared vehicles are partially offset by reductions in public transport VMT. 
Conversely, for households that shed cars, reductions in car VMT are partially offset by 
increases in public transport VMT (panel B). This effect is important to keep in mind while 
answering focus question #3: Because we have already evaluated changes in car VMT in 
focus question #2, changes in public transportation usage discussed in this section are 
separate and in addition to the changes in car VMT discussed earlier. Somewhat 
counterintuitively, therefore, increases in public transportation usage represent increases—
not decreases—in GHG emissions. 
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Figure 1.15: How shifts toward and away from public transportation usage compensate for 
shifts in car VMT. The net change in total travel is the difference between travel before and 
after car sharing, which is less than the change in car VMT if public transport is used instead. 
PMT stands for passenger miles traveled, since a public transportation user only adds an 
additional passenger—rather than additional vehicle—for each additional mile traveled. 
As reported by Martin and Shaheen (2011b), the majority of car sharing users are 
people who did not own a car before joining car sharing. This means that, outside of 
occasional rental cars, they had no access to car travel and thus used public or alternative 
transportation (motor scooter, walking, biking, etc.). Traveling by car can be more 
convenient than traveling by public or alternative transportation due to increased freedom 
and flexibility. Thus, because car sharing gives carless households access to car travel, it may 
shift their travel from public or alternative transportation to car travel. Previously carless 
people who used public transportation for errands may find a shared car more convenient and 
use public transportation less. This shift increases these households’ car VMT, but decreases 
their public transportation travel, which partially offsets the emissions increase. However, 
alternative transportation typically has low or no emissions, and public transportation has 
very low emissions per passenger mile traveled (PMT) due to high vehicle capacity; thus, the 
public transportation decrease will not fully offset increases in car VMT, even if it is an even 
shift in terms of mileage. 
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On the other hand, in many urban environments driving a car is less convenient than 
taking public or alternative transportation due to high vehicle congestion and limited parking. 
It is conceivable that some people own a car only because they occasionally need to use it for 
abnormal trips for which public or alternative transportation would be impractical. Yet, 
because they own the car, they may take more trips (on weekends, or occasional commuting) 
simply because it is easy to do so. With car sharing as an option, these people may decide 
that occasionally using a shared car fills the need for occasional abnormal trips, and may 
choose to sell their owned car. Without the availability of an owned car, not only will these 
people drive less in total, they may increase their usage of public or alternative 
transportation. This increase will offset the emissions reductions from car VMT, but due to 
the lower emissions per PMT of public transportation this offset will not be full. 
In their third car sharing article, Martin and Shaheen (2011a) report results from the 
car sharing survey on members’ transportation mode shifts after joining a car sharing service. 
Portions of these results are reproduced in Tables 1.9 and 1.10. 
Transportation mode Number of people increased Number of people decreased Increase ratio 
Rail 494 589 0.84 
Bus 732 828 0.88 
Walk 756 568 1.33 
Bike 628 235 2.67 
Carpool 289 99 2.92 
Ferry 6 13 0.46 
Table 1.9: Summary of transportation mode shifts (source: Martin & Shaheen, 2011a). 
Increase ratio is calculated as the number of people increasing the mode divided by the 
number of people decreasing the mode. An increase ratio greater than one indicates that more 
people increased than decreased the transportation mode. 
Table 1.9 shows the number of people who increased and decreased different 
alternative and public transportation modes, along with the ratio of people increasing to 
people decreasing each mode. From the table, the effect of car sharing on public and 
alternative transportation usage appears to be mixed. Some car sharing members increased 
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their public transportation use, but more decreased it. For every six people who decreased rail 
use, only five people increased it; for every eight people who rode the bus less, only seven 
people rode the bus more. More people increased rather than decreased their travel by 
bicycle, carpool, and walking. 
Martin and Shaheen attribute these findings to the large proportion of carless 
households in the sample. They suggest that whether people use public transportation more 
or less after having access to car sharing is a result of differences in travel circumstances. 
Those who previously had a car and are adapting to a carless lifestyle will ride public 
transportation more; those previously without cars will ride public transportation less. Since 
60% of the sample was carless before car sharing, the results are pushed toward an overall 
decrease in public transportation usage. 
People can appear in Table 1.9 more than once (for instance, the six people who 
increased ferry use may have also increased usage of the other modes), making it difficult to 
draw conclusions about overall transportation shifts. Table 1.10 presents similar information 
but groups the transportation modes into car travel vs. public and alternative transportation, 
and places each respondent into only one category based on whether he or she increased, 
decreased, both increased and decreased, or had no change in their public and alternative 
transport modes. This split makes it clearer that more people increased their usage of public 
and alternative transportation than decreased it. Additionally shown is the average VMT in 
personal cars for respondents in each group, which shows that the personal car VMT 
decrease from people who increased their usage of alternative and public transportation far 
outweighs the personal car VMT increase from people who decreased their usage of these 
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transport modes. Even people who stated both an increase and a decrease in public and 
alternative transportation tended to drive less as a result. 
Measurement Direction of change after joining car sharing 
Respondent 
count 
Average observed
personal VMT 
change 
(VMT/yr/hh) 
Average 
hours 
using transit 
Increased public and alternative transport only 1,046 (17%) -5,040 
Both increased and decreased public and alternative 
transport 755 (12%) -1,711 
Decreased public and alternative transport only 901 (14%) 438 
No stated change in and alternative transport 3,579 (57%) -181 
Table 1.10: Change in nonmotorized/public transit travel (source: Martin & Shaheen, 2011a) 
Interestingly, there were differences in the mode-change and driving distance 
behavior of users among the eleven car sharing companies represented in the sample, 
indicating that there may be differences in the companies’ marketing or target consumers that 
encourage either increased or decreased public transportation usage, a point to which we 
shall return in the conclusions. 
Mode 
Passenger-miles 
per gallon Source Notes 
Car 23.3 Martin, Shaheen, & Lidicker (2010) Owned-car average 
Rail 52.6 DOT NTS Table 4-27a pMPG-equivalent, assuming U.S. EPA 
standard 33.7 kWh/gal 
Bus 48.6 DOT NTS Table 4-24a  
Walk 0  Excludes food energy 
Bike 0  Excludes food energy 
Carpool 46.6 Calculated Double car MPG; assumes two 
occupants 
Ferry 13.6 Cottrell (2011) Vessel count-weighted average of all 
U.S. ferry operators reporting to 
National Transit Database 
a U.S. Department of Transportation (2012) National Transportation Statistics; 2011 values 
Table 1.11: Average fuel efficiency used to compute GHG change from transportation mode 
shifts 
In order to calculate the net GHG change from transportation mode shifts, more 
information would be needed. First, representative fuel efficiencies for each transportation 
mode would be required, such as those shown in Table 1.11. Second, data on each individual 
car sharing member’s VMT for each transportation mode would be needed. These data could 
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be combined to calculate a net change in fuel consumption and, with a fuel emission factor, a 
net change in GHG emissions. Unfortunately, the survey authors have not made the 
individual-level data available to conduct this analysis. Aggregated information such as 
shown in Tables 1.9 and 1.10 is insufficient because it is impossible to determine the source 
and destination of the mode shifts. 
Even without this calculation, however, we have come a good deal closer to 
answering key question #3. Basically, the answer is that car sharing does draw some people 
away from public and alternative transportation, but it draws more people toward them. Due 
to the lifestyles of formerly carless people (short commute distances, urban settings, etc.), the 
increase in car VMT from those decreasing their use of public and alternative transportation 
is outweighed by the VMT decrease of people shedding cars; however, this decrease is 
partially offset by these people using more public and alternative transportation. In summary, 
car sharing appears to create a net transportation mode shift that lowers overall VMT and 
likely (but not assuredly) lowers net GHG emissions. 
4) What is the total effect of car sharing on the production and disposal of new cars? 
The discussion of the net green status of car sharing thus far has focused exclusively 
on use-phase emissions. GHG emissions from use are an important part of a transportation 
system’s overall impact, but they are not the only impacts. According to a life cycle 
assessment by Hawkins, Singh, Majeau-Bettez, and Strømman (2013), fuel combustion 
makes up 65% of total GHG emissions, but production and end-of-life (EOL) are the second-
largest category at 15% of GHG emissions; production and EOL also represent the largest 
life cycle phase in terms of human and ecotoxicity impacts. Production and EOL impacts are 
relevant for car sharing because car sharing has the potential to change net vehicle 
production. This aspect of car sharing is often highlighted in car sharing marketing materials. 
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Zipcar Inc., for instance, claims that “each and every Zipcar takes fifteen personally owned 
vehicles off the road” (Zipcar Inc., 2014b), which they derive from data and statements made 
by Martin et al. (2010). Whether this claim is true has a potentially large bearing on the net 
green status of car sharing. 
To evaluate the effect of car sharing on vehicle production, let us first make several 
simplifying assumptions that should be uncontroversial. First, assume that on average, each 
vehicle produced is driven for a lifetime of ܯ miles before being scrapped. ܯ represents the 
point at which the vehicle has been fully “consumed” and is more valuable as scrap than as a 
vehicle, and therefore depends on a number of factors that we will discuss. Note that this first 
assumption does not require every vehicle to be driven for the same number of miles, merely 
that the average lifetime over the entire vehicle fleet is equal to ܯ, around which we expect 
there to exist a distribution of actual vehicle lifetimes. Second, assume that there is a total 
“demand” for vehicle-miles by all consumers each year (or other time period ݐ), equal to 
ܸܯ ௧ܶ. This number is simply the sum of all miles traveled by all vehicles over the period ݐ, 
estimates of which are readily available from many transportation statistics agencies. Third, 
assume that new vehicles are produced as old vehicles are scrapped to the extent that they are 
needed to fulfill ܸܯ ௧ܶ. Therefore, in the steady state where VMT is constant, the number of 
vehicles produced equals the number of vehicles scrapped, which is equivalent to the number 
of vehicles fully consumed in the period.17 We can then express the total number of vehicles 
scrapped and produced in the period ( ௧ܸ) by dividing period VMT by vehicle lifetime: 
 
௧ܸ ൌ ܸܯ ௧ܶܯ (7.7)
                                                 
17 Because the number of vehicles produced equals the number disposed of, for the remainder of the discussion I 
refer only to vehicle production rather than vehicle production and disposal. 
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We can confirm the validity of this approach by plugging actual values for VMT and 
vehicle production into eq. 7.7 and ensuring this produces a sensible vehicle lifetime 
estimate. For instance, total U.S. VMT for cars in 2010 was 1.56 ൈ 1012 miles (Davis, 
Diegel, & Bundy, 2013); total U.S. car sales and leases in 2010 were 7.53 ൈ 106 (U.S. 
Bureau of Transportation Statistics, 2013), which results in ܯ ൌ 207,000 miles. The Federal 
Highway Administration estimated that 2002 vehicle lifetimes were 152,000 miles, and 
lifetimes have been increasing over time (Davis et al., 2013), so the estimate for ܯ is 
reasonable. 
The point of presenting new vehicle production in this way is to highlight that there 
are only two variables that can change the number of vehicles produced: total VMT, which 
has a direct relationship with vehicle production, and vehicle lifetime, which has an inverse 
relationship with vehicle production. It is also worth emphasizing here that vehicle 
production is equivalent to new car sales; used car sales simply shuffle existing cars around 
among owners until they reach their ܯ-mile lifetime. Used car sales, therefore, do not have 
any impact on vehicle production except to the extent that they change either total VMT or 
vehicle lifetime. This important fact has been misunderstood in prior car sharing literature, a 
point to which we shall return shortly. 
Because the only variables that affect car production are VMT and vehicle lifetime, 
car sharing can only affect net vehicle production to the extent that it causes changes in either 
of these variables. The previous sections detailed how car sharing is likely to result in VMT 
reductions; all that is left is to ask how car sharing might affect vehicle lifetime. 
Average vehicle lifetime is collectively determined by car owners who must make 
decisions about whether to maintain or retire aging vehicles. Setting aside sentimentality and 
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other noneconomic concerns, the car owner’s fix-or-scrap decision is based on minimizing 
transportation costs in order to meet desired levels of travel. As a vehicle ages, more repairs 
are required and therefore vehicle maintenance becomes more expensive on the margin. At 
the same time, the option exists to scrap the vehicle and use the scrap value toward the 
purchase of a newer car. Presumably, scrap values are constant, based on the metal content of 
the vehicle. Therefore, the individual will choose to scrap the vehicle at the point when the 
annual cost of maintaining the vehicle ( ௠ܲ௔௜௡௧) becomes greater than the annualized fixed 
cost of purchasing a newer one ( ௙ܲ, as above), less the scrap value ( ௌܲ௖௥௔௣): 
 ௠ܲ௔௜௡௧ ൐ ௙ܲ െ ௌܲ௖௥௔௣ (7.8)
Thus, under these conditions, there are three determinants of vehicle lifetime: 
maintenance cost, scrap value, and replacement vehicle cost. It is difficult to imagine close 
causal links between the existence of car sharing and maintenance costs or scrap values. 
However, car sharing could very well change the cost of buying a replacement vehicle by 
affecting the supply of vehicles in the market. Car sharing companies maintain very young 
fleets in order to provide users with modern, trouble-free rental vehicles. Zipcar Inc., for 
instance, only purchases new vehicles and maintains an average vehicle age of eleven months 
(Zipcar Inc., 2013), after which the cars are sold on the used car market. In 2012, there were 
twenty-six U.S. car sharing organizations operating 12,634 vehicles (Shaheen, 2012); if each 
is replaced every eleven months, this equates to over 13,700 cars, or 0.18% of U.S. annual 
new car sales (Davis et al., 2013), entering the used car market annually due to car sharing. It 
is conceivable that this increase in supply will reduce the price of used cars, which lowers ௙ܲ 
in eq. 7.8 and therefore decreases vehicle lifetime. The size of this effect is unknown, and is 
likely impossible to test until shared car fleets makes up a larger share of total vehicle sales. 
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Nonetheless, the key insight of this section is to realize that new car production is 
affected only by total VMT and vehicle lifetime. This is an interesting insight, since much is 
said in the car sharing literature about shed cars being “taken off the road.” Because cars 
shed by car sharing members are sold, not scrapped, this can be a misleading statement. Only 
foregone future vehicles—not shed vehicles—reduce net vehicle production and thus “take 
cars off the road.” 
With this in mind, let us assess the Zipcar marketing statement that “each and every 
Zipcar takes fifteen personally owned vehicles off the road” (Zipcar Inc., 2014b). Zipcar 
draws this statistic from Table 4 of Martin et al. (2010, p. 14), which estimates that the 
number of car sharing members across the entire car sharing industry who shed vehicles 
ranged between 36,565 and 73,129, and the number of members who “maybe, probably, or 
definitely would [have bought] a car in the absence of carsharing” (i.e., avoided vehicles) 
ranged between 39,299 and 78,598. This study also reports that 9,818 car sharing vehicles 
were in operation in 2010. The authors add the total number of vehicles shed and avoided 
and divide by the number of operational car sharing vehicles to arrive at a value of “vehicles 
removed per carsharing vehicle” between 7.7 and 15.5. Zipcar adopts the higher of these 
numbers and claims that each Zipcar removes fifteen cars from the road. 
The preceding discussion reveals that this methodology is flawed for two reasons. 
First, as mentioned, shed cars are not avoided cars. The method of summing shed cars and 
avoided cars as “removed cars” ignores the fact that shed cars continue to operate as used 
cars to the end of their useful lives. Second, in their survey, Martin and his colleagues did not 
ask car sharing members whether they would have bought a new car in the absence of car 
sharing, only whether they would have bought any car. As discussed, only new car sales 
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increase vehicle production—used car sales simply shuffle existing cars around until they 
reach the end of their lives. Therefore, only foregone new car sales can truly be said to be 
avoided and therefore to reduce net vehicle production and disposal. However, this 
information was not recorded in the survey.  
We can calculate a different estimate for the change in vehicle production caused by 
car sharing using real-world data in eq. 7.7. Assuming the “full” VMT change of –1,728 
miles per car sharing user per year, as discussed in focus question 2, and 806,332 U.S. car 
sharing users in 2012 (Shaheen, 2012), and assuming that the effect of car sharing on vehicle 
lifetimes is negligible and average vehicle lifetimes are 207,000 miles, the change in vehicle 
production is: 
 Δ ௧ܸ ൌ Δܸܯ ௧ܶܯ ൌ
െ1,728 miles ሺyear ൈ userሻିଵ ൈ 806,332 users
207,000 miles carିଵ
ൌ െ6,731 cars yearିଵ
(7.9)
Using the 2012 car sharing fleet size of 12,634 vehicles (Shaheen, 2012), this equates 
to –6,731/12,634 = –0.53, or half of a new vehicle avoided for every shared vehicle. These 
estimates are 11–23 times smaller than those reported by Martin et al. (2010). Even using an 
extremely conservative estimate for ܯ of 100,000 miles results in 13,933 avoided cars, or 1.1 
avoided cars per shared car. The discrepancy between these numbers and those of Martin and 
his colleagues is due to the fact that those authors 1) count shed cars as avoided cars and 2) 
assume that avoided used cars reduce vehicle production. This discussion has shown that the 
true parameters of interest are total VMT and vehicle lifetime, and that a more reasonable 
estimate of the net effect of car sharing on vehicle production is less than one avoided new 
car per shared car. Thus, car sharing does appear to create net benefit through reduced 
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vehicle production and disposal, though the quantity of avoided cars is smaller than 
previously estimated. 
7.1.3 Is car sharing net green? 
In this, the most complex of the four case studies, we used the lens of the net green 
definition to examine the practice of dematerializing vehicle transportation by sharing cars. 
We recognized that there are four different sets of effects that car sharing can have on the 
environment: shifting travel between more and less efficient vehicles, changing vehicle miles 
traveled, shifting travel between personal vehicles and public transportation, and changing 
the production and disposal of new personal vehicles. In each of these, there was potential for 
car sharing to either increase or decrease net environmental impacts. By applying the net 
green definition and following chains of causality we determined that the answer to whether 
car sharing is net green rests with four key questions: 
1) Are shared cars likely to be more or less efficient than the personal cars with 
which they compete? 
2) What effect does car sharing have on personal vehicle-miles traveled? 
3) What is the effect of car sharing on mileage shifts to and from public 
transportation use? 
4) What is the effect of car sharing on the production and disposal of new cars? 
Answering the first question was simply a matter of using data from Martin and his 
colleagues (2010) to determine the average fuel efficiency of vehicles previously used by car 
sharing members vs. those of car sharing fleet vehicles used instead. The data indicate that 
car sharing vehicles are 41% more efficient than shed personal vehicles, on average. 
I attempted to answer the second question two ways. First, I developed a behavioral 
model that described people’s decision to buy a car or use a shared car. The model showed 
that people will choose both options depending on prices and preferences, and that within the 
range of real-life prices, either choice is possible. Within this range, the decision to drive a 
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personal car will always result in higher VMT. The decision to car share can lead to either 
higher or lower VMT, depending on preferences for car travel in general and on preferences 
for personal car travel over shared car travel. Second, I drew on findings from Martin and 
Shaheen (2011b), who found that even though the majority of car sharing members increased 
their VMT, the fact that the minority decreased VMT by a larger amount meant that, on 
average, car sharing members reduced their VMT by 43%. 
For the third question, first pointed out that because I already accounted for changes 
in car VMT in the second question, increases in public transportation offset reductions in 
vehicle VMT caused by car sharing; conversely, reductions in public transport from carless 
households partially offset the car VMT increases of using shared cars. To quantify these 
effects, I turned again to Martin and Shaheen (2011a), who found that car sharing causes 
transportation mode shifts both toward and away from public and alternative transportation. 
As a result of car sharing, fewer people travel by bus and train, but more people walk and 
bike. However, data on the VMT changes in each of these modes was unavailable, so I was 
unable to calculate net GHG emissions from these modal shifts. 
The fourth question focused on vehicle production changes as a result of car sharing, 
a topic largely ignored in scholarly literature on car sharing, but often used in marketing 
information from car sharing companies. I started from a vehicle production framework that 
views cars as consumptive goods that have a fixed lifetime based on mileage. Using this 
framework, I showed that the only two parameters that affect net vehicle production are total 
VMT and vehicle lifetime. Using VMT change data from Martin and Shaheen (2011b) and 
reasonable vehicle lifetimes, car sharing decreases vehicle production by half a car per shared 
car, as compared to the 7- to 15-car decrease per shared car reported by Martin et al. (2010) 
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and used in Zipcar marketing. In this case, applying the net green definition allowed us to cut 
through marketing statements to determine the real extent to which car sharing decreases 
vehicle production. 
8 CONCLUSION 
With the passage of the Pollution Prevention Act, environmental management focus 
moved from pollution control to pollution prevention, with the idea that “pollution 
prevention … offers the exciting possibility of reconciling economic growth with 
environmental protection to enhance the quality of life for ourselves and our children” 
(Browner, 1993). Pollution prevention was seen as the solution to sustainable development. 
However, this article has shown that true sustainable development requires going 
further. I introduced a new definition of greenness, “net green,” which states that an activity 
is net green if and only if it produces net environmental benefit. This definition shifts the 
focus from policies and procedures to actual environmental consequences, and in four case 
studies I demonstrated that no pollution control or prevention activities are guaranteed to 
produce net environmental benefit—indeed some, such as corn ethanol, are all but 
guaranteed to do the opposite. 
We stated that all industrial activity causes environmental damage, and raised the 
question of how, then, can we hold industrial activities to a standard of creating 
environmental benefit? The answer rests in consequential thinking: the idea that the 
environmental impact of a product or activity is not just its direct impacts, but the impacts of 
changes it causes to the economic system in which it exists. Consequential thinking involves 
following cause-effect chains as they ripple out from an activity and cause changes to other 
systems, which themselves have environmental implications. Some of those changes may 
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increase environmental impacts from the baseline; others may decrease them. Under the new 
net green definition, what determines whether an activity is green is the sum of these positive 
and negative changes: If the net effect of the activity is to decrease total environmental 
impacts from the baseline, the activity is net green; if it increases total impacts, it is not. 
8.1 Common themes 
To demonstrate the method and usefulness of the net green definition, I applied it to 
four case studies representing the four categories of pollution control and prevention (PCP) 
activities. Though the specific methods of analysis and findings varied among all four, 
several common themes emerged: 
First, the potential to create net environmental benefit rests with the displacement of 
more harmful alternative activities. Without displacement, any industrial activity—no matter 
how “green” it may seem—necessarily increases net environmental impact. Only by 
displacing other activities can an industrial activity create negative impacts and thus create 
environmental benefit. Maximizing this displacement, both in terms of the environmental 
impact of the displaced activity and the amount displaced, is the key to maximizing net 
environmental improvement. 
This leads to the second common theme, which is the importance of determining what 
the displaced alternative activity is. This question has two pieces. First is a methodological 
question: Against what alternative should the activity be compared to determine its net 
effect? The second is a forecasting question: What is the counterfactual future that would 
occur in the absence of the activity? The methodological comparison question was most 
salient in the carbon capture and storage (CCS) and corn ethanol cases. In both cases, there 
were two types of comparisons discussed. First, there was a “before vs. after” comparison. In 
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the CCS case, we compared the direct emissions of a coal power plant before and after CCS 
was installed. It was relatively straightforward to determine that CCS reduces CO2 emissions 
relative to a non-CCS plant. In the corn ethanol case, it was clear that corn ethanol creates 
lower source-to-wheels CO2 emissions than gasoline (although the issue of indirect land use 
change made matters more complicated). Second, there was a “with vs. without” comparison. 
In both the CCS and corn ethanol cases, this centered on the more complicated issue of 
whether CCS or corn ethanol changes the future trajectory of the energy industry by lowering 
the incentive to transition to renewable energy sources. 
The distinction between the before/after and the with/without comparisons is 
illustrated in Figure 1.16. The before/after comparison is depicted by the change in the level 
of the solid “activity” line: Before, emissions are at the status quo level, and after, they are 
lower. This sort of comparison is commonly made in environmental assessments, and in life 
cycle assessment it is known as “attributional” analysis; however, the before/after 
comparison is not equivalent to net environmental impact. The net green definition requires 
that we look beyond the before/after comparison to determine the net consequences of the 
activity. This requires a forecast about the future both with the activity and without the 
activity; the future without the activity is the counterfactual. Whether the activity creates net 
environmental benefit or harm is determined by whether the future with the activity is 
environmentally better or worse than the counterfactual. 
105 
 
Figure 1.16: How before/after comparison differs from with/without comparison: The 
activity that occurs in period T1 appears to have environmental benefits as compared to the 
prior state. In the future, whether the activity results in net benefit or damage depends on the 
assumed counterfactual scenario. Under counterfactual 1, the activity causes additional 
environmental damage; under counterfactual 2 the activity results in net benefit. 
This brings us to the forecasting question. As shown in the figure, the determination 
of net impact rests not only on the environmental impact of the activity itself, but also on the 
assumed counterfactual. For example, applying the CCS case to Figure 1.16, the line for 
Counterfactual 1 could represent a future where CO2 emissions force the world to transition 
to renewable energy. Based on this comparison, CCS results in a net increase in CO2 
emissions by the amount of the difference between the Activity line and the Counterfactual 1 
line. The line for Counterfactual 2 could represent a future where no renewable energy 
transition occurs; in this case, CCS would be seen to reduce net CO2 emissions. 
Determining the most appropriate comparison is difficult because it relies on 
counterfactual reasoning, asking “what would have happened in the absence of this activity?” 
Yet, this type of analysis is required in order to know whether an activity increases or 
decreases environmental damage, and therefore whether it is net green. Careful 
consideration, accurate modeling, and, when possible, exploiting natural experiments can 
help select the most appropriate alternative scenario for comparison. Often, however, the best 
one can do might be to use scenario modeling to derive conditional answers, such as “in 
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scenario A, this activity is net green, but in scenario B, it is not.” This was the case in the 
paper recycling case, and in the behavioral utility model of the car sharing case. If the 
probability of different scenarios occurring can be determined, as was the case with the 
displaced fine paper production technology, then probabilities can be likewise be attached to 
the activity’s net green status. 
Determining what is displaced is difficult, but it is not all we need to know. The third 
theme that emerged is the importance of determining how much of an activity is displaced. 
As we saw in the corn ethanol and car sharing cases, this can often be the most difficult 
determination since it involves sociobehavioral considerations. Chapter 2 will delve further 
into the factors that affect how much displacement occurs and will propose a methodology 
for estimating displacement rate. 
The fourth common emergent theme is that companies engaged in PCP activities have 
some control over the impact their activities have in the economic system, and therefore have 
some control over their net green status. For instance, there were differences in the mode-
change and driving distance behavior of car sharing users among the eleven car sharing 
companies surveyed by Martin et al. (2011a), indicating that there may be differences in the 
companies’ marketing or target consumers that encourage either increased or decreased 
public transportation usage. If a car sharing company wanted to ensure that it created net 
environmental benefit, and if it could somehow craft its service to be most visible or 
beneficial to people who would otherwise buy new cars and least visible or useful to those 
who presently ride public transport, it could maximize the environmental benefit of its car 
sharing service. 
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8.2 General findings about PCP activities 
Each case study examined a specific example of each type of PCP activity. Yet, 
through this examination we were able to distill some general results about each PCP 
category. Overall, it emerged that the different PCP categories had particular strengths and 
weaknesses. End-of-pipe pollution controls, while often effective at reducing the focal 
emission, require energy inputs and disposal of the captured emission that increase impacts in 
other life cycle stages and impact categories. The gains achieved by pollution controls may 
be outweighed by losses in other areas. However, if the pollutants of concern are harmful 
enough and the losses in other areas are small, as in the case of SOx and NOx filtration, end-
of-pipe controls can be effective. 
Similarly, recycling is an end-of-life solution that is limited by the quality of scrap 
input and the presence of a market for recycled material output, and the recycling process 
itself requires energy and material inputs. Recycling can potentially create large benefits by 
displacing the production of more harmful primary materials, but how much displacement 
actually occurs is not clear. 
Theoretically, material substitution has more promise in general, since it moves the 
locus of change upstream in product life cycle, seeking to reduce waste at the point of 
creation rather than at end-of-life or end-of-pipe. Substantial gains can be achieved in this 
category, but only if the future implications of the new substitute material or technology are 
examined across all impact categories and throughout the entire life cycle. Unforeseen 
macro-level consequences (for instance, indirect land use change in the case of corn ethanol) 
that ripple through the economic system can offset any gains from the substitution, and may 
involve impact category tradeoffs or difficult social justice issues. 
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Dematerialization, in principle, offers the most potential to create environmental 
benefit because it seeks to reduce material consumption entirely rather than swap it for other 
materials or treat downstream waste. Yet, dematerialization has its drawbacks. Most 
importantly, servicizing functions changes their cost structure and therefore the behavior of 
their users. These changes may create rebound effects, where people use more of the function 
because it is cheaper or more convenient, reducing or negating any material reduction gains. 
Additionally, to the extent that servicizing functions makes them cheaper, this essentially 
increases consumers’ available income to spend on other goods. The environmental impact 
of this marginal consumption may be higher or lower than that of the original function; 
quantifying this effect was beyond the scope of this paper but deserves research attention. 
Overall we saw that PCP activities in all four categories have potential benefits as 
well as important drawbacks. Yet, it should be pointed out that the above case studies were 
selected because they highlight interesting tradeoffs and complications; sometimes, however, 
applying the net green definition is much simpler and clearer, particularly for activities that 
fail to meet the standard. For instance, consider the recent meteoric rise of single-serving, 
pod-based coffee. Sales of pod coffee machines in the U.S. increased from 1.6 million to 11.6 
million units from 2008 to 2013 (Ferdman, 2014). As of 2012, pod-coffee giant Nestlé had 
sold over 27 billion Nespresso pods worldwide, a staggering figure which does not even take 
into account the roughly 5 billion Keurig pods sold every year by Nestlé’s largest competitor, 
Green Mountain (Cornelius, 2012). At the same time, the added convenience for the user of 
being able to brew coffee with no preparation or cleanup means that pod coffee systems may 
encourage more coffee consumption overall (although the convenience factor may be 
tempered by the fact that pod coffee is considerably more expensive per pound than 
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traditional coffee). What this represents is the exact opposite of dematerialization: Whereas 
the function of at-home coffee brewing was traditionally fulfilled by replaceable or reusable 
filter drip coffee machines, which have very little or no material waste per cup, pod-based 
coffee systems fulfill the same function with many times the material production and 
disposal. This is a drastic over-materialization to achieve the same function. In this case, the 
net green determination is straightforward: Single-serve pod coffee is unambiguously not net 
green. 
Nonetheless, from this discussion it should be apparent that even activities that on the 
surface seem to be clearly net green can often be very complex once their various possible 
consequences are unpacked. By applying the net green definition to activities that seem to be 
green, we are forced to closely and rigorously examine the likely impacts of the activity 
rather than use ad hoc or heuristic judgments about what seems to be green. The value of the 
new definition of greenness, therefore, is not simply to assist us in labeling some things green 
and others not, but to create a fundamental shift in our thinking, moving from things that 
seem environmental to things that actually improve the environment. 
8.3 Implications for corporate environmental management 
Realizing this shift in thinking is difficult. Following through cause-effect chains can 
require significant amounts of data, complex modeling, determinations of consumer 
behavior, and time-consuming analysis. Yet, the payoff of making this shift can be large, 
particularly for corporate environmental management scholars, as well as for corporate 
environmental managers and environmentally minded entrepreneurs. Applying the net green 
definition is useful in this realm for four principal reasons. 
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First, the net green definition provides much-needed rigor, structure, and direction to 
the “pays-to-be-green” debate. As discussed, this debate has focused on how, why, and when 
environmental business activities can increase profitability, but this discussion has been 
disconnected and remains unresolved, not least because there is no agreed-upon definition of 
what constitutes a green business activity. This paper fills that gap with the net green 
definition. 
This paper also highlights that business strategy and the environment, as a scholarly 
field, has much further to go in terms of answering the PTBG question. If, for the first time, 
we have a concrete definition of green, prior work examining the link between greenness and 
profitability must be reexamined with this new lens, or at least reframed. For instance, King 
and Lenox (2002) empirically showed that pollution prevention activities tend to be more 
profitable than pollution control activities. The authors assume pollution prevention is 
greener than pollution control, and therefore present this as evidence of a link between 
environmental benefit and financial benefit. However, the foregoing case studies showed that 
pollution prevention may be more environmentally beneficial than pollution controls, but we 
also saw that not all pollution prevention activities lead to net environmental benefit. Thus, 
King and Lenox’s findings do not necessarily support the “do well by doing good” argument. 
In fact, much of the literature in the PTBG arena may not actually contribute at all to 
answering the question of whether it pays to be green, since a clear definition of greenness 
has only now been described. Previous studies provided links between individual 
environmental measures and profitability. This paper has shown, however, that simple 
measures are not equivalent to—and may not even be related to—net environmental benefit, 
and thus cannot answer whether improving the environment is profitable. 
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This paper, by proposing and demonstrating the net green definition, establishes a 
clear research agenda aimed at unraveling the connection between profitability and 
environmental performance. To begin, we must evaluate activities that we use as independent 
variables in PTBG studies—our “environmental performance measures”—according to 
whether they result in net environmental benefit or damage. We must move beyond 
convenient measures such as TRI, KLD, and Trucost, and instead engage with industrial 
ecology scholars to determine the net environmental impact of the activities we are 
studying.18 Only then can we use those activities as measures in examinations of profitability. 
The second reason the net green definition is useful is that it provides guidance for 
corporate managers and entrepreneurs on how to actualize environmental performance. 
Increasingly, managers receive stakeholder pressure to green their companies, and more 
entrepreneurs start environmentally based ventures each year. Just as the lack of a definition 
of greenness in BS&E literature has waylaid the PTBG debate, a similar lack of definitional 
clarity exists in the practical business world that has left managers and entrepreneurs without 
guidance on how to create environmental companies. Many attempts to define green business 
exist outside of scholarly work. Many are extremely vague, such as Koester’s (2010) 
definition in his Green Entrepreneur Handbook: “A green business requires a balanced 
commitment to profitability, sustainability, and humanity.” Others are more specific, such as 
the Green Business Network (2012) green business standards, which include items such as 
“conserving resources and minimizing waste,” “using renewable energy,” “using chlorine-
free cleaning products,” “maximizing use of local organic food for events,” and “avoiding 
                                                 
18 In fact, we need much closer ties in general between BS&E and industrial ecology. Both fields study the 
interaction of industrial activity—business—and the environment. BS&E does so from the perspective of 
economics, while industrial ecology does so from the perspective of engineering, but both sides have much they 
can learn from the other to enhance the depth, credibility, and usefulness of their studies. 
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huge lawns.” These are statements without a benchmark, so it is unclear at what point they 
are achieved. (What is the “maximum” of local organic food? How big is a “huge” lawn? 
What constitutes a “balanced commitment” to the triple bottom line?) 
By contrast, the net green definition provides a clear mandate: Reduce net 
environmental impact. Unlike past conceptualizations of greenness, the net green definition 
does not attempt to prescribe specific actions, because the path toward impact reduction will 
be different in every case and will continually evolve. Instead, it provides a proactive goal 
(rather than a list of prohibitions) and a clear benchmark for success: If an activity improves 
the natural environment, it is net green; if not, it is not. If an entrepreneur wants to create an 
environmental firm, she should create one that, through its activities, reduces net 
environmental impact. She will know she has succeeded when she measures the 
environmental impact her company creates and that number is negative. In this way the net 
green definition is objective and specific without being prescriptive. This flexibility allows 
managers to capitalize on their companies’ strengths and resources with the clear goal of 
creating environmental benefit by shifting industrial activity from more damaging 
alternatives to cleaner ones—in other words, by taking business away from their dirtier 
competitors. 
The third reason the net green definition is useful is that it creates a foundation of 
legitimacy for a firm to make robust, transparent environmental marketing claims. As 
environmentalism becomes more important to consumers and policy makers, firms seek to 
use environmental marketing either to allay concerns about perceived negative environmental 
performance or to use their superior environmental performance as a source of competitive 
advantage. In order for their marketing messages to be effective, firms need to convey to 
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their stakeholders a sense of legitimacy—that they have their stakeholders’ best interests at 
heart, they are honest, and their messages are trustworthy (Suchman, 1995). Communication 
lies at the heart of this legitimacy (Suchman, 1995), yet firms currently struggle to effectively 
communicate the veracity of their environmental performance claims. This difficulty is due 
in large part to the lack of definition of greenness. Without such a metric, firms are forced to 
use incomplete measures or vague, hollow statements such as those discussed above. 
Vague or incomplete concepts of greenness are particularly problematic for firms that 
seek to communicate real environmental performance, because the value of their superior 
environmental position can only be realized if they can credibly distinguish themselves from 
their dirtier competitors. If they are unable to do so, distrust in the market leads to a classic 
“lemons market” problem that self-reinforces low selling prices and distrust from buyers, and 
ultimately drives legitimate firms out of business (Akerlof, 1970). Incomplete quantitative 
measures can easily be manipulated, and appeals to sustainability are just as frequently made 
by highly damaging companies as they are by virtuous ones. These messages thus become 
meaningless and are ineffective at differentiating truly green companies. 
Furthermore, in order to avoid their messages being attacked by environmental 
watchdog groups as “greenwashing,” firms must be able to defend the legitimacy of their 
claims. For instance, in 2007 Bente Oeverli, a senior official at the office of the Norwegian 
Consumer Ombudsman, announced that new advertising rules required that “phrases such as 
‘environmentally friendly,’ ‘green,’ ‘clean,’ ‘environmental car,’ ‘natural’ or similar 
descriptions not be used in marketing cars” (Doyle, 2007). A variety of auto manufacturers, 
including Toyota, Opel, Mitsubishi, and Saab, had all used advertising that the ombudsman 
found misleading, and all have since been banned from using environmental language in 
114 
Norwegian advertising. With this decision, the ability of auto companies to leverage the 
environmental performance of their products vis-à-vis their competitors was swiftly 
eliminated. 
The net green definition is thus particularly well suited to alleviate this lemons market 
problem by providing a method of communicating environmental performance in a way that 
is transparent and rigorous. Thus, the net green definition can enable firms to capitalize on 
their greenness and create a real impression of environmental performance safe from attacks 
of greenwashing. 
The fourth reason the net green definition is useful is that applying the net green 
definition and following through causal chains can expose loci of impact and potential 
benefit that were before hidden, allowing companies to examine their activities in these areas 
and work to create net environmental benefit. As the adage goes, “what gets measured gets 
managed,” and the net green definition provides a framework for quantifying net 
environmental impact. Because the net green definition rests on the notion of displacement, 
applying the sort of consequential analysis demonstrated in the case studies above may 
highlight interesting possibilities to expand into new markets, compete more effectively with 
other firms, and improve on weaknesses, all while creating net environmental benefit. 
In summary, the net green definition provides rigor and clarity to what counts as a 
green activity that will greatly assist researchers in industrial ecology and environmental 
business strategy, and will also provide guidance and a proactive goal for corporate 
environmental managers and environmental entrepreneurs. The methodology is demanding, 
but applying it allows us to ensure that our efforts in environmental management are not 
mere lip service, but result in physical, measurable improvements in the quality of the natural 
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environment. If we are serious about protecting the natural environment, the net green 
definition—net reduction in physical environmental impact—is the only acceptable measure 
of greenness on a corporate, governmental, and personal level.  
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APPENDIX: SENSITIVITY OF CAR SHARING UTILITY MODEL 
This section provides additional information on the sensitivity of the car sharing 
utility model described in Section 7 (p. 69). 
One source of variation in the utility and mileage intersection curves is the size of the 
annualized fixed price of car ownership relative to income. Lower fixed costs relative to 
income cause both utility and mileage intersection curves in to shift downward, as shown in 
Figure 1.A.1. As stated in the text, when fixed costs are 12% of income, the utility 
intersection curve never crosses the line ݔ ݖ⁄ ൌ 1, meaning trip-type-indifferent people will 
not choose to own a car even if the shared mileage price is five times higher than the owned 
mileage price. However, when fixed costs are 3% of income, the utility intersection curve 
crosses the line ݔ ݖ⁄ ൌ 1 at a price ratio of about 1.5. The utility intersection curve lowers 
because with higher levels of income, the fixed cost lowers consumption by a smaller relative 
amount and thus makes owned car travel attractive below a certain price ratio. This suggests 
that people with higher income or lower fixed ownership costs are more likely to own cars, 
even if they are indifferent in their owned vs. shared car preferences—a result that aligns 
well with what we observe in reality. 
Another source of variation in the model is the individual’s preference for car travel 
in general, relative to other consumption (i.e., ݔ or ݖ as compared to 1, the coefficient on ܻ in 
the utility function, eq. 7.1). Since trip type preference in the utility and mileage graphs is 
normalized to the value of ݖ, we can test how different levels of general mileage preference 
affect the utility and mileage decisions by testing different values of ݖ. In these calculations, 
the coefficient on consumption of ܻ remains constant at 1. As the individual’s preference for 
mileage increases from 0.05 to 1.5, the overall quantity of mileage consumed increases under 
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both scenarios, as expected, and the mileage intersection curve becomes more acute, as 
shown in Figure 1.A.2. Additionally, the utility intersection curve moves downward to 
converge at a place where it crosses the line ݔ/ݖ ൌ 1 at a price ratio of about 1.33. The 
mileage intersection curve also rotates around this point, meaning that with any value of ݖ, 
trip-type-indifferent people (ݔ ݖ⁄ ൌ 1) will drive more when they own a car than if they 
shared a car if the price ratio is at least 1.33. 
The variation observed with both of these factors is small, and does not change the 
shape of the curves or the behavior of the model. Therefore, neither of these factors changes 
the overall outcome or findings of the model. 
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CHAPTER 2 
QUANTIFYING PRIMARY PRODUCTION DISPLACEMENT: METHODOLOGY 
DEVELOPMENT AND ALUMINUM RECYCLING CASE STUDY  
 
ABSTRACT 
The most significant environmental benefit of recycling or reusing a wide range of 
products and materials is typically the potential to displace material production from primary 
resources; lack of displacement would significantly reduce these environmental benefits. 
Therefore, a method for quantifying the true “displacement rate” of primary production is 
essential to accurately assess the environmental benefits of reuse or recycling. As no 
consensus method has emerged, environmental assessments have tended to assume that 
secondary materials displace primary equivalents on a one-to-one basis. However, displaced 
production is a complex phenomenon governed primarily by market mechanisms rather than 
physical relationships. This two-part paper advances the understanding of displacement by 
presenting a displacement estimation methodology based on partial equilibrium market 
modeling. In the first part, a basic market model is developed that reveals the underlying 
mechanisms of displaced production and identifies key parameters affecting displacement 
rate. Results from the basic model suggest that one-to-one displacement occurs only under 
specific parameter restrictions that are unlikely in a competitive commodity market. In the 
second part, the modeling methodology is demonstrated by developing an econometric model 
of the U.S. aluminum industry, which is the first metal industry model to include primary and 
secondary metals as substitutes and to estimate cross-price elasticities between them. The 
aluminum market model suggests that displacement rates vary from 10% to 45% but tend to 
be below 20% in recent decades, although this finding is sensitive to model uncertainty and 
could be as high as 40% in recent decades. The demonstrated methodology can be generally 
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applied to any system in which recycled or reused materials compete as substitutes with 
primary equivalents or other types of materials altogether. Implications for improving 
recycling and reuse efficacy, environmental assessment methodology, and corporate 
environmental strategy are discussed. 
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1 INTRODUCTION 
At the heart of the industrial ecology metaphor is the idea of closing material loops, 
with the reuse and recycling of end-of-life materials being a central aspect of this idea. 
Despite the prominence of reuse and recycling in environmental research over the past 
decades, properly accounting for the benefits of these activities in quantitative environmental 
assessments remains a significant obstacle. One popular methodology in life cycle 
assessment (LCA), called the “avoided burden method,” is to credit recycling or reuse with 
the avoided or “displaced” production of comparable primary materials (Guinée et al., 2002). 
The assumption underlying this approach is that increased secondary material from recycling 
or reuse displaces equivalent primary production, which often has larger impacts. The 
avoided burden method is illustrated in Figure 2.1, which shows a general product system 
involving recycling or reuse. 
 
Figure 2.1: Life cycle impacts of a recycled product under the avoided burden method 
In this system, a product is produced from virgin materials, which creates 
environmental impacts ܧ௣௥௜௠. After the product is used, the material is either landfilled or 
reprocessed. Reprocessing requires energy and material inputs, creating environmental 
damage ܧ௥௘௖. Although the possibility of avoiding landfill creates some benefits, the most 
significant environmental benefit of reuse or recycling is typically the potential to prevent the 
production—and therefore the associated environmental impacts—of equivalent primary 
materials. Under the avoided burden method, primary production is said to be displaced by 
Landfill 
(ܧ௟௔௡ௗ) 
Displaced production 
(ܧௗ௜௦௣) 
Collection and 
reprocessing (ܧ௥௘௖) 
Material & product
markets
Product use Primary production (ܧ௣௥௜௠) 
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secondary production and the avoided impacts, ܧௗ௜௦௣, are credited to the system. If the 
impacts of primary production are larger than the impacts of recycling (as is the case with 
nearly all highly recycled materials), recycling can result in significant environmental 
benefit. Net life cycle impacts from the product are calculated by summing the incurred 
impacts and subtracting the avoided impacts (without loss of generality, in the present 
discussion I ignore landfill impacts; see appendix A.1): 
 ܧ௡௘௧ ൌ ܧ௣௥௜௠ ൅ ܧ௥௘௖ െ ܧௗ௜௦௣ (1.10)
The most common assumption in environmental assessments is that primary materials 
are displaced by recycled or reused materials on a one-to-one basis. However, whether 
primary production displacement actually occurs—and furthermore that it occurs on a one-
to-one basis—is not a given. One-to-one, or “full,” displacement makes the implicit 
assumption that “the demand for [the good] is not changed and that increased recycling does 
not affect recycling in other parts of the system” (Merrild, Damgaard, & Christensen, 2008, 
p. 2). In reality, secondary products and materials may replace primary production of a 
different kind, or may simply expand overall demand and displace less material than is 
recycled (Ekvall, 2000), leading to incomplete displacement. In fact, it has been suggested 
that sales of used goods may actually stimulate increased sales of new goods (Thomas, 
2003), leading to negative displacement. 
The effect of incomplete displacement can be demonstrated by including a term ݀, for 
displacement rate, to the calculation of net environmental impact in eq. 1.10: 
 ܧ௡௘௧ ൌ ܧ௣௥௜௠ ൅ ܧ௥௘௖ െ ݀ ⋅ ܧௗ௜௦௣ (1.11)
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where ݀ is defined as the change in primary production quantity (Δܳ௣) caused by a change in 
secondary production (Δܳ௦), multiplied by െ1 so that ݀ is positive under the expected 
outcome that ܳ௣ decreases in response to an increase in ܳ௦:19 
 ݀ ൌ െΔܳ௣ Δܳ௦⁄  (1.12)
If ݀ ൌ 1 (the full displacement assumption) the result is the same as shown in eq. 
1.10: Primary production cancels with displaced production and the only relevant impacts are 
those of recycling. However, if ݀ ൏ 1, net impacts can increase dramatically. 
The possibility of incomplete displacement arises because displaced production is not 
only governed by engineering or physical relationships, but primarily by market mechanisms 
such as prices, market structure, supply and demand, and strategic firm interaction. 
Specifically, by influencing prices, recycling or reuse can increase overall material demand, 
reducing displacement. Although the reality of incomplete displacement has been recognized 
in the literature (Ekvall, 2000; Frees, 2007; Thomas, 2003; Weidema, 2003), a complete 
understanding of the drivers of displacement and a methodology for accurately estimating 
displacement rate was heretofore lacking. Because no consensus method for estimating 
displacement emerged, environmental assessments have typically rested on the “inaccurate 
assumption” (Ekvall, 2000) of one-to-one, or full, displacement (Thomas, 2003). In some 
cases heuristics have been used, such as assuming 0% or 50% displacement (Ekvall & 
Weidema, 2004; Klöpffer, 1996). 
It has been shown that the displacement rate parameter is extremely important: 
Different assumptions about displacement rate can frequently reverse the results or 
                                                 
19 ܳ௦௘௖ refers to the quantity of material leaving the reprocessing stage and entering the material market after 
accounting for recycling rate and yield loss. In this discussion we are primarily concerned with economic 
drivers of displacement; physical factors such as collection rates and recycling yields have received thorough 
treatment elsewhere (Newell & Field, 1998). See Appendix A.2 for more details. 
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preference order of an environmental assessment (Geyer & Doctori Blass, 2009; Heijungs & 
Guinée, 2007; Zink, Maker, Geyer, Amirtharajah, & Akella, 2014). Therefore, it is the goal 
of this paper to improve the understanding of displaced production by exploring the 
underlying mechanisms and developing a general methodology for estimating displacement 
rate. 
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows: In Section 2, I develop the basic 
market modeling methodology, show how it can be used to reveal the underlying market 
dynamics and estimate displacement rate, identify the most important parameters, and derive 
the conditions for zero and full displacement. In Section 3, I illustrate the basic model by 
expanding it to capture the dynamics of the U.S. aluminum market. In Section 4 I discuss 
general lessons from both models, including implications for improving recycling and reuse 
efficacy, lessons for improving environmental assessment methodology including areas for 
future research, and takeaways for managers seeking to leverage their products’ 
environmental performance. 
2 BASIC MODELING METHODOLOGY 
I model market interactions using supply and demand partial equilibrium analysis 
(PEA). Following standard approaches used by authors in microeconomics and industrial 
organization (Blomberg & Hellmer, 2000; Fisher, Cootner, & Baily, 1972; Foley & Clark, 
1981; Gilbert, 2006; Gomez, Guzman, & Tilton, 2007; Hojman, 1981; Slade, 1980; US EPA, 
1998) I employ PEA to describe market interactions of producers and consumers of primary 
and secondary material. I make typical assumptions of a competitive market, including that 
suppliers sell a homogenous good and are profit-maximizing price-takers who choose 
135 
production levels based on selling prices.20 Buyers are downstream producers or final goods 
consumers who maximize production or utility by choosing consumption quantities of all 
goods based on their prices. Buyers set their demand and can choose between substitute 
materials based on relative prices, technical substitution constraints, and preferences.21 
Typically, markets are modeled using structural equations that describe the behavior 
of actors in the market. A very basic general market model for primary and secondary 
materials that are substitutes can be described by the following system of equations: 
 ܵ௦௘௖ ൌ ߙଵ ௦ܲ௘௖ ൅ ߙ଴
ܵ௣௥௜௠ ൌ ߚଵ ௣ܲ௥௜௠
ܦ௦௘௖ ൌ ߛଵ ௦ܲ௘௖ ൅ ߛଶ൫ ௣ܲ௥௜௠ െ ௦ܲ௘௖൯	
ܦ௣௥௜௠ ൌ ߣଵ ௣ܲ௥௜௠ ൅ ߣଶ൫ ௦ܲ௘௖ െ ௣ܲ௥௜௠൯	
ܵ௦௘௖ ≡ ܦ௦௘௖	
ܵ௣௥௜௠ ≡ ܦ௣௥௜௠
 
(2.1)
where ௜ܵ, ܦ௜, and ௜ܲ represent the supply, demand, and price of material ݅, respectively, and 
ߙ଴ is the intercept on secondary supply, which captures the effect of all omitted variables. 
This intercept will manipulated in the next section to simulate an increase in recycling 
(equivalently, one could include intercept coefficients on the other three supply and demand 
equations as well, but they are extraneous in this demonstration). In market-clearing 
equilibrium, supply of each material is equal to demand. The coefficients on the price 
variables are price responses and represent the sensitivity of supply or demand to changes in 
prices. I refer to ߙଵ and ߚଵ as own-price responses and to ߛଶ and ߣଶ as cross-price 
                                                 
20 Even if individual suppliers cannot or do not adjust production in response to price changes in the short term 
(i.e., fixed levels of capital), the aggregate effect over all suppliers will be to adjust capital investments and 
levels of production based on selling price. 
21 For a more detailed treatment of the theory of the firm and consumer utility theory, see any economics 
textbook; Pepall, Richards, and Norman (2008) provide an excellent treatment of firm behavior. 
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responses.22 The cross-price responses reflect buyers’ ability and willingness to switch from 
their usual material to the competing material as a function of the price differential between 
the two materials.23 Economic theory predicts that ߙଵ, ߚଵ, ߣଶ, and ߛଶ should be positive and 
that ߣଵ and ߛଵ should be negative. For a step-by-step development of a simple market model 
such as this, see Blomberg and Hellmer (2000) and Blomberg (2007). 
2.1 Supply shock experiment 
The model presented in eq. 2.1 exists in equilibrium until an exogenous shock is 
introduced. Since the system of equations is simultaneous—that is, interdependent and linked 
via shared endogenous price variables—a shock to one exogenous variable will affect the 
entire system. To see this explicitly, eq. 2.2 shows the system solved to the reduced form, in 
which each endogenous variable is expressed as a function of the exogenous variables: 
௣ܲ௥௜௠ ൌ ߙ଴ߣଶെߙଵߚଵ ൅ ߚଵߛଵ െ ߚଵߛଶ ൅ ߙଵߣଵ െ ߙଵߣଶ െ ߛଵߣଵ ൅ ߛଵߣଶ ൅ ߛଶߣଵ	
௦ܲ௘௖ ൌ ߙ଴ሺߚଵ െ ߣଵ ൅ ߣଶሻെߙଵߚଵ ൅ ߚଵߛଵ െ ߚଵߛଶ ൅ ߙଵߣଵ െ ߙଵߣଶ െ ߛଵߣଵ ൅ ߛଵߣଶ ൅ ߛଶߣଵ	
ܵ௣௥௜௠ ൌ ܦ௣௥௜௠ ൌ ߙ଴ߚଵߣଶെߙଵߚଵ ൅ ߚଵߛଵ െ ߚଵߛଶ ൅ ߙଵߣଵ െ ߙଵߣଶ െ ߛଵߣଵ ൅ ߛଵߣଶ ൅ ߛଶߣଵ	
ܵ௦௘௖ ൌ ܦ௦௘௖ ൌ ߙ଴ሺߚଵߛଵ െ ߚଵߛଶ െ ߛଵߣଵ ൅ ߛଵߣଶ ൅ ߛଶߣଵሻെߙଵߚଵ ൅ ߚଵߛଵ െ ߚଵߛଶ ൅ ߙଵߣଵ െ ߙଵߣଶ െ ߛଵߣଵ ൅ ߛଵߣଶ ൅ ߛଶߣଵ 
(2.2)
From eq. 2.2 it can be seen that the equilibrium price and quantity of both materials 
are a function of all the price response coefficients and the secondary supply intercept, ߙ଴. 
The extent to which each endogenous variable is affected by a change in this intercept is 
                                                 
22 Supply or demand responses to price changes are sometimes generically referred to as elasticities (e.g., 
Weidema, 2003); however, price elasticity has a precise definition as the percentage change in supply or 
demand relative to the percentage changes in price. Since eq. 2.1 is linear, the term “elasticity” is inappropriate 
in this context. Regardless of the terminology, what is of interest is the response of suppliers and consumers to 
changes in prices. See Appendix A.4 for sensitivity analysis of the basic model in log-log specification. 
23 Another way to model cross-price responses would be to use the absolute price of the competing material 
instead of the price differential between the two materials. I believe the specification shown in eq. 2.1 more 
accurately describes the purchase decision of buyers of primary and secondary material. Nonetheless, results for 
the competing specification are shown in Appendix A.3; the results of the basic model are qualitatively 
unchanged under either specification. 
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determined by the functional form and the values of the coefficients.24 Thus, displacement 
can be measured by introducing a shock to the supply intercept and observing how both 
primary and secondary supply are affected.25 Specifically, following a shock, displacement 
can be calculated by first computing the difference between supply (or demand, since they 
are equivalent) of each material before and after the shock, and then by taking the ratio of the 
change in primary supply to the change in secondary supply, in accordance with eq. 1.12. For 
instance, if in 2.2 we introduce a 10% shock to ߙ଴, we can label the “before” intercept ߙ଴஻ 
and the “after” intercept ߙ଴஺ ൌ 1.1ߙ଴஻. We can then compute ݀ by dividing the difference 
between primary supply before and after the shock by the difference in secondary supply 
before and after the shock, as shown in eq. 2.3: 
 Δܵ௣ ൌ Δܦ௣ ൌ ሺߙ଴஺ െ ߙ଴஻ሻߚଵߣଶെߙଵߚଵ ൅ ߚଵߛଵ െ ߚଵߛଶ ൅ ߙଵߣଵ െ ߙଵߣଶ െ ߛଵߣଵ ൅ ߛଵߣଶ ൅ ߛଶߣଵ	
Δܵ௦ ൌ Δܦ௦ ൌ ሺߙ଴୅ െ ߙ଴஻ሻሺߚଵߛଵ െ ߚଵߛଶ െ ߛଵߣଵ ൅ ߛଵߣଶ ൅ ߛଶߣଵ
ሻ
െߙଵߚଵ ൅ ߚଵߛଵ െ ߚଵߛଶ ൅ ߙଵߣଵ െ ߙଵߣଶ െ ߛଵߣଵ ൅ ߛଵߣଶ ൅ ߛଶߣଵ			
݀ ൌ െΔܵ௣Δܵ௦ ൌ
െሺߙ଴୅ െ ߙ଴஻ሻߚଵߣଶ
ሺߙ଴୅ െ ߙ଴஻ሻሺߚଵߛଵ െ ߚଵߛଶ െ ߛଵߣଵ ൅ ߛଵߣଶ ൅ ߛଶߣଵሻ	
݀ ൌ െ ߚଵߣଶߚଵߛଵ െ ߚଵߛଶ െ ߛଵߣଵ ൅ ߛଵߣଶ ൅ ߛଶߣଵ 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
(2.3) 
2.2 Results from the basic model 
The primary results of the basic model are both the symbolic equation for 
displacement in eq. 2.3 as well as an understanding of how price responses govern 
displacement. Although the basic model is simplified, it is useful for several reasons. First, 
the basic model is simple enough to be solved symbolically, which allows us to see the 
                                                 
24 The ability of the model to produce reliable results rests on the accuracy of both of these aspects. For this 
reason we leave the basic model as simple and general as possible; the system presented in eq. 2.1 assumes only 
linearity and the most fundamental economic theories of supply and demand. 
25 It has been shown that supply-side and demand-side price shocks have different effects in some markets 
(Kilian, 2009). In this paper I focus only on supply-side shocks because they represent the kind of situation in 
which displacement is relevant in environmental assessments of recycling and reuse. As discussed in Section 1, 
displacement becomes a factor in environmental assessments when increased scrap is collected and reprocessed, 
so this is the change I intend to capture with the supply-side price shock. 
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general structure and behavior of the model and the supply shock experiment without 
introducing complexities and uncertainties associated with parameter estimation. Second, it 
demonstrates the general methodology for estimating displacement rate, which can be 
summarized as follows: 
(1) Describe the market in a system of simultaneous equations. 
(2) Solve the system to the reduced form. 
(3) Introduce a shock to an exogenous variable that appears in the secondary supply 
equation, such as an intercept, or input prices. 
(4) Write the reduced form “after” equations using this new shocked variable. 
(5) Subtract the “before” reduced form supply equations from the “after” equations. 
(6) Compute displacement rate by dividing the difference in primary supply by the 
difference in secondary supply. 
The outcome of the simple model presented in eq. 2.3 reveals several general facts 
about the displacement relationship: First, eq. 2.3 reveals the conditions under which ݀ ൌ 0 
(zero displacement) and ݀ ൌ 1 (full displacement), which will be discussed in Sections 2.4.1 
and 2.4.2. Second, the model highlights what parameters are important for determining 
displacement. Displacement is determined by the relationships among ߚଵ, ߣଵ, ߣଶ, ߛଵ, and ߛଶ. 
Based on eq. 2.3, the direction of the effect that each price response variable has on 
displacement is summarized in Table 2. It emerges that ߛଵ, ߛଶ, and ߣଵ have an inverse 
relationship with displacement (in terms of absolute value), while the own-price and cross-
price responses of primary demand, ߚଵ and ߣଶ, have a direct relationship with displacement. 
The net determination of displacement depends on the relative magnitudes of these 
competing forces. These general facts point to important lessons for environmental 
assessment and environmental management at large, which will be discussed in Sections 2.4 
and 4. 
Third, the model highlights what parameters are not important for the determination 
of displacement: The size of the secondary supply shock and the own-price response of 
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secondary suppliers (ߙଵ) are inconsequential—although they affect the changes in supply and 
demand, they affect both proportionally and the terms end up canceled out of the 
displacement equation (note, however, that this relies on an assumption of linearity in the 
parameters that may not be valid for large-magnitude shocks). As we will see in Section 3, 
estimating price responses is a nontrivial task, so knowing which variables are important is 
useful. 
Variable Description Effect on displacementa 
ߚଵ Own-price response of supply (primary) Positive ߣଵ Own-price response of demand (primary) Negative ߣଶ Cross-price response of demand (primary) Positive ߛଵ Own-price response of demand (secondary) Negative ߛଶ Cross-price response of demand (secondary) Negative 
a Indicates what happens to ݀ as the absolute value of the price response increases (i.e., is more elastic). 
Table 2.1: Summary of how displacement following a supply-side shock is affected by 
relevant price response variables 
2.3 Understanding the displacement mechanism 
We can use the structure of the basic model to better understand the mechanisms that 
govern displacement by examining the relationships between the components of the system. 
Solving the system to the reduced form shows how the components are mathematically 
interconnected, but it does not necessarily provide an intuitive sense of how causality flows 
through the system or why the supply of the two materials might be affected differently. To 
explain these mechanisms, I turn to the methodology of system dynamics, which is an 
approach for understanding the behavior of complex systems such as markets (Morecroft, 
2007). At the heart of system dynamics are diagrams that show the direction and sign of 
relationships between modeled processes. 
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Phase 2 has two components. In phase 2a, shown with a dashed line, the decrease in 
secondary price simultaneously triggers reduced incentive on the part of suppliers and an 
increase in secondary demand. This increase in secondary demand also increases the price of 
secondary material, causing effects to ripple around the circle again, with the opposite sign 
(supply is increased, demand is decreased). These counteracting forces eventually reach a 
new equilibrium price and quantity. Phase 2b, shown with a dotted line, arises from the fact 
that primary and secondary material are substitutes; the demand for one is a function of the 
price of the other. The initial decrease in secondary price will decrease primary demand 
(since the higher secondary material price makes it less attractive as a substitute), which will 
in turn decrease the price of primary material. 
In phase 3, shown with a dash-dot line, the decrease in primary price will have two 
simultaneous effects. First, it will lower primary supply. This will in turn raise the price of 
primary, which will lower demand, lowering the price of primary, and so on. At the same 
time, the lower price of primary will draw consumers from secondary material, lowering 
secondary demand. This will lower secondary price and supply, and so on. These forces will 
continue until they balance at a new equilibrium price and quantity for each material. 
The simultaneous nature of the model means that the new equilibrium cannot be 
determined without solving the system as shown earlier. Figure 2.2 highlights that the model 
is entirely driven by price changes and responses to these changes, which means it may 
ignore nonmarket factors, such as government recycling targets. This is useful to consider 
when moving on to more complex market models; though the number of parameters 
increases, price responses remain the fundamental factors that drive the model results. In the 
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model, displacement less than 100% occurs when increased secondary supply decreases 
prices of both materials such that overall production and consumption increases. 
2.4 Discussion of the basic model results 
The basic model described the underlying structure of a market where primary and 
secondary materials compete. By symbolically solving for displacement following an 
exogenous supply-side shock, I showed that there are five parameters that affect 
displacement: the own-price response of primary supply ሺߚଵሻ, the own-price responses of 
demand for both materials ሺߛଵ, ߣଵሻ, and cross-price responses of demand for both materials 
ሺߛଶ, ߣଶሻ. Thus, accurately estimating these parameters is critical, and these response 
parameters should be the focus of future market models that seek to estimate displacement. 
To explore the sensitivity of displacement rate to these parameters, I performed a 
number of Monte Carlo simulations, drawing values for each price response parameter from 
uniform distributions spanning a range of hypothetical upper and lower bounds designed to 
test both “high” and “low” price responses (from [േ0.01,േ2] to [േ0.01,േ15000], using 
negative values for own-price demand responses).26 In every 1 million-iteration simulation, 
calculated displacement rates were recorded using the above procedure. A histogram of 
calculated displacement rates from the simulation using representative upper and lower 
bounds of [േ0.01,േ100] is shown inFigure 2.3. Though calculated displacement ranged from 
nearly zero to just under 200, in all cases the vast majority of displacement values were 
concentrated at the lower end of the range: 97% of the calculated displacement rates were 
                                                 
26 Uniform distributions and a variety of parameter ranges were used in order to illustrate a general case where 
no specific information about price responses is known; using normal distributions around the midpoints of the 
ranges shown above results in a distribution of displacement values even more heavily skewed toward zero. 
What is considered a “high” or “low” price response of course depends on the product in question; the 
simulation presented is designed to show a wide range of hypothetical ranges, although as stated, the response 
turns out not to affect the model outcome. When studying an actual product system, one could construct 
different probability distributions centered around likely price response values based on knowledge of the 
products in question. 
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 ߚଵ ൌ 0 and  ߛଶߣଵ ് ߛଵሺߣଵ ൅ ߣଶሻ, or 
ߣଶ ൌ 0 and ሺߚଵ െ ߣଵሻሺߛଵ െ ߛଶሻ ് 0 
 
(2.4) 
It was shown in eq. 2.3 that displacement is equal to zero when either the own-price 
response of primary supply ሺߚଵሻ or the cross-price response of primary demand for 
secondary material ሺߣଶሻ is zero (and the denominator is not zero). Conversely, if both of 
these coefficients are not zero, displacement is necessarily greater than zero. To visualize 
why values of zero for these coefficients lead to zero displacement, refer again to Figure 2.2 
and imagine a break in either the line from “price of primary” to “primary supply” (ߚଵ) or the 
line from “price of secondary” to “primary demand” (ߣଶ). If either of these pathways is 
broken (i.e., the corresponding coefficient is zero), the changes in the secondary market will 
not loop back to affect primary supply: If primary demand is unresponsive to secondary price 
changes (ߣଶ ൌ 0), additional secondary production will have no effect on the primary 
material market; if primary supply is unresponsive to primary price changes (ߚଵ ൌ 0), even if 
primary price falls in response to a decrease in primary demand, this will have no effect on 
primary supply. If either ߚଵ or ߣଶ is zero, primary supply is isolated from changes in the 
secondary market; primary supply will thus fail to decrease when secondary supply 
increases, and displacement will be equal to zero. 
In terms of real-life products where these conditions might be the case, it is hard to 
imagine realistic cases in a competitive market where primary producers are utterly 
unresponsive to selling prices. This condition may be possible in cases where production is 
intentionally decoupled from prices, such as in the provision of public services. However, 
these are not cases where displacement is likely to be relevant. For commodity goods and 
materials in well-behaved markets, we can safely assume that ߚଵ ൐ 0. 
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However, the possibility that primary demand is insensitive to changes in the price of 
secondary material is more realistic and even likely in certain situations. The parameter ߣଶ 
measures the willingness and ability of buyers of primary material to substitute secondary 
material for primary material. In many commodity markets, these buyers are in fact 
intermediary producers who transform material inputs into semifabricated goods or final 
products. Therefore their willingness and ability to substitute secondary material for primary 
material may be limited by technical constraints or quality requirements. If the quality of 
recycled or reused material is unsuitable for their needs, it may be difficult or impossible to 
substitute secondary for primary material, meaning that ߣଶ will be close or equal to zero. 
A clear example of this situation is the paper pulp market, where the shorter fibers of 
recycled pulp make it unsuitable or very costly to use in many paper applications. A similar 
case is recycled polyethylene terephthalate (RPET), which is often not of sufficient quality to 
be reused in bottle-grade applications and must be “downcycled” into other products. In these 
cases, primary producers are unresponsive to price changes in the secondary market in the 
same way they are unresponsive to price changes for any material that they do not use as a 
production input. Thus, real-life situations where displacement rate is equal to or near zero 
most likely arise from technical limitations on material substitutability. 
2.4.2 Conditions for full displacement 
On the other end of the spectrum from zero displacement, the model showed that full 
displacement occurs under the following conditions: 
 െߚଵߣଶ ൌ ߚ1ߛ1 െ ߚ1ߛ2 െ ߛ1ߣ1 ൅ ߛ1ߣ2 ൅ ߛ2ߣ1, and 
ሺߚଵ െ ߣଵሻሺߛଵ െ ߛଶሻ ് 0, or ߛଵߣଶ ് 0 
 
(2.5) 
Unlike the condition for ݀ ൌ 0, there is an infinite set of solutions that satisfy the 
condition for ݀ ൌ 1, which makes it more difficult to draw general conclusions about when 
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full displacement is likely to occur. However, we can make some progress by remembering 
that this infinite set is bounded by economic theory regarding price responses: ߚଵ, ߣଶ, and ߛଶ 
must be positive, while ߣଵ and ߛଵ must be negative. For instance, ݀ ൌ 1 if ߚଵ ൌ െߛଵ ൌ െߛଶ 
and ߚଵߣଶ ് 0. However, this condition fails immediately because ߚଵ and ߛଶ must have the 
same (positive) sign. A similar full-displacement case is where ߚଵ ൌ െߛଵ ൌ ߣଵ and ߚଵଶߣଶ ്
ߚଵߛଶߣଵ, which fails because ߚଵ and ߣଵ must have opposite signs. 
Additionally, the conditions for ݀ ൌ 0 combined with the denominator restrictions for 
݀ ൌ 1 provide useful bounds: If ߚଵ ൌ 0 or ߣଶ ൌ 0 then displacement is either zero or 
undefined; if all of the own-price elasticities are zero, displacement is undefined. 
Beyond these restrictions we cannot place economically meaningful analytic bounds 
on when full displacement should not occur. We can, however, discuss an interesting case 
where we can expect that full displacement will occur. Specifically, if the cross-price 
responses of both materials are equal but not zero ሺߛଶ ൌ ߣଶ ് 0ሻ, both the own-price 
responses of demand are equal to zero ሺߛଵ ൌ ߣଵ ൌ 0ሻ, and the own-price response of primary 
supply is not zero (ߚଵ ് 0), then ݀ ൌ 1. In real-life terms, this means that buyers of both 
types of material have exactly the same technical ability or preference to use the alternative 
material, that their willingness to switch is nonzero (i.e., at some price differential they will 
begin using the other material), that they are completely unresponsive to changes in the price 
of their usual material, and that suppliers of primary material do respond to price changes.  
These conditions are unrealistic for any standard good in any reasonably behaved 
competitive market. The second condition implies completely fixed demand no matter how 
drastically the price changes, and the first condition implies that downstream producers have 
the exact same ability and willingness to use the alternative material (i.e., their marginal costs 
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of substitution are identical). For the major recycled materials this is certainly not the case 
since primary material is more easily substituted for secondary material than the other way 
around. For these materials, the response of primary demand to changes in the price of 
secondary material will be lower than the response of secondary demand to changes in the 
price of primary material. 
However, special cases that meet these criteria are possible. Another way of looking 
at the above restrictions is to say that demand is fully satiable (after which the own-price 
demand response will be zero) and that consumers are indifferent between the two goods 
(meaning the cross-price responses will be equal). Again, these conditions are unlikely for 
many products, but one can think of special cases where they may hold. For instance, Zink et 
al. (2014) consider a case study of repurposing a smartphone as an in-car parking meter. The 
displacement question in this case is whether the repurposed phone prevents the production 
of a purpose-built parking meter. A case could be made that demand for in-car parking 
meters is fully satiable, especially since a person typically only purchases an in-car parking 
meter because it is required to park at her work/school/etc. Once she has one in-car parking 
meter, she is unlikely to desire more. One could also argue that consumers are more or less 
indifferent between a smartphone-turned-parking meter and a purpose-built model: Both 
provide the same function, neither have any special features or ancillary benefits, both are 
equally reliable, durable, long-lasting, etc. For the last condition, producers of purpose-built 
parking meters presumably respond to changes in parking meter selling prices. Thus, this 
represents a fairly strong candidate for a product system where full displacement occurs. 
However, many product systems fail one of the above criteria. For instance, when 
primary-production options have better features, as is often the case, consumers are not 
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From Figure 2.4 we see that full displacement is much more likely when the primary 
supply and cross-price demand price responses (ߚଵ, ߣଶ) are high and those of own-price 
primary demand and secondary supply and demand (ߣଵ, ߛଵ, ߛଶ) are low. Nearly half of the 
values of own-price response of primary supply (ߚଵ) and cross-price response of primary 
demand (ߣଶ) that resulted in ݀ ൌ 1 were in the upper 25% of the random draw range. More 
than two-thirds of values of own-price response of primary demand (ߣଵ) that resulted in 
݀ ൌ 1 were in the lower half of the random draw range (in absolute value). Full displacement 
never occurred when the value for own-price response of secondary demand (ߛଵ) was greater 
than 35% of the random draw range (in absolute value), or when the cross-price response of 
secondary demand (ߛଶ) was greater than 80% of the random draw range. 
Whereas Figure 2.4 shows distributions of values that produced ݀ ൒ 1, Figure 2.5 
shows a sample of actual sets of parameter values that resulted in ݀ ൒ 1. There are a few 
patterns that emerge. First, for all cases where ݀ ൒ 1, ߛଶ is smaller than ߣଶ, so we can treat 
this requirement as a necessary condition for full displacement and amend eq. 2.5 to include 
it: 
 െߚଵߣଶ ൌ ߚ1ߛ1 െ ߚ1ߛ2 െ ߛ1ߣ1 ൅ ߛ1ߣ2 ൅ ߛ2ߣ1, 
ሺߚଵ െ ߣଵሻሺߛଵ െ ߛଶሻ ് 0, or ߛଵߣଶ ് 0, and 
ߣଶ ൒ ߛଶ 
 
(2.6)
Additionally, in nearly every case, ߛଵ is smaller than ߣଵ, but there are some sets of 
parameter values where this does not hold, so we cannot treat this as a necessary condition. 
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perhaps due to limited demand for final goods. Buyers of secondary material, however, must 
be unresponsive to the price of primary material while buyers of primary material must be 
highly responsive to the price of secondary material. 
This last piece, which is also the last necessary condition for full displacement 
(ߣଶ ൐ ߛଶ), is the most problematic for real-world products or materials in well-behaved 
competitive markets. As mentioned, for nearly all highly recycled materials, the primary 
version of the material is more versatile than the secondary version: Primary aluminum can 
be used for wrought or cast products, whereas secondary aluminum is typically only suitable 
for cast applications; primary PET is useful for any range of products, whereas RPET is 
unsuitable for bottle production. In these cases, buyers of primary material will be less 
responsive to price changes of secondary material than buyers of secondary material are to 
price changes in primary material, which violates the above condition. Doubtless, there are 
special products that satisfy this condition, as in the case of the parking meter example 
above. It seems, however, that unless one has particularly convincing reasons to believe that 
primary buyers are more sensitive to secondary prices than secondary buyers are to primary 
prices, assuming full displacement is likely the incorrect choice and will thus overstate the 
benefits of reuse or recycling. 
3 CASE STUDY: U.S. ALUMINUM MARKET 
In this section, I demonstrate the applicability of the modeling and supply shock 
experiment methodology by building an industry model describing supply and demand of 
primary and secondary aluminum in the U.S. Aluminum provides an ideal case study because 
it is highly recycled, data quality and availability are excellent, and the recycled material is 
very similar but not identical to the primary material, such that the two are substitutes but 
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still have distinct prices. Additionally, aluminum is of current practical interest due to trends 
in the automotive industry toward lightweight vehicles for increased fuel efficiency. 
Aluminum industry groups propose that aluminum provides a lower-energy solution to light-
weighting than high-strength steel, a result that pivots on assumptions about primary 
aluminum displacement by recycled aluminum (European Aluminium Association, 2013; 
Industry Today, 2013; International Aluminum Instutute, 2006). Aluminum is therefore ideal 
for a case study to demonstrate the market model–based displacement estimation 
methodology, although the method is generally applicable to any system where materials 
compete with recycled alternatives. I begin with the basic structure of the aluminum industry 
before detailing the estimation methodology and data. I then present and discuss the 
estimated parameters and the resulting aluminum displacement rates, including a sensitivity 
analysis. 
3.1 Market structure and factors of production 
Aluminum begins as the naturally occurring mineral bauxite. Bauxite is mined 
worldwide in large, open-pit mines and minimally processed before being shipped to 
refineries where it is turned into alumina via the Bayer process. Refined alumina is then 
shipped to aluminum smelters where it is dissolved in an electrolyte with a carbon anode, 
using large amounts of electricity, to produce molten aluminum metal in the Hall-Héroult 
process. This pure aluminum may be alloyed with other metals to achieve specific properties 
and is then transported either in molten or cast form to semifabricator facilities that cast, roll, 
extrude, or forge semifabricated products that are used to produce final goods (Plunkert, 
2000). Primary aluminum production is fairly centralized, both internationally and within 
major producing countries. In 2012 the top ten producing countries accounted for 80% of 
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global production (USGS, 2012); the top ten refiners worldwide accounted for over half of 
global output in 2011 (Bell, 2011; USGS, 2012). 
Secondary aluminum processing is a much more disaggregated industry. Collection is 
distributed across countless individual and corporate collectors who deposit end-of-life 
aluminum at material recovery facilities (MRFs) or at independent scrap yards. From there, 
scrap is sold by dealers, often through scrap brokers, on the international market. Scrap is 
more valuable if it is of known and consistent grade and quality, so scrap dealers sort and 
preprocess scrap to the extent that it is cost-effective. Scrap is purchased by recyclers who 
melt it in one of several types of furnaces before alloying the metal and selling it to 
semifabricators (Plunkert, 2000). Secondary aluminum is substitutable for primary aluminum 
in most but not all applications. Most secondary aluminum is used in cast rather than wrought 
products. 
Both primary and secondary aluminum are globally traded commodities, and the 
primary industries for aluminum are transportation, packaging (mainly beverage cans), 
construction, and electrical (Plunkert, 2000). Since the 1970s the price of various aluminum 
alloys has been determined through futures trading on the London Metal Exchange (LME); 
prior to that, published prices were set by the major producers and discounts were 
independently negotiated with buyers. In contrast to other markets such as agriculture, 
aluminum producers are able to change production quantity relatively quickly in response to 
changes in price, whereas consumers are often unable to easily switch to substitutes due to 
choices in manufacturing technology and product design (Gilbert, 2006). 
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3.2 Aluminum market model 
For the current model I focus on the U.S. aluminum market due to the availability of 
high-quality data, and I account for international trade by including imports and exports. 
Beginning with the general model presented in Section 2, the goal is to estimate the own- and 
cross-price responses that drive the displacement relationship. Estimation of these parameters 
is complicated by the fact that supply and demand are determined simultaneously, making 
ordinary least squares estimates biased. Estimation requires two-stage least squares (TSLS) 
using instrumental variables to isolate the slopes of the supply and demand curves. To this 
end, I augment the model with additional control variables that allow us to statistically 
identify each price response parameter. In addition to prices of both types of material on the 
right-hand side of each equation, I now include exogenous explanatory variables such as the 
price of other substitutes (in this case, copper, but the results are nearly identical if using steel 
as a substitute), factors of production (such as wages, energy costs, and input prices), 
production capacity, and indicators of demand (such as levels of industrial manufacturing 
and aluminum castings activity). Additionally included on the right-hand side are lagged 
dependent variables. These lagged variables mean, for instance, the supply of secondary 
aluminum each year is a function of the amount supplied in the previous year—that is, for 
each time period ݐ, ܵ௦௘௖೟ ൌ ݂൫ܵ௦௘௖௧ିଵ൯. 
The addition of lagged dependent variables makes the model dynamic. In contrast to 
the basic, static model, shocks to the system will not take full effect immediately, but only 
after some time as a new equilibrium is reached. The final modification to the simple model 
is that the supply-demand equality is changed to reflect real-life conditions. Now supply and 
demand are equated according to a stock-and-flow identity using changes in physical 
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stockpiles (Δܵݐ݋ܿ݇) and levels of imports ሺܫܯሻ and exports ሺܧܺሻ of each material. As a 
simplification, I treat imports, exports, and stock as exogenous. The modified model is 
shown in eq. 3.1. 
logሺܵ௦௘௖ሻ ൌ ߙ଴ ൅	ߙଵ logሺ ௦ܲ௘௖ሻ ൅ ߙଶ log൫ ௦ܲ௖௥௔௣൯ ൅ܹ ൅ ߙଷ log൫ܵ௦௘௖೟షభ൯ ൅ ߝ	
log൫ܵ௣௥௜௠൯ ൌ ߚ଴ ൅ ߚଵ log൫ ௣ܲ௥௜௠൯ ൅ ܺ ൅ ߚଶlogሺܵ௣௥௜௠೟షభሻ ൅ ߝ
logሺܦ௦௘௖ሻ ൌ ߛ଴ ൅ ߛଵ logሺ ௦ܲ௘௖ሻ ൅ ߛଶ൫log൫ ௣ܲ௥௜௠൯ െ logሺ ௦ܲ௘௖ሻ൯ ൅ ܻ ൅ ߛଷlog	ሺܦ௦௘௖೟షభሻ ൅ ߝ	
log൫ܦ௣௥௜௠൯ ൌ ߣ଴ ൅ ߣଵ log൫ ௣ܲ௥௜௠൯ ൅ ߣଶ൫logሺ ௦ܲ௘௖ሻ െ log൫ ௣ܲ௥௜௠൯൯ ൅ ܼ ൅ ߣଷlog	ሺܦ௣௥௜௠೟షభሻ ൅ ߝ
ܵ௦௘௖ ≡ ܦ௦௘௖ ൅ Δܵݐ݋ܿ݇௦௘௖ െ ܫܯ௦௘௖ ൅ ܧܺ௦௘௖	
ܵ௣௥௜௠ ≡ ܦ௣௥௜௠ ൅ Δܵݐ݋ܿ݇௣௥௜௠ െ ܫܯ௣௥௜௠ ൅ ܧܺ௣௥௜௠ 
where 
ܹ ൌ ߙସ log൫ ௪ܲ௔௚௘௦൯ ൅ ߙହ log൫ ௦ܲ௖௥௔௣൯ ൅ ߙହሺ ௦ܲ௜௟௜௖௢௡ሻ ൅ ߙ଺൫ ௖ܲ௔௣௜௧௔௟൯	
ܺ ൌ ߚଷ log൫ ௪ܲ௔௚௘௦൯ ൅ ߚସ log൫ ௘ܲ௡௘௥௚௬൯ ൅ ߚହ logሺܥܽ݌ሻ	
ܻ ൌ ߛସሺlogሺ ஼ܲ௨ሻ െ logሺ ௦ܲ௘௖ሻሻ ൅ ߛହ log൫ܣ௖௔௦௧௜௡௚௦൯	
ܼ ൌ ߣସ൫logሺ ஼ܲ௨ሻ െ log൫ ௣ܲ௥௜௠൯൯ ൅ ߣହ log൫ܣ௜௡ௗ௠௙௚൯ 
 
(3.1) 
 
 
 
 
 
The variables that make up ܹ,ܺ, ܻ, and ܼ are regressors detailed in Table 2.2. These 
variables are exogenous except in the case of the price difference between copper and each 
type of aluminum, where only the price of copper is exogenous. The subscript ݐ െ 1 denotes 
a one-year lag. Log-log form is used so that estimated coefficients can be interpreted as 
elasticities. 
3.3 Model limitations 
The aluminum model is simplified in several ways. First, like the basic model, it does 
not consider various nonmarket factors such as government recycling targets, subsidies, and 
quotas. It also treats all primary aluminum as a single product and all secondary aluminum as 
a single product, when in reality there are many grades and alloys of both. Additionally, 
scrap is treated as homogenous and a single scrap price is used, which is a production 
quantity-weighted average of mixed low-copper-content clippings, clean dry turnings, old 
sheet and castings, and used beverage cans. This mix represents both old and new scrap, 
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which may in reality be handled separately by different industrial actors. This simplification 
also ignores the fact that not all scrap is suitable for all recycling uses. However, scrap enters 
the model only as in input price to secondary supply, and these four grades of scrap vary in 
price by only 10–15% during the estimation period. Thus, treating scrap as homogenous is 
justified; sensitivity analysis using only used beverage cans does not change the overall 
findings. 
The aluminum model is geographically limited to the U.S. market. This limitation 
was necessitated by the considerable data requirements of the study and the availability of 
public data in the U.S. The U.S. relies heavily on imports of bauxite for aluminum 
production and relies on exports for refined aluminum and for scrap, primarily to China. An 
attempt was made to account for these flows by including actual annual data on imports and 
exports for each type of material, but those flows were kept exogenous in the model. The 
effect of this limitation is that domestic supply and demand in the model react to price 
changes without intervention from international markets. 
However, endogenizing imports and exports would require a significantly more 
complex global model with similar data demands for six or more major producing countries. 
Previous authors have attempted such models for aluminum-bauxite (Hojman, 1981) and 
copper (Fisher et al., 1972), though they were forced to significantly simplify the control 
variables used and ultimately arrived at own-price elasticities roughly in line with those 
estimated in this study, suggesting that the added complexity may not deliver more accurate 
or useful model results. Additionally, the quality of data on secondary metals production and 
prices is significantly worse on a global scale; neither of the multicountry models explicitly 
considers the effect of recycled material on the market. Limiting the study to the U.S. was 
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therefore necessary without access to further high-quality global data, and appropriate for 
this case study, whose primary purpose is to demonstrate the displacement estimation 
methodology. 
Additionally, aluminum stock is simplified in that I modeled stock as an exogenous 
variable, whereas in reality the level of stock is a function of both random fluctuations and 
suppliers’ expectations about future demand and preferred stock size. Expanding the model 
to include intentional fluctuations in stock size would increase the realism of the model, but 
was outside the scope of this study. 
Finally, as I will discuss more in the following section, it should be acknowledged 
that like-kind displacement (i.e., secondary aluminum displacing primary aluminum as 
opposed to steel, plastic, etc.) is not the only kind of displacement and in some cases may not 
be the most appropriate comparison. In this illustrative case study, I restricted the notion of 
displacement to like-kind material in order to demonstrate the displacement estimation 
methodology. This focus was necessary due to the massively increased data requirements and 
modeling complexity if considering alternative displaced materials. As I will discuss, further 
research along this vein is needed to fully understand the environmental consequences of 
aluminum recycling. 
3.4 Datasets and estimation 
To estimate each equation, time series data were required for aluminum price and 
production data, each of the explanatory variables, and the stock and trade variables. 
Collecting reliable data with sufficient time coverage is a significant challenge to this type of 
analysis, particularly for scrap and secondary material prices. I drew annual price and 
production data from the U.S. Geological Survey (USGS), the U.S. Census Bureau, the U.S. 
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Federal Reserve, the U.S. Energy Information Administration (EIA), and the U.S. Bureau of 
Labor Statistics (BLS). A complete list of variables and associated datasets is provided in 
Table 2.2. The estimation period was 1969–2010 (N=41) in order to most accurately reflect 
current conditions rather than past anomalies. 
Specifications for the equations in eq. 3.1 were developed by reviewing previous 
econometric models of aluminum markets (e.g., Blomberg & Hellmer, 2000; Blomberg & 
Söderholm, 2009) and by investigating the structure and history of the U.S. aluminum 
market. Various specifications, including competing autoregressive lag structures, were 
tested. The final specifications were selected based on standard diagnostics, their ability to 
produce accurate forecasts, and a preference for parsimony. 
Equations were estimated using two-stage least squares (TSLS) with instrumental 
variables. Instruments consisted of all exogenous variables in the equations, one-period 
lagged dependent variables, and exogenous variables from the opposite supply or demand 
equation (i.e., for each supply equation, the regressors from the corresponding demand 
equation were used as instruments, and vice versa). Regressions were checked for serial 
correlation using the Breusch-Godfrey statistic, shown at the bottom of Table 2.3; no 
significant serial correlation was observed. 
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Variable Description Units Source 
Sprim Production quantity of primary aluminum from 
bauxite 
tonne USGS 
Ssec Production quantity of secondary aluminum from 
old and new scrap 
tonne USGS 
Pprim Price of primary aluminum $/tonne USGS 
Psec Price of secondary aluminum, average of various 
aluminum-based alloys 
$/tonne USGS 
Pscrap Price of aluminum scrap, weighted average $/tonne USGS 
Pwages Average hourly earnings of production and 
nonsupervisory durable goods employees 
$/hr BLS 
Cap Capacity of primary refineries thousand 
tonnes 
USGS 
Pcapital Price of capital, approximated by U.S. 10-year 
constant maturity treasury bill 
% yield per 
annum 
US Federal reserve 
Penergy Price of West Texas Intermediate crude $/barrel US EIA 
Psilicon Price of silicon $/tonne USGS 
Dprim Demand/consumption of primary aluminum tonne Identity: Di = Si + IMi - 
Exi - stockchangei 
Dsec Demand/consumption of secondary aluminum tonne Identity: Di = Si + IMi - 
Exi - stockchangei 
Acasting Net shipments of total cast products thousand 
tonnes 
USGS 
Aindmfg Value of shipments from industrial manufacturing 
sectors 
million $ US Census 
Pcu Price of copper $/tonne USGS 
defl_PPI Deflator for each year using U.S. Producer Price 
Index 
 BLS 
defl_CPI Deflator for each year using Consumer Price 
Index 
 BLS 
IMp Imports of primary aluminum tonne USGS 
EXp Exports of primary aluminum tonne USGS 
IMs Imports of secondary aluminum tonne USGS 
EXs Exports of secondary aluminum tonne USGS 
StockPrim Quantity of primary aluminum in industry and 
government stockpiles 
tonne USGS 
StockSec Quantity of secondary aluminum in industry and 
government stockpiles 
tonne USGS 
Table 2.2: Variables and data sources 
3.5 Estimation results and calculation of displacement 
Results for the estimation of eq. 3.1 are shown in Table 2.3. As in the basic model, to 
calculate displacement, the procedure is to solve the system of equations using the estimated 
parameters, introduce a secondary supply shock, and calculate the difference in primary and 
secondary supply before and after the shock. In the basic model, the price response 
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parameters were linear and expressed in terms of absolute supply changes, meaning 
displacement was a constant that depended on the price response parameters. 
The aluminum model, however, differs in two important ways: First, eq. 3.1 is 
nonlinear due to the fact that the stock-change identity is in levels and the supply and demand 
equations are in logs. Thus, eq. 3.1 cannot be solved analytically. Rather, I solved the system 
using the Broyden method (Broyden, 1965), using actual data for the exogenous variables for 
each year of the estimation period. Second, the price response parameters are elasticities, and 
thus expressed in percentage changes to supply; to calculate displacement, these percentage 
changes must be converted to absolute quantity changes by multiplying by the actual 
production quantity of each material. Since these actual production quantities as well as the 
exogenous imports, exports, and stockpiles change each year, the model solution (and 
therefore the calculated displacement rate) also varies by year. Instead of a single value for 
primary and secondary supply, therefore, we instead arrive at a set of solutions—one for each 
year. The solved values for supply of both materials are shown in Appendix B.2. 
To calculate displacement rates for each solution-year, I introduced a 10% increase to 
the secondary supply intercept (ߙ଴) from 1980 to 2010, and once again solved the system for 
each year. The set of solved levels of primary and secondary supply under the baseline 
scenario were subtracted from those under the supply shock scenario. Figure 2.6 shows the 
difference between the supply shock scenario and the baseline for supply of both materials. 
Prior to the shock in 1980, the difference is zero, but after the secondary supply intervention, 
secondary supply increases and primary supply decreases, as expected. Because supply of 
each material in eq. 3.1 is dependent on exogenous factors, the supply changes following the 
shock are not constant, but vary each year; because the model is dynamic, the changes each 
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year are also a function of the previous years’ change. Figure 2.6 shows that the increase in 
secondary supply is larger and grows more over time than the decrease in primary supply. 
Next, the change in supply of primary material was divided by the change in supply 
of secondary material to obtain the displacement rate, in accordance with eq. 1.12. Because 
the supply changes vary each year, so too does the displacement rate; thus we arrive not at a 
singular displacement rate, but a time series of displacement rates over the estimation period, 
shown in Figure 2.7. Prior to the shock in 1980 there is, of course, no displacement rate; 
thereafter, displacement starts out around 45% but gradually drops as secondary supply 
outpaces the decline in primary supply, ending at 10%. The intervention year is 
inconsequential; a similar pattern emerges no matter when the secondary supply shock is 
introduced (see Appendix B.2). 
3.6 Sensitivity analysis 
Table 2.3 shows that there is considerable uncertainty in many of the parameter 
estimates. Of particular concern are the elasticities that drive the displacement relationship, 
as summarized in Table 2.1. To assess the effect of the estimation uncertainty on the results, I 
conducted sensitivity analysis by solving the model incorporating stochastic equation error 
(residuals from each equation). From these upper- and lower-bound supply change values I 
computed upper- and lower-bound displacement rates using the same method as above. 
These bounds are shown as dash-dot 95% confidence intervals in Figures 2.6 and 2.7. See 
Appendix B.2 for more information on the model solving procedure and calculation of 
confidence intervals. 
The sensitivity analysis shows that the uncertainty in the equation estimates does 
indeed create uncertainty in the estimated displacement rate. Estimated displacement can 
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vary by 50% in the first period after the shock, and can be as high as 80%. For the majority 
of the time series, and especially in more recent years, the range of estimated displacement 
rates tends to be below 50%, and only reaches 100% once, in 1981. 
 Dependent variable 
Independent variable log(Sprim) log(Dprim) log(Ssec) log(Dsec) 
log(Pprim) 0.366 
(0.178)** 
-0.241 
(0.404) 
  
log(Pwages) -0.844 
(0.567) 
 -0.658 
(0.620) 
 
log(Penergy) -0.077 
(0.035)** 
   
log(Cap) 0.594 
(0.360)* 
   
log(Psec) – log(Pprim)  0.269 
(0.597) 
  
log(Pcu) – log(Pprim)  -0.138 
(0.110) 
  
log(Aindmfg)  0.063 
(0.083) 
  
log(Psec)   0.493 
(0.431) 
-0.352 
(0.658) 
log(Pscrap)   -0.055 
(0.116) 
 
log(Psilicon)   -0.178 
(0.174) 
 
log(Pcapital)   -0.040 
(0.046) 
 
log(Pprim) – log(Psec)    0.646 
(0.844) 
log(Pcu) – log(Psec)    -0.071 
(0.165) 
log(Acasting)    0.227 
(0.128)* 
log(D.V.t – 1) 0.604 
(0.149)*** 
0.694 
(0.199)*** 
0.947 
(0.129)*** 
0.674 
(0.222)*** 
Intercept 0.861 
(1.466) 
5.802 
(4.531) 
0.653 
(4.176) 
5.950 
(7.708) 
Estimation period 1969–2010 1969–2010 1969–2010 1969–2010 
Adj. R-squared 0.84 0.41 0.95 0.91 
BG statistic, 1 lag (p-value) 0.056 (0.814) 0.000 (0.988) 0.000 (0.988) 1.444 (0.230) 
Standard errors in parentheses 
*, **, *** coefficient significant at the 10%, 5%, 1% level 
Table 2.3: Estimation results using TSLS with instrumental variables (see text for description 
of instruments) 
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Figure 2.6: Dynamic response of primary and secondary production to 10% scrap price 
decrease 
 
Figure 2.7: Estimated U.S. aluminum displacement rate over time (see text) 
3.7 Discussion of the aluminum model results 
The coefficient estimates in Table 2.3 correspond well with economic theory and 
previous literature. The own- and cross-price elasticities all have the theoretically predicted 
sign, although most are not statistically significant. It is worth pointing out that achieving 
price elasticities with the theoretically predicted sign is not a trivial task due to data 
limitations (Fisher et al., 1972), and the fact that all six estimates of interest point the 
expected direction is encouraging.  
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The coefficient estimates on the exogenous variables are less interesting for the 
current discussion, but it is worth noting that all but two (the differential copper price in the 
demand equations) have the expected sign, although again, most fail to achieve statistical 
significance. The variables with the most influence and tightest errors are the dependent 
variable autoregressive terms, suggesting that supply and demand have inertia from year to 
year. Looking at the model response to a 10% secondary supply shock in Figure 2.6, the 
initial response of the system is similar to that of the basic, static model: When the shock is 
introduced in 1980, secondary supply immediately increases and primary supply decreases. 
However, the decrease in primary supply is less than the increase in secondary supply, an 
effect that increases throughout the remainder of the simulation period. 
The amount of variability that results from the sensitivity analysis suggests that more 
work is needed to develop advanced econometric models that can provide more tightly 
estimated elasticity parameters. Nevertheless, the fact that the 95% confidence range of 
displacement rates is below 45% from 1987 on and only reaches 100% on one occasion 
suggests that even with loose elasticity estimates, we can have some confidence that 
displacement in the U.S. aluminum industry may be lower than 100%. 
4 CONCLUSION 
The basic model uncovered the underlying mechanisms of displacement and revealed 
the market conditions that are likely to result in zero displacement or full displacement. The 
aluminum market model predicted actual displacement rates of primary aluminum by 
recycled aluminum to be below 45% in the U.S. in the last several decades. These results 
together indicate that displacement of primary material by recycled material is unlikely to be 
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100% for many commonly recycled commodity materials, and, according to model estimates, 
is likely lower than 100% in the U.S. aluminum market. 
4.1 Increasing displacement 
These results should be troubling to environmentalists in general and to industrial 
ecologists in particular. Over the past four decades significant effort has been focused on 
increasing collection and recycling of a variety of materials, notably steel, aluminum, glass, 
and plastic. The results of this study suggest that recycling and reuse in general do not result 
in the environmental benefits previously assumed, and in some cases, if displacement is 
below the break-even rate, may in fact increase overall environmental impacts.27 
Nevertheless, by no means is the solution to start landfilling recyclable materials. 
After all, in the case of aluminum, based on the relative CO2 intensity of primary and 
secondary aluminum production, the break-even displacement rate is 5% (PE International, 
2012). This means that even at the lowest displacement rates predicted by the aluminum 
market model, recycling aluminum does result in net benefit; if displacement approaches 
100% that benefit becomes substantial. Instead, therefore, the solution is to influence the way 
secondary and primary aluminum interact in the market in such a way as to maximize 
displacement. For instance, all else being equal, an increase in the cross-price response of 
primary demand for secondary material (ߣଶ in the basic model) increases displacement rate. 
Cross-price demand response is a measure of buyers’ ability to substitute between 
alternatives, so one way to increase this response is to improve the ability of secondary 
material to substitute for primary material. In the case of aluminum, in many applications the 
                                                 
27 Break-even displacement rate is the rate at which the net benefit of recycling is zero. The break-even rate can 
be calculated as the ratio of recycling impacts to displaced production impacts (ܧ௥௘௖/ܧௗ௜௦௣) in any impact 
category of interest. Displacement above this rate will ensure environmental benefit; displacement below this 
rate means recycling causes increased impacts. See eq. 5.1 in Chapter 1 for more detail. 
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two materials are perfect substitutes; however, some applications require high-grade primary 
aluminum. Secondary aluminum is of lower quality primarily due to other contaminant 
metals that are introduced during the collection and processing steps, particularly with the 
mixing of different alloys. Therefore, increased efforts to separate different grades and alloys 
of scrap could improve overall secondary aluminum quality. An increase in secondary 
aluminum quality would increase primary producers’ willingness to substitute secondary 
material, thereby increasing displacement rate. 
Another way to increase displacement is to reduce secondary buyers’ price 
sensitivity, both to changes in the price of secondary material and to changes in the price of 
primary material. We learned from examining the market system dynamics in Figure 2.2 that 
one of the keys to high displacement rates is ensuring that decreases in the price of primary 
material, which occur when primary buyers substitute for secondary material, do not translate 
induce secondary buyers to substitute more primary material. From the discussion in Section 
2.4.2, we saw that full displacement is only possible when secondary buyers are quite 
unresponsive to the price of secondary material. 
In practice, ensuring low own- and cross-price price sensitivity for secondary buyers 
may be achievable through subsidies or other incentives to produce goods with higher 
recycled content. For instance, if there were a tax subsidy tied to the percentage of goods 
produced from secondary materials, this would make producers more willing to use 
secondary material and make them less price sensitive, since the subsidy would help hedge 
against increases in input prices. Such a subsidy would also make secondary buyers less 
willing to switch to primary material since they would receive a lower subsidy, and it would 
also help to increase primary buyers’ willingness to switch to secondary material in order to 
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receive more of the subsidy. All of these factors would contribute to a higher displacement 
rate. 
4.2 Displacement of other types of material 
This study has been focused on displacement of primary material by secondary 
material of like kind. That is, in eq. 1.12 we constrain ܳ௣ and ܳ௦ to be essentially the same 
type of material: virgin aluminum vs. recycled aluminum, PET vs. RPET, etc. However, like-
kind displacement is not the only type of displacement that can occur as a result of reuse or 
recycling, and may not always be the most appropriate or interesting in an LCA context. For 
instance, even if secondary aluminum has low primary aluminum displacement rates, in some 
applications it may still displace primary production of other materials such as copper, steel, 
or plastics. As another example, even though RPET is unsuitable for bottle production and 
will therefore have very low displacement rates for primary bottle-grade PET, RPET may 
still displace primary production of a different material. RPET can be turned into clamshell 
containers, molded pieces, and everyday objects like park benches and speed bumps. To the 
extent that these objects would have been created even in the absence of the recycled plastic, 
downcycled RPET displaces the alternative primary material such as polypropylene, steel, 
wood, or asphalt. This type of displacement relationship is less common in life cycle 
assessments, but some examples do exist (e.g., Schmidt & Weidema, 2007), which typically 
assume full displacement of a different type of material. 
Even though this study has focuses on like-kind displacement, the demonstrated 
approach is equally applicable to displacement of other materials. Eq. 1.11 can easily be 
generalized to handle any combination of potentially displaced materials as follows: 
 ܧ௡௘௧ ൌ ܧ௣௥௜௠ ൅ ܧ௨௦௘ ൅ ܧ௥௘௖ െ ∑݀௜ܧௗ௜௦௣೔ (4.1)
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where ܧௗ௜௦௣೔  is the per-unit impact of production for material ݅ and ݀௜ is the displacement 
rate for material ݅, where displacement rate is defined as the change in production quantity of 
material ݅ caused by a change in secondary production of the material of interest: 
 ݀ ൌ െΔܳ௣೔ Δܳ௦⁄  (4.2)
Eqs. 4.1–4.2 are completely general in that not only can material ݅ refer to primary 
production of any other potentially displaced material, it can also refer to secondary 
production of any potentially displaced material. Thus, if one has reason to believe, for 
instance, that recycled aluminum might not only displace primary aluminum but also primary 
and recycled steel, each of these materials could be included in eq. 4.1 and individual 
displacement rates could be estimated for each material in eq. 4.2.28 The main 
methodological difference in evaluating these other-material displacement relationships 
would be that the relevant cross-price responses would not be between primary and 
secondary material, but between the secondary material of interest and the competing 
material. 
However, other-material displacement significantly complicates the environmental 
assessment: As discussed, recycling has the potential to create environmental benefit because 
most recycled materials have lower impacts than their primary production counterparts. In 
the case of other-material displacement, there is no guarantee that the displaced primary 
material has higher impacts than the recycled material, since they are of different kind. For 
instance, if recycled aluminum displaces primary steel at 100% displacement, the greenhouse 
gas (GHG) benefits will be about one-fifth as large as if it displaced primary aluminum at 
                                                 
28 Additionally, eq. 4.1 need not be limited to production of a physical good; it could, for instance, refer to 
displacement of one production technology by a newer one—such as displacement of fossil-based energy by 
renewables. However, development of this extension is beyond the scope of the current study and must left to 
future research. 
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100%; if it displaces recycled steel, it will roughly double GHG impacts as compared to not 
recycling the aluminum at all (recycled steel creates about half the GHG impacts of recycled 
aluminum) (PE International, 2012). A comprehensive investigation into multimaterial 
displacement is needed to gain a better understanding of recycling impacts, but was outside 
the scope of the current study. 
4.3 Lessons for environmental assessment practitioners and corporate managers 
The demonstrated methodology and findings suggest a number of general lessons for 
both environmental assessment practitioners and would-be green firms. First is that 
environmental analyses involving recycled or reused products must consider and take steps to 
quantify displacement. Assumptions about displacement can reverse the environmental 
preference order of alternatives, and this study has shown that the full displacement 
assumption leads to overstated benefits of reuse and recycling, and possibly to suboptimal 
environmental choices. Reducing uncertainty of displacement by conducting market studies 
using the demonstrated methodology should be of prime importance. Considering the 
importance of price elasticities to a wide range of scholarly and practical pursuits, the dearth 
of rigorous elasticity estimates, including cross-price estimates between primary and 
secondary versions of a commodity, represents an important research gap. Additionally, the 
idea of multimaterial displacement is critical. To fully understand the environmental 
consequences of a reuse or recycling activity, we need to know not only how much, but also 
what kind of competing material is displaced. This paper has advanced the methodology on 
answering the first question; similarly robust, market-based methodologies are needed to 
answer the second. 
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Secondly, companies that wish to differentiate their products through superior 
environmental performance must recognize the importance of displacement in their 
environmental claims. The assumption of displacement of environmentally harmful 
alternatives lies at the heart of environmental claims made by many firms to differentiate 
their products. Car sharing firms, for instance, rely on the assumption that car sharing 
displaces production and use of personal vehicles; however, as we saw in Chapter 1, it may 
be the case that car sharing in fact attracts consumers who would otherwise use public 
transport. The environmental benefit of a Patagonia recycled plastic fleece rests partly on the 
assumption that it displaces a fleece made from primary fabrics; it may, however, simply 
displace a similar recycled fiber fleece from North Face, or something else entirely. 
This means two things for managers: First, managers must take steps to model the 
market in which the product competes and attempt to measure the effect it has on competing 
products. As watchdog NGOs and consumers become more interested and savvy, firms must 
be prepared to back their environmental claims with robust research on how a green product 
actually takes market share from dirtier products and therefore benefits the environment 
(under the net green definition from Chapter 1). Second, firms that wish to maximize the 
environmental benefit of their products (whether out of goodwill or for financial purposes) 
should seek to design their products and position them in markets where displacement of the 
dirtiest alternatives is most likely to occur. 
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APPENDIX A: BASIC MODEL 
A.1 Landfill is only avoided if production is displaced 
One popular belief is that the benefit of recycling arises from the avoidance of 
landfill. However, recycling does not necessarily avoid landfill. For instance, consider a case 
where PET bottles are recycled into a fleece jacket. If the fleece jacket is discarded to landfill 
at the end of its life, then recycling the PET into the fleece has not changed its fate but 
merely delayed it; in the end, the material is still landfilled. The same is true even of so-
called “closed-loop” recycling, such as steel sections being recycled back into steel sections. 
Even if this material is recycled many times, the laws of thermodynamics dictate that during 
each iteration some material is lost to landfill or other environmental releases. For instance, if 
a 1 kg steel section is recycled indefinitely at 10% yield loss, after forty-five cycles 90% of 
the material will have been lost. Thus, even in closed-loops, recycling does not avoid 
landfill—it merely delays it.  
However, recycling can reduce the amount of material reaching landfill by reducing 
the amount of material produced in the first place. If recycling displaces primary production, 
it effectively reduces the amount of extant industrial material in circulation, and thus 
eliminates the need to dispose of this material. Thus, recycling and reuse can pay “double 
dividends” by preventing the impacts of both material production and material landfilling—
but only if (and to the extent that) displacement occurs. 
A.2 Displacement rate, recycling rate, and recycling yield 
Figure 2.1 is simplified to highlight the role of displaced primary production as the 
main source of environmental benefits from recycling and reuse. Two concepts that are 
missing from the diagram are recycling rate and recycling yield. Figure 2.A.1 replicates 
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Figure 2.1, including these two concepts shown as parameters that determine the sizes of the 
flows out of “product use” and out of “collection and reprocessing.” After ܯ material is 
used, the parameter ܺ ∈ ሾ0,1ሿ determines the collection rate: After products are used, ܺ are 
collected and the remainder are landfilled. The parameter ܻ determines the recycling yield: 
During the recycling process some material may be lost, so only ܻ ∈ ሾ0,1ሿ secondary 
material is produced and the remainder is landfilled. Therefore, the total amount of secondary 
material entering the material and product market after accounting for recycling rate and 
recycling yield is ܳ௥௘௖ ൌ ܯ ⋅ ܺ ⋅ ܻ. 
 
Figure 2.A.1: Product system involving recycling or reuse, showing recycling rate and yield 
loss 
These parameters are ignored in the present study for two reasons. First, recycling 
rate and recycling yield loss are physical quantities that can easily be determined simply by 
measuring the difference between the quantity of material used and the quantity collected 
(for recycling rate) and between the quantity collected and the quantity of secondary material 
produced (for recycling yield). These parameters have been well studied for a number of 
product systems (e.g., Geyer et al., 2007; Geyer, Kuczenski, Henderson, & Zink, 2013; 
Kuczenski & Geyer, 2011). 
Second, and more importantly, it can be seen that while recycling rate and recycling 
yield help to determine the amount of primary production displaced, they are not involved in 
the determination of displacement rate. The amount of primary production displaced is equal 
Landfill 
(ܧ௟௔௡ௗ) 
Displaced production 
(ܧௗ௜௦௣) 
Collection and 
reprocessing (ܧ௥௘௖) 
Material & product
markets
Product use Primary production (ܧ௣௥௜௠) X 1-X
Y
1-Y 
ܳௗ௜௦௣ ൌ ݀ܳ௥௘௖ ܳ௥௘௖ ൌ ܯܻܺ
M
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to the quantity of secondary material entering the materials market multiplied by the 
displacement rate: ܳௗ௜௦௣ ൌ ݀ܳ௥௘௖, or equivalently, ܳௗ௜௦௣ ൌ ݀ܯܻܺ, using the formula for 
ܳ௥௘௖ from above. Thus, ݀ is a separate parameter from ܺ and ܻ and can be considered 
independently from them. The current study is focused on a methodology to determine 
displacement rate, and therefore recycling rate and recycling yield can be ignored without 
loss of generality. 
A.3 Alternate cross-price response specification 
In eq. 2.1 the cross-price response is a coefficient on the price differential between 
primary and secondary materials. An alternative approach would specify the cross-price 
response as the coefficient on the price of the competing material: 
 ܵ௦௘௖ ൌ ߙଵ ௦ܲ௘௖ ൅ ߙଶ ௜ܲ௡ௌ
ܵ௣௥௜௠ ൌ ߚଵ ௣ܲ௥௜௠ ൅ ߚଶ ௜ܲ௡௉
ܦ௦௘௖ ൌ ߛଵ ௦ܲ௘௖ ൅ ߛଶ ௣ܲ௥௜௠	
ܦ௣௥௜௠ ൌ ߣଵ ௣ܲ௥௜௠ ൅ ߣଶ ௦ܲ௘௖	
ܵ௦௘௖ ൌ ܦ௦௘௖	
ܵ௣௥௜௠ ൌ ܦ௣௥௜௠
 
(A.1)
The reduced form equations for this specification are as follows: 
௣ܲ௥௜௠ ൌ ߙ଴ߣଶߚଵߛଵ െ ߙଵߚଵ ൅ ߙଵߣଵ െ ߛଵߣଵ ൅ γଶߣଶ
௦ܲ௘௖ ൌ ߙ଴ሺߚଵ െ ߣଵሻߚଵߛଵ െ ߙଵߚଵ ൅ ߙଵߣଵ െ ߛଵߣଵ ൅ γଶߣଶ	
ܵ௣௥௜௠ ൌ ܦ௣௥௜௠ ൌ ߙ଴ߚଵߣଶߚଵߛଵ െ ߙଵߚଵ ൅ ߙଵߣଵ െ ߛଵߣଵ ൅ ߛଶߣଶ	
ܵ௦௘௖ ൌ ܦ௦௘௖ ൌ ߙ଴ሺߚଵߛଵ െ ߛଵߣଵ ൅ ߛଶߣଶሻߚଵߛଵ െ ߙଵߚଵ ൅ ߙଵߣଵ െ ߛଵߣଵ ൅ ߛଶߣଶ 
(A.2)
Introducing a 10% shock to the intercept on secondary supply, we can compute ݀ 
using the methodology described in Section 2: 
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Δܵ௣ ൌ Δܦ௣ ൌ ሺߙ଴ூ െ ߙ଴஻ሻߚଵߣଶߚଵߛଵ െ ߙଵߚଵ ൅ ߙଵߣଵ െ ߛଵߣଵ ൅ ߛଶߣଶ
Δܵ௦ ൌ Δܦ௦ ൌ ሺߙ଴ூ െ ߙ଴஻
ሻሺߚଵߛଵ െ ߛଵߣଵ ൅ ߛଶߣଶሻ
ߚଵߛଵ െ ߙଵߚଵ ൅ ߙଵߣଵ െ ߛଵߣଵ ൅ ߛଶߣଶ			
݀ ൌ Δܵ௣Δܵ௦ ൌ
ሺߙ଴ூ െ ߙ଴஻ሻߚଵߣଶ
ሺߙ଴ூ െ ߙ଴஻ሻሺߚଵߛଵ െ ߛଵߣଵ ൅ ߛଶߣଶሻ	
݀ ൌ െ ߚଵߣଶߚଵߛଵ െ ߛଵߣଵ ൅ ߛଶߣଶ 
 
 
 
(A.3) 
Comparing eqs. 1.12 and A.3, we see that under the alternative cross-price response 
specification, the equation for ݀ is slightly changed. The numerator remains the same, 
whereas the denominator has fewer terms under the alternate specification. The same 
variables drop out of the before-after subtraction, leaving the same five parameters of 
interest, each of which has the same direction of influence on ݀ as shown in Table 2.1. 
Repeating the Monte Carlo simulation as described in Section 2, the alternate specification 
results in minimum displacement near zero and maximum displacement of 4.3. The 
distribution of simulated displacement values is also nearly identical to the original 
specification: 97% below ݀ ൌ 1, 90% below ݀ ൌ 0.5, 56% below ݀ ൌ 0.15, and 0.5% where 
0.95 ൏ ݀ ൏ 1.05. 
Thus, the difference in specification of the cross-price response is largely 
inconsequential for the calculation of displacement following a secondary supply shock. 
Ultimately, I chose to use the original price-differential specification because this 
specification more accurately portrays the purchase decision facing consumers of primary 
and secondary material. Whereas they are likely to choose the level of production based on 
the absolute price of material, they are more likely to make decisions about which material to 
purchase based on the price of each relative to one another. Nevertheless, as this section 
demonstrates, the decision has little bearing on the model results. 
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A.4 Log-log specification 
The basic model in eq. 2.1 is expressed in terms of linear price responses. This was 
done for exposition to maximize understanding of the basic concepts. Typically, however, 
market models are constructed in logarithms on both sides of the equation (“log-log form”), 
as follows: 
 log	ሺܵ௦௘௖ሻ ൌ ߙଵlogሺ ௦ܲ௘௖ሻ ൅ ߙ଴
log	ሺܵ௣௥௜௠ሻ ൌ ߚଵlogሺ ௣ܲ௥௜௠ሻ
log	ሺܦ௦௘௖ሻ ൌ ߛଵlog	ሺ ௦ܲ௘௖ሻ ൅ ߛଶ൫log	ሺ ௣ܲ௥௜௠ሻ െ log	ሺ ௦ܲ௘௖ሻ൯	
log	ሺܦ௣௥௜௠ሻ ൌ ߣଵlog	ሺ ௣ܲ௥௜௠ሻ ൅ ߣଶ൫log	ሺ ௦ܲ௘௖ሻ െ log	ሺ ௣ܲ௥௜௠ሻ൯	
ܵ௦௘௖ ൌ ܦ௦௘௖	
ܵ௣௥௜௠ ൌ ܦ௣௥௜௠
 
(A.4)
The advantage to the specification in eq. A.4 is that the coefficients can be interpreted 
as price elasticities. A price elasticity is the ratio of percentage changes in quantity to 
percentage changes in price. Formally: 
ߟ ൌ ݀ܳ/ܳ݀ܲ/ܲ, 
which can be equivalently expressed in logs: 
ߟ ൌ ݀ logሺܳሻ݀ logሺܲሻ 
Expressing the basic model in log-log form makes the exposition slightly more 
complex, but it has the benefit that the price responses are now in percentage change format, 
and therefore “reasonable” values fall within a smaller range. Additionally, it more closely 
approximates real-world econometric industry models. To see how this specification affects 
the overall basic model results, I repeated the Monte Carlo simulation, as described in 
Section 2.4, using eq. A.4. Ten thousand values for the five elasticity parameters were chosen 
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from uniform distributions with a range of [0,േ5] (again using negative values for own-price 
elasticities).  
Figure 2.A.2 shows the results of the Monte Carlo simulation. Compared to the linear 
specification in Figure 2.3, the log-log specification results in a more skewed distribution 
with more observed values of displacement close to zero. In fact, over the 10,000 simulation 
repetitions, only twenty-six instances of ݀ ൒ 1 were recorded. Focusing on these twenty-six 
occurrences, the distribution of elasticity values that produced them is shown in Figure 2.A.3. 
While the low number of occurrences makes the histograms less smooth than with the linear 
model, the basic pattern remains the same: Full displacement is more likely when primary 
own- and cross-price demand are more elastic, primary own-price demand is less elastic, and 
secondary supply and demand are less elastic. Figure 2.A.4 shows the actual values for each 
elasticity parameter for each simulation repetition that resulted in ݀ ൒ 1. Here, again, the full 
displacement condition that ߣଶ ≫ ߛଶ holds, as in the linear model. 
 
Figure 2.A.2: Monte Carlo results from the basic model with log-log specification (10,000 
repetitions). See Figure 2.3 for comparison. 
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APPENDIX B: ALUMINUM MODEL 
B.1 Aluminum model diagnostics 
I tested the predictive power of the model by computing a dynamic forecast,29 
comparing the model’s predicted values to actual values over the estimation period 1969–
2010 and computing Theil’s UII index for the predictions. Theil’s UII is a diagnostic of 
forecast accuracy that can be interpreted as the ratio of the residual mean square error 
(RMSE) of the proposed forecasting model to the RMSE of the naïve model, ݕො௧ ൌ ݕ௧ିଵ: 
ܷܫܫ ൌ ඥ∑ ሺݕො௧ െ ݕ௧ሻ
ଶ௡௧ୀଵ
ඥ∑ ݕ௧ଶ௡௧ୀଵ
 
which takes a value of ܷܫܫ ൌ 1 for the naïve model and ܷܫܫ ൌ 0 for a perfect fit. ܷܫܫ ൏ 1 
indicates an improvement in forecast accuracy as compared to the naïve model; ܷܫܫ ൐ 1 
indicates worse forecast accuracy than the naïve model (Theil, 1966; Bliemel, 1973). For a 
discussion of two competing indices generally known as “Theil’s ܷ” and why UII rather than 
UI is used here, see Bliemel (1973). 
Figure 2.B.1 shows the actual values against the modeled dynamic forecast. Theil’s 
UII statistics for each endogenous variable are presented in Table 2.B.4. 
Forecast variable Theil’s UII statistic 
Primary aluminum supply 0.105 
Primary aluminum demand 0.532 
Secondary aluminum supply 0.496 
Secondary aluminum demand 0.577 
Table 2.B.4: Theil UII statistics for endogenous variable forecasts 
 
                                                 
29 As is standard practice, the dynamic forecast was computed using previous-period predicted dependent 
variable values for current-period lagged dependent variable values. 
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Figure 2.B.1: Dynamic model predictions vs. actual values from 1969 to 2010 
A visual check of the dynamic forecast in Figure 2.B.1 shows the fit to be quite good, 
particularly in the latter thirty years. All six endogenous variable forecasts result in Theil 
index statistics lower than 0.6, indicating that they provide reasonably accurate forecasts for 
our purposes. The ability to fit historic data builds confidence that the model is able to reveal 
the displacement dynamics between secondary and primary production. Overall, the 
estimated parameters from the model are in line with previously estimated models, shown in 
Table 2.B.5. 
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 Price elasticity: Primary Price elasticity: Secondary 
Study Supply ߚଵ Demand ߣଵ Supply ߙଵ Demand ߛଵ 
Slade (1980) -0.25c  0.24  
Hojman (1981)a   0.05 -0.17 
Deadman & Grace (1979) 0.23    
Gilbert (1994) 0.14 -0.127   
EPA (1998)   2.33 -0.34 
Grant (1999)   0.6b  
Carlsen (1980)   0.32  
Blomberg & Hellmer (2000)   0.17 0.07c 
Blomberg (2007)   0.21 – 0.78  
Blomberg & Soderholm (2009)   0.21  
a Only short-run elasticities reported 
b Elasticity of scrap supply; not the same as secondary supply 
c Economic theory predicts coefficient should have the opposite sign 
Table 2.B.5: Price elasticity estimates from previous econometric models of aluminum 
B.2 Aluminum model solution, supply shock, and confidence intervals 
The model in eq. 3.1 was solved for each year in the estimation period by finding a 
set of primary and secondary supply, demand, and prices that satisfied the estimated 
equations given values of the exogenous variables each year. Because eq. 3.1 is nonlinear, an 
analytic solution is not possible. Rather, the model was solved using the Broyden method 
(Broyden, 1965) built into EViews 7 to arrive at simultaneous solutions for every equation in 
the model. The model was solved dynamically, meaning that the previous-period solved 
values of the endogenous variables were plugged into the lagged dependent variables in each 
equation (as opposed to a static solution, in which actual, historical previous-period 
endogenous variable values are plugged in for lagged variables). 
To calculate 95% confidence intervals, the model was solved stochastically, 
incorporating estimation error in each equation (residuals). The stochastic solution was 
performed over 50,000 iterations, drawing values for the random components of the 
equations from random normal distributions. 
To incorporate the effect of the secondary supply shock, ߙ଴ in eq. 3.1 was increased 
by 10% from 1980 to 2010 and the model solve procedure was repeated, including 
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calculation of confidence intervals. Figures 2.6 and 2.7 show the deviation of the supply 
shock scenario solutions from the baseline model solutions. To see how these were 
calculated, Figures 2.B.2 and 2.B.3 show both the baseline and supply shock solutions in 
absolute rather than relative terms. Figures 2.6 and 2.7 simply show the difference between 
the dashed line (supply shock) and the solid line (baseline) in Figures 2.B.2 and 2.B.3, 
respectively. 
 
Figure 2.B.2: Baseline and supply shock scenario solutions for secondary supply 
 
Figure 2.B.3: Baseline and supply shock scenario solutions for primary supply 
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The results are not sensitive to the period in which the supply shock occurs. Figures 
2.B.4 and 2.B.5 show the results if the intervention occurs in 1995 rather than 1980. The 
main result that secondary supply increases more than primary supply decreases is still 
visible, and the calculated displacement is consistent with the predictions from the 1980 
intervention (Figure 2.B.6). 
 
Figure 2.B.4: Secondary supply solutions with supply shock introduced in 1995 
 
Figure 2.B.5: Primary supply solutions with supply shock introduced in 1995 
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Figure 2.B.6: Estimated displacement with supply shock introduced in 1995 
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CHAPTER 3 
CORPORATE SOCIAL RESPONSIBILITY AND EMPLOYEE SATISFACTION 
 
ABSTRACT 
Increasingly, managers see corporate social responsibility (CSR) as a way to increase 
employee satisfaction and thereby improve firm performance. Social identity theory suggests 
that CSR should affect employee satisfaction, yet empirical evidence for this relationship is 
scarce. Using a novel dataset, I measure CSR performance and employee satisfaction for 
3,121 U.S. firms from 1998 to 2012 and find that companies’ performance in six out of seven 
CSR dimensions can explain whether they are rated by their employees as one of the best 
places to work in the country. I disaggregate each dimension into forty-four individual CSR 
measures, and from those identify ten measures that are most likely to lead to higher 
employee satisfaction—six areas in which to improve (employee ownership plans, family 
benefits, gay and lesbian policies, charitable giving, conscientious labor rights, and product 
innovation) and four areas in which to reduce negative impacts (toxic emissions, workforce 
reductions, poor labor rights, and deceptive marketing). I discuss managerial lessons for most 
effectively utilizing CSR to improve employee satisfaction. 
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1 INTRODUCTION 
The importance of human assets for firm performance has been increasingly 
recognized in strategic management (e.g., Koch & McGrath, 1996; Huselid, Jackson, & 
Schuler, 1997; Campbell & Ganco, 2012). Employee satisfaction has been shown to be a 
critical determinant of firm performance (Hansen & Wernerfelt, 1989; Huselid, Jackson, & 
Schuler, 1997). It has been shown to increase customer service ratings (Yee, Yeung, & 
Cheng, 2010), product quality (Zhou et al., 2008), team performance (Nerkar, McGrath, & 
MacMillan, 1996), worker productivity (Oswald, Proto, & Sgroi, 2013) and stock price 
(Edmans, 2012). Conversely, dissatisfaction causes increased turnover (Jaros & Jermier, 
1993; Carsten & Spector, 1987), which has been shown to reduce worker productivity 
(Campbell & Ganco, 2012), profit margin, customer service, and product quality (Ton & 
Huckman, 2008; Hancock et al., 2011; Chi & Gursoy, 2009), as well as to increase the cost 
of capital (McElroy, Morrow, & Rude, 2001). Therefore it is imperative for managers to 
understand how firm policies can affect employee satisfaction.  
Given the critical role of employee satisfaction in firm performance, a large body of 
research has emerged from theories of human resources that attempts to identify and explain 
factors affecting satisfaction (Hausknecht & Trevor, 2010). One set of firm policies that has 
been purported to affect employee satisfaction and in turn affect firm performance is 
corporate social responsibility (CSR) activities—for example, engaging in environmental 
cleanups, adopting progressive social policies, building schools, and voluntarily limiting 
emissions (Aguilera et al., 2007; Ambec & Lanoie, 2008). 
Although companies invest in CSR for a variety of reasons (Reinhardt, 1999; Barnett, 
2007), employee satisfaction is the third-most-cited reason by executives for engaging in 
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CSR (KPMG, 2011). Grolleau, Mzoughi, and Pekovic (2012), citing a 1991 McKinsey study, 
report that 68% of 403 senior executives around the world think that “organizations with a 
poor environmental record will find it increasingly difficult to recruit and retain high caliber 
employees.” However, beyond the anecdotal evidence provided in consulting studies, robust 
empirical evidence to support the view that CSR affects employee satisfaction is scarce. 
The connection between CSR and employee satisfaction is complicated by the fact 
that CSR is multidimensional (Clarkson, 1995). CSR includes social, environmental as well 
as governance components (Chen & Delmas, 2011). Although CSR has been defined in a 
multitude of ways (Bansal, 2005; Carroll, 1999), recent empirical work has tended to focus 
on a set of dimensions delineated on stakeholder needs: environmental performance, 
employee relations, corporate governance, community relations, diversity, human rights, and 
product-related issues (e.g., Kotchen & Moon, 2011; Dawkins & Fraas, 2008). Furthermore, 
the CSR literature has been criticized for its overaggregation of the various CSR dimensions 
(Chen & Delmas, 2011). It is therefore unclear which components of CSR are most likely to 
relate to employee satisfaction. 
This study represents a substantial step toward filling these gaps by quantifying the 
effect of multiple dimensions of CSR on employee satisfaction. I test the relationship 
between the adoption of CSR initiatives and employee satisfaction and address two primary 
research questions: whether CSR can affect employee satisfaction, and, if so, what specific 
aspects of CSR have the largest impact on employee satisfaction. 
This study answers these questions by examining 3,121 U.S. firms in eight broad 
industries spanning fifteen years. Using a novel dataset, I measure the firms’ performance in 
seven dimensions of corporate social responsibility in order to determine if their CSR 
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performance explains whether they are rated by their employees as one of the most desirable 
places to work. I test the general CSR-satisfaction relationship, and disaggregate each 
dimension into individual CSR activities to identify the aspects of CSR that are most 
important to employees. To my knowledge, this paper represents the first empirical study 
using firm-level panel data to test the effect of a wide range of corporate social responsibility 
activities on employee satisfaction. The results hold important general lessons for managers 
on how to maximize returns to competitive advantage on investments in CSR. 
2 LITERATURE REVIEW 
2.1 Corporate social responsibility 
The idea of corporate social responsibility has received considerable attention in 
strategy literature (Carroll & Shabana, 2010). Although CSR has been defined in many ways 
(Bansal, 2005) the most often used definition (Dahlsrud, 2008) is that of the Commission of 
the European Communities (2001): “A concept whereby companies integrate social and 
environmental concerns in their business operations and in their interaction with their 
stakeholders on a voluntary basis.” CSR studies commonly focus on three main principles of 
sustainability: social, environmental, and economic (Bansal, 2005). 
Of particular interest in strategy research has been whether CSR can increase a firm’s 
competitive advantage. Whether firms can “do well by doing good” remains a topic of 
considerable debate in the strategy literature, as an extensive amount of empirical testing of 
the relationship between CSR and firm performance has resulted in mixed findings (Barnett 
& Salomon, 2012; Margolis, Elfenbein, & Walsh, 2009; Margolis & Walsh, 2003). While the 
empirical literature on the link between CSR and competitive advantage, mostly rooted in 
economics, emphasizes external drivers such as regulation, we still have little understanding 
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of the organizational mechanisms that link CSR to competitive advantage (Marcus, 2005). 
This omission could lead to misspecified models that ignore the effect of such organizational 
mechanisms on both social and environmental strategy and competitive advantage 
(McWilliams & Siegel, 2000). 
Furthermore, it has been recognized that CSR is not one concept, but is 
multidimensional (Clarkson, 1995), incorporating stakeholders, society, economics, the 
environment, and governance (Dahlsrud, 2008). The multidimensional nature of CSR makes 
it particularly difficult to measure and implement in research (Chen & Delmas, 2011). In 
some cases authors have simplified the complex nature of CSR by aggregating the concept 
into a single measure (Hillman & Keim, 2001). However, the CSR literature has been 
criticized for overaggregating CSR (Chen & Delmas, 2011). It has been argued that 
aggregation not only makes comparing and unifying studies difficult, but also renders the 
measurement invalid, as a single measure cannot capture the breadth of the CSR construct 
(Rowley & Berman, 2000). By definition, aggregation sacrifices valuable information, 
limiting my ability to discover the differing effects of the underlying CSR dimensions on 
competitive advantage. Therefore, some authors have sought to retain the complexity of CSR 
by measuring the effects of multiple CSR dimensions on firm performance outcomes (e.g., 
Greening & Turban, 2000). 
2.2 CSR and employee satisfaction 
One of the ways CSR has been theorized to contribute to competitive advantage is by 
improving employee satisfaction (Ambec & Lanoie, 2008; Bhattacharya, Sen, & Korschun, 
2008). However, very little empirical work is focused directly on this question. Some authors 
have studied factors that may be related to satisfaction, such as organizational commitment 
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and ratings of employer attractiveness. Carmeli and his colleagues (2007) surveyed 
employees in the electronics and media industry in Israel and found that perceived CSR leads 
to higher organizational identification, and ultimately to higher job performance. Aggregated 
measures of CSR performance have been shown to predict organizational commitment 
(Peterson, 2004; Turker, 2008; Ali, Rehman, & Ali, 2010; Brammer, Millington, & Rayton, 
2007), perceived external prestige (H. R. Kim et al., 2010), and workers’ attitudes and 
behaviors (Zheng, 2010). However, as discussed above, the aggregated measures of CSR 
used in these studies make generalization difficult and obscure which aspects of CSR are 
most important to employees. 
Other authors have examined multiple dimensions of CSR. Stites and Michaels 
(2011) surveyed 136 kitchen cabinet manufacturing workers and found that community-
related and environmentally related CSR were related to workers’ organizational 
commitment. Turban and Greening (1997; 2000) found that firms’ environmental 
performance, employee relations, diversity, community-relations, human rights, and product-
related CSR affected undergraduates’ job pursuit intentions, willingness to accept job offers, 
and ratings of firms’ attractiveness as employers. Albinger and Freeman (2000) found that 
companies’ employee relations, community relations, and diversity CSR made them more 
attractive to job seekers. Backhaus, Stone, and Heiner (2002) also surveyed undergraduates 
and found that employee relations, environmental performance, diversity, community 
relations, and product-related CSR were important to job seekers deciding whether or not to 
accept an offer. Grolleau, Mzoughi, and Pekovic (2012) used cross-sectional data from the 
French Organizational Changes and Computerization’s (COI) 2006 survey to assess the 
effect of adoption of voluntary product standards on employers’ difficulties in recruiting, and 
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found that the adoption of these voluntary standards reduced difficulties in recruitment of 
both professional and nonprofessional employees. Sen, Bhattacharya, and Korschun (2006) 
found that undergraduates were more likely to seek employment with a firm after it had 
given a large charitable gift. While these studies are an improvement in that they examine 
multiple dimensions of CSR, they are not directly focused on employee satisfaction. 
Some studies have looked specifically at employee satisfaction, but only in 
connection with one dimension of CSR. In terms of employee relations, Sutton (1985) 
surveyed employees and found that higher employee benefits were linked to higher 
satisfaction and lower turnover. This finding was later extended by Heneman (2007), who 
showed that longer-term benefits such as stock options and retirement plans were most 
effective at improving satisfaction and reducing turnover. Bernardi, Bosco, and Vassill 
(2006) looked at diversity CSR and found a correlation between the number of women on a 
firm’s board of directors and membership on the Fortune “100 Best Companies to Work for 
in America” list. Walsh and Sulkowski (2010) found a positive correlation between 
environmental CSR and employee satisfaction using cross-sectional employee survey data. In 
terms of corporate governance, Kim and Brymer (2011) found that hotel middle managers’ 
satisfaction was predicted by their perceptions of executives’ ethical leadership, and 
Schwepker (2001) found that perceptions of a positive ethical climate led to higher job 
satisfaction among salespeople. Valentine and Fleischman (2007) found that CSR mediates 
the positive relationship between ethics programs and job satisfaction. 
Although these studies looked specifically at employee satisfaction, they are limited 
by their narrow focus on only one CSR dimension. There may be some overlap between the 
dimensions or shared variance with measures of employee satisfaction, which could lead 
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single-dimension models to produce biased results that inflate the importance of the studied 
dimension, a possibility I further explore later. 
This prior work has made initial strides in uncovering the relationship between CSR 
and employee satisfaction. However, these studies are insufficient to form generalized 
conclusions about this relationship. All of these studies used cross-sectional data, and many 
sampled few firms or few employees. I therefore cannot establish that the findings of these 
studies are valid for the majority of firms, for firms in many industries, or over time. 
Additionally, a cohesive picture of the relative importance of the various dimensions of CSR 
is lacking. For these reasons, Turban and Greening (2000) called for a large-sample panel 
data analysis looking at a wide range of CSR dimensions. The goal of this study is to take a 
substantial step toward filling that research need. 
3 THEORY AND HYPOTHESES 
3.1 Theoretical framework 
Previous studies looking at the effects of CSR on internal stakeholders, such as 
employees, have tended either to focus on prospective or current employees (Turker, 2008). 
Studies that focus on prospective employees have asked how CSR might be used to attract 
the best talent (Albinger & Freeman, 2000; Backhaus, Stone, & Heiner, 2002; Turban & 
Greening, 1997; Greening & Turban, 2000). Authors in this area build on signaling theory 
(Spence, 1973; for an excellent review, see Connelly et al., 2010) and argue that companies 
send signals with CSR that indicate the firm’s commitments and goals (Greening & Turban, 
2000). 
Studies that focus on existing employees have asked how CSR can be used to retain 
employees and increase their satisfaction, organizational commitment, and productivity 
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(Peterson, 2004; Maignan, Ferrell, & Hult, 1999; Riordan, Gatewood, & Bill, 1997; Rupp & 
Ganapathi, 2006; Ali, Rehman, & Ali, 2010; H. R. Kim et al., 2010; Carmeli, Gilat, & 
Waldman, 2007; Bhattacharya, Sen, & Korschun, 2008). Authors arguing for a link between 
CSR and current employees have most commonly built their arguments around social 
identity theory; however, I also draw on loss aversion theory in order to extend this 
theoretical framework. 
3.1.1 Social identity theory and discrepancy theory 
Social identity theory (SIT) asserts that people classify themselves and others into 
social categories and construct their self-image within a social context (Ashforth & Mael, 
1989; Tajfel & Turner, 1985; Dutton, Dukerich, & Harquail, 1994). According to SIT, the 
concept of “social identity” comprises the totality of one’s memberships in various social 
groups (communities, political affiliations, etc.) and prescribes how one should behave as a 
member of those groups (Turker, 2008). The extent to which one feels a “oneness” or 
“belongingness” with a group determines one’s identification with that group (Ashforth & 
Mael, 1989). The higher an individual’s identification with a group, the more he or she 
vicariously takes part in and internalizes the successes or failures of the group (Ashforth & 
Mael, 1989); therefore more successful or prestigious groups will provide their members 
with higher self-esteem and improved self-image (Dutton, Dukerich, & Harquail, 1994). 
Although SIT began as a psychological theory of interpersonal behavior, authors have 
noted that one’s membership in a business organization is an important component of one’s 
social identity (Ashforth & Mael, 1989; Brammer, Millington, & Rayton, 2007). Therefore 
the relationship of one’s organization to other organizations, its distinctiveness, and its 
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prestige contribute importantly to one’s self-esteem and self-description (Ashforth & Mael, 
1989). 
Some have extended this to the realm of CSR and argued that if employees perceive 
their organizations to be socially and environmentally responsible, they will feel more pride, 
well-being, and connection with the company, which ultimately lead to higher job 
satisfaction and productivity (Turker, 2008; Smith et al., 2001; Frank, 2003; Akerlof & 
Kranton, 2005; Maignan & Ferrell, 2001). One often-cited example is the “near cultlike” 
sense of identity at the Timberland Company, which has been attributed in part to the 
company’s CSR (Bhattacharya, Sen, & Korschun, 2008). 
According to Locke (1969, p. 316), job satisfaction is “the pleasurable emotional state 
resulting from the appraisal of one’s job as achieving or facilitating the achievement of one’s 
job values.” Locke’s (1969; 1976) discrepancy theory of satisfaction states that job 
satisfaction is based on the distance between one’s job expectations as compared to reality. 
Thus, employee satisfaction with respect to CSR depends not only on the firm’s actual CSR 
performance but also on employee expectations. Accordingly, working for a socially 
responsible company has been theorized to increase happiness by reducing cognitive 
dissonance caused by conflicts between an individual’s personal beliefs and those of her 
organization (Grolleau, Mzoughi, & Pekovic, 2012; Ashforth & Mael, 1989). 
While employees may feel more identity and therefore have higher job satisfaction 
working for a company with higher CSR performance, conversely, they may also experience 
reduced job satisfaction working for a company with low CSR performance. Prior research 
has determined that poor CSR performance is not the mirror image of good CSR 
performance (Delmas, Etzion, & Nairn-Birch, 2012; Mattingly & Berman, 2006; Strike, Gao, 
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& Bansal, 2006; Minor & Morgan, 2011). For many dimensions of CSR, a distinction 
between positive and negative performance is intuitively meaningful: For example, if 
negative environmental performance means emitting toxic chemicals, positive environmental 
performance means something more than simply not emitting toxic chemicals. It means, for 
instance, developing environmental products, innovating new pollution control technologies, 
or spearheading environmental regulation. 
Because positive and negative performance in CSR are not mirror images, it may be 
that they have asymmetric impacts on employee satisfaction. Theory and experimental 
research in economics has shown that gains and losses of equal size can have asymmetric 
effects on happiness (Kahneman & Tversky, 1984; Thaler, 1980), which may also be true of 
CSR and satisfaction. Therefore, throughout the study I distinguish between positive and 
negative CSR performance, leaving open the possibility that they will have asymmetric 
effects on employees’ satisfaction. Based on social identity theory and the limited empirical 
evidence on general concepts of CSR, I therefore propose two initial hypotheses: 
Hypothesis H1a: Higher levels of positive CSR performance are positively 
associated with employee satisfaction. 
Hypothesis H1b: Higher levels of negative CSR performance are negatively 
associated with employee satisfaction. 
3.2 Multiple dimensions of CSR 
As discussed, CSR is not a single concept but is made up of multiple dimensions 
(Chen & Delmas, 2011; Clarkson, 1995). In the context of employee satisfaction, it is 
important to consider multiple dimensions of CSR because employees in different firms, 
industries, or job types may find some aspects of CSR more important than others (Albinger 
& Freeman, 2000; Bhattacharya & Sen, 2013). Again turning to Locke’s (1969; 1976) theory 
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of job satisfaction, employees may have preferences over the optimal level of different types 
of CSR, which will mean that not all types of CSR are equally effective at improving 
satisfaction. In the next sections I review the evidence specific to seven different dimensions 
of CSR—environmental performance, employee relations, diversity, corporate governance, 
community relations, human rights, and products—as they relate to employee satisfaction. 
However, the preceding theoretical arguments are valid for all dimensions of CSR and 
contribute to my specific hypotheses in each area, particularly when the empirical evidence 
in a particular dimension is lacking. 
3.2.1 Environmental CSR and employee satisfaction 
Environmental CSR includes measures of emissions, pollution prevention initiatives, 
green energy programs, or environmental products. Ambec and Lanoie (2008) reviewed the 
pays-to-be-green research and identified seven avenues by which environmental performance 
could improve the firm’s competitive position. One of these was that environmental 
performance lowers labor costs by making it easier to attract and retain talented employees. 
Drawing on prior work from Lankoski (2006) and Henriques and Sadorsky (2007), Ambec 
and Lanoie theorized that three types of companies are likely to realize labor cost reductions 
from improved environmental performance: (1) companies whose emissions affect worker 
health; (2) companies that seek to attract young, well-educated professionals; and (3) 
companies located in areas sensitive to environmental concerns. The authors point to 
anecdotal evidence that supports these ideas, but were unable to find any empirical studies 
linking environmental performance to labor cost reduction. 
There were, however, two studies related to the recruitment side of this issue. Turban 
and Greening (1997) measured the effect of firm environmental performance (as well as 
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employee relations, diversity, community relations, human rights, and product issues, which 
will be discussed in the following sections) on undergraduates’ ratings of the companies’ 
attractiveness as employers. They found no significant association between environmental 
performance and attractiveness as an employer. However, in a subsequent study, Greening 
and Turban (2000) found that firms’ environmental performance was positively associated 
with undergraduates’ job pursuit intentions and willingness to accept a job offer, a finding 
later confirmed by Backhaus, Stone, and Heiner (2002). 
Grolleau, Mzoughi, and Pekovic (2012) used cross-section data from the French 
Organizational Changes and Computerization’s (COI) 2006 survey to regress employers’ 
difficulties in recruiting on the adoption of the voluntary standards ISO14000, Fair Trade, 
and Certified Organic. They found that the adoption of these voluntary standards reduced 
difficulties in recruitment of both professional and nonprofessional employees. 
While those studies focus on the effect of CSR on prospective employees, Stites and 
Michael (2011) surveyed manufacturing workers and found that environmentally related 
CSR was related to workers’ organizational commitment. Walsh and Sulkowski (2010) 
performed a simple analysis using data on satisfaction and environmental performance 
ratings culled from online news stories and social media and found that perceptions of a 
firm’s environmental performance were positively associated with employee satisfaction. 
Thus, based on this evidence, I propose Hypotheses 2a and 2b: 
Hypothesis 2a: Higher levels of positive environmental performance are 
positively associated with employee satisfaction. 
Hypothesis 2b: Higher levels of negative environmental performance are 
negatively associated with employee satisfaction. 
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3.2.2 Employee relations CSR and employee satisfaction 
The relationship between employee relations and employee satisfaction is the most 
intuitively direct. Employee relations CSR includes union relations, retirement benefits, 
health and safety, employee ownership plans, and workforce stability. Behavioral theory 
holds that in order for employees to be productive, satisfied, and remain with a firm, their 
basic security needs such as good working conditions and compensation must be met (Sutton, 
1985). However, not all aspects of employee relations may be equally effective at improving 
satisfaction. Barber and her colleagues (1992) found that flexible benefits plans that allow 
employees to choose personally optimal levels of health insurance, retirement, stock options, 
etc. are more effective at improving employee satisfaction than one-size-fits-all benefits 
plans. 
There has been empirical evidence in the management literature to support the 
relationship between employee relations CSR and employee satisfaction. Turban and 
Greening (1997) and Albinger and Freeman (2000) found that higher employee relations 
performance was positively associated with undergraduates’ ratings of firms’ attractiveness 
as an employer. Greening and Turban (2000) and Backhaus, Stone, and Heiner (2002) found 
that employee relations were related to undergraduates’ willingness to accept a job offer. 
Sutton (1985) used surveys to study drivers of employee turnover in different types of 
firms and across different types of employees, and found that high benefits are significantly 
linked to low turnover, particularly in larger firms and among nonsalaried employees. 
Heneman (2007) extended this work and found that certain types of benefits are more 
effective than others at increasing satisfaction. Particularly, benefits with longer-term vesting 
schedules (retirement plans, employee ownership plans, stock options) are more effective at 
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reducing employee turnover and increasing employee satisfaction than other types of 
benefits. Based on this evidence, I propose Hypotheses 3a and 3b: 
Hypothesis 3a: Higher levels of positive employee relations performance are 
positively associated with employee satisfaction. 
Hypothesis 3b: Higher levels of negative employee relations performance are 
negatively associated with employee satisfaction. 
3.2.3 Diversity CSR and employee satisfaction 
Diversity issues concern a company’s policies and practices toward women, 
minorities, gay/lesbian/bisexual/transgender, and disabled employees. The business case for 
diversity, particularly in terms of board and top management makeup, has received 
considerable attention with mixed results (e.g., Adams & Ferreira, 2009; Carter et al., 2010; 
Triana, Miller, & Trzebiatowski, 2013). Here I focus only on the impact of diversity on 
employee satisfaction. 
The link between diversity and satisfaction has been argued for and in some cases 
demonstrated in the social psychology literature as well as the management literature. Social 
psychologists primarily draw on the theory of minority influence, which holds that more 
diverse groups lead to increased divergent thinking and wider perspectives (Nemeth, 1992). 
Bowman and his colleagues (2011) suggested that diversity can provide opportunities for 
personal, social, and intellectual development, positively contributing to psychological well-
being and satisfaction. In a longitudinal study of college graduates, they found that diversity 
experiences in college positively influence well-being after graduation. Additionally, racial 
minorities are perceived to contribute to the novelty of ideas produced by a group (Antonio et 
al., 2004). 
203 
Within management literature, Turban and Greening (1997) and Albinger and 
Freeman (2000) found that higher diversity scores were positively associated with 
undergraduates’ ratings of a firm’s attractiveness as an employer. Greening and Turban 
(2000) and Backhaus, Stone, and Heiner (2002) found that diversity performance was related 
to undergraduates’ willingness to accept a job offer. Baer, Rahman, and Post (2010) found 
that board gender diversity was positively associated with firms’ rankings on the Fortune 
Most Admired Companies list, while Bernardi, Bosco, and Vassill (2006) found that higher 
female representation on a company’s board of directors is positively correlated to being 
listed on Fortune’s “100 Best Companies to Work For” list. Pitts (2009) argued that as the 
workforce becomes more diverse, if companies adopt leadership or policies that value 
diversity, they will be more responsive to employees’ needs and will therefore be better able 
to retain employees. He tested this theory empirically using a sample of U.S. federal 
employees and found that diversity management increases workers’ team productivity and 
job satisfaction, particularly for women and ethnic minorities. Based on the foregoing 
theories and evidence, I propose Hypotheses 4a and 4b: 
Hypothesis 4a: Higher levels of positive diversity performance are positively 
associated with employee satisfaction. 
Hypothesis 4b: Higher levels of negative diversity performance are negatively 
associated with employee satisfaction. 
3.2.4 Corporate governance CSR and employee satisfaction 
Corporate governance issues concern a company’s ethical leadership, reporting 
transparency, and executive pay. Prior authors have theorized that aspects of corporate 
governance, particularly ethical leadership, are associated with higher employee satisfaction 
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(W. G. Kim & Brymer, 2011). Brown et al. (2005) proposed that employees will be more 
satisfied when leadership is fair, considerate, and just. 
Initial evidence for these theories exists. Schwepker (2001) surveyed salespeople and 
found that perceptions of positive ethical climates in their organizations led to higher job 
satisfaction and organizational commitment. Kim and Brymer (2011) surveyed hotel middle 
managers and found that perceptions of ethical leadership by executives is a significant 
predictor of job satisfaction and organizational commitment. Other studies have confirmed 
that ethical CSR considerations are significant predictors of job satisfaction (Peterson, 2004; 
Valentine & Fleischman, 2007). 
Along with ethical leadership, another component of governance is transparent 
reporting. In terms of reporting, Bhattacharya, Sen, and Korschun (2008) argue that many 
companies’ CSR efforts are less effective than they could be due to ineffective 
communication on the part of the company. They argue that if CSR initiatives are 
communicated transparently to employees, they are more likely to feel connected and 
committed to the organization. Based on this evidence, I propose Hypotheses 5a and 5b: 
Hypothesis 5a: Higher levels of positive corporate governance performance 
are positively associated with employee satisfaction. 
Hypothesis 5b: Higher levels of negative corporate governance performance 
are negatively associated with employee satisfaction. 
3.2.5 Community relations CSR and employee satisfaction 
Community relations issues have to do with a company’s charitable giving to local 
communities, support for local housing and education, and tax evasion issues. Research in 
neuropsychology and management has shown that contributing to the welfare of one’s 
community increases one’s satisfaction and happiness in a number of ways. Examining 
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neural responses to taxation and voluntary giving, Harbaugh et al. (2007) found that people 
respond positively to both voluntary and involuntary giving in areas of the brain linked to 
reward processing. Harbaugh and his colleagues theorized that involuntary giving produces 
happiness through “pure altruism,” while voluntary giving provides a sense of “warm glow.” 
While warm glow is associated with more powerful feelings of happiness, pure altruism from 
involuntary giving does increase happiness. 
In the management literature, Parsons and Broadbridge (2006, p. 121) found that 
managers of nonprofit charity shops, though dissatisfied with job factors such as pay and 
benefits, feel a sense of satisfaction from “the knowledge that their efforts are benefiting a 
charitable cause.” This “altruism payoff” can make up for and overcome the dissatisfaction 
caused by other aspects of their jobs. 
Turban and Greening (1997) and Albinger and Freeman (2000) found that higher 
community relations performance was positively associated with undergraduates’ ratings of 
firms’ attractiveness as an employer. Greening and Turban (2000) and Backhaus, Stone, and 
Heiner (2002) found that community relations performance was related to undergraduates’ 
willingness to accept a job offer. 
Fombrun and Shanley (1990) tested a number of CSR variables, including firms’ 
charitable giving, for their effect on the Fortune Most Admired Companies list and found 
that people assign higher reputations to firms that give proportionally more to charities than 
other firms. Sen, Bhattacharya, and Korschun (2006) surveyed undergraduates on their 
interest in seeking employment with a large company before and after the company gave a 
large gift to the university. They found that awareness of the gift was positively related to 
interest in seeking employment. 
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In terms of current employees, the evidence is thinner. In their study of kitchen 
cabinet manufacturers, Stites and Michael (2011) found that community relations CSR was 
related to workers’ organizational commitment. Based on this evidence, I propose 
Hypotheses 6a and 6b: 
Hypothesis 6a: Higher levels of positive community relations performance are 
positively associated with employee satisfaction. 
Hypothesis 6b: Higher levels of negative community relations performance 
are negatively associated with employee satisfaction. 
3.2.6 Human rights CSR and employee satisfaction 
Human rights CSR centers on a company’s relationship with its overseas supply 
chain, including supply chain transparency, controversies, overseas labor relations, and 
involvement in conflict areas. As with charitable giving to local communities, the same 
feelings of altruism and warm glow as discussed by Harbaugh et al. (2007) that arise when 
giving to charity may contribute to employee satisfaction if employees know that their 
company is contributing to positive work environments for people overseas. Consistent with 
social identity theory and loss aversion theory, employees should feel more connected to a 
company that treats overseas workers fairly, and should identify less with a company with a 
poor reputation for labor rights abuses. 
However, limited empirical evidence exists in this domain. In their two studies, 
Turban and Greening (1997; 2000) found that higher human rights performance was 
positively associated with undergraduates’ ratings of both employer attractiveness and 
willingness to accept a job offer. Grolleau and his colleagues (2012) also found that 
companies with the voluntary Fair Trade certification, which ensures that upstream suppliers 
pay workers a living wage, face less difficulty in recruiting. I found no studies directly 
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related to human rights CSR and satisfaction of current employees. Nevertheless, based on 
the foregoing theoretical arguments, I propose Hypotheses 7a and 7b: 
Hypothesis 7a: Higher levels of positive human rights performance are 
positively associated with employee satisfaction. 
Hypothesis 7b: Higher levels of negative human rights performance are 
negatively associated with employee satisfaction. 
3.2.7 Product-related CSR and employee satisfaction 
Product-related CSR is concerned with a company’s product quality and safety, 
product innovation, antitrust issues, and deceptive marketing. In accordance with social 
identity theory, employees should feel more connected and proud of a company that has a 
positive reputation for product quality, safety, and bringing innovative products to market. At 
the same time, loss aversion theory suggests employees should feel more embarrassed to 
work for a company that engages in false or deceptive marketing or has a reputation for 
market manipulation. Additionally, employees are happier working with the most cutting-
edge technologies. A recent survey shows that companies with progressive policies that 
allow employees to use their own new technologies in the workplace are 37% more likely to 
report improved employee satisfaction (Avanade Inc., 2013). 
To my knowledge, the only studies to include product-related CSR in a management 
context are the two studies of Turban and Greening (1997; 2000), who found that higher 
product CSR performance was positively associated with undergraduates’ ratings of both 
employer attractiveness and willingness to accept a job offer. I found no studies related 
directly to product CSR and current employee satisfaction. Based on the theoretical 
arguments above, I propose Hypotheses 8a and 8b: 
Hypothesis 8a: Higher levels of positive product-related performance are 
positively associated with employee satisfaction. 
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Hypothesis 8b: Higher levels of negative product-related performance are 
negatively associated with employee satisfaction. 
3.3 Interactions between dimensions and measures 
It may be the case that the various dimensions and aspects of CSR have differing 
effects on satisfaction depending on their levels relative to each other. For instance, a firm 
that already performs well in one area may see smaller satisfaction gains from increasing 
performance in another area. Or it may be that synergies exist and higher performance in two 
areas may be more effective at increasing satisfaction than in either area alone. It may also be 
that poor performance in one area may offset good performance in another area, or vice 
versa. Additionally, poor performance in two areas could compound into a “negative 
synergy.” I found no theory or evidence to provide support or guidance in this area, so I do 
not propose any formal hypotheses here. Nevertheless, initial analysis showed that this seems 
to be an important consideration and is worthy of exploration. I therefore conduct an 
exploratory analysis to brush the surface of the types of interactions that can occur between 
different measures of CSR. 
4 DATA AND MEASURES 
To test my hypotheses, I compiled a novel dataset from a variety of existing sources 
described in this section. A summary of the number of observations each year from each 
individual data source and the matched dataset are shown in Table 3.1. Descriptive statistics 
and correlations for key explanatory and control variables are provided in Table 3.5, and the 
descriptive statistics and correlations for all variables are found in the appendix (Table 
3.A.2). 
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4.1 Dependent variables 
Employee satisfaction is measured using the list of the “100 Best Places to Work for 
in America” compiled by the Great Place to Work Institute. I refer to this list as the “Great 
Place list” and abbreviate it in some charts and tables as “GP.” The Great Place list is 
considered one of the most reputable employee satisfaction studies in existence (Joo, 2006). 
The scores are based on two company surveys: one completed by 250 randomly 
selected employees, called the “Trust Index,” and one completed by a company 
representative about the firm’s programs and policies, including pay and benefits programs, 
workforce diversity, and culture, called the “Culture Audit” (Edmans, 2012). The employee 
survey “measures engagement by surveying employee opinions, attitudes and perceptions on 
the level of trust between colleagues and between management and employees” (Great Place 
to Work Institute, 2013). Over 400 companies participate in the survey process each year, 
meaning that data is gathered from more than 100,000 employees per year. More information 
on the content of the survey, including sample questions, can be found in two recent papers 
by Edmans (2011; 2012). 
Roughly two-thirds of the company’s assessment score is based on the employee 
survey and one-third on the Culture Audit. Once the results are received by Great Place to 
Work, they are judged according to the Great Place to Work model. This model measures, 
among other things, whether the employees trust their employers, have pride in what they do, 
and enjoy their coworkers (Great Place to Work Institute, 2013). Once the scores for all 
participating companies are determined, a list of the top 100 companies is published in the 
January issue of Fortune magazine. 
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4.1.1 Selection bias 
There is some concern about selection bias with this list. The Great Place Institute 
does not solicit survey responses from companies, and the survey does not include all 
companies. Rather, companies volunteer to participate. Companies are incentivized to 
participate because of the potential prestige of being included on the top 100 list and because 
they receive their own employee satisfaction survey data, which they can use for internal 
review. Additionally, not all firms are eligible for consideration; firms must be five or more 
years old and have at least 1,000 regular full- and part-time employees in the U.S. to be 
considered for the Great Place list. Thus the survey cannot be considered a random sample. 
However, Edmans (2011; 2012), who also uses the Great Place list in two studies, 
argues convincingly that this selection bias should not bias the results of the analysis. He 
argues that the selection bias can manifest in only two ways: The first way is if companies 
that know they have low employee satisfaction self-select out of the study; this simply 
increases the list’s accuracy. The second way is if companies with high employee satisfaction 
self-select out of the study because think their high satisfaction is well-known and they do 
not need the additional publicity. This lowers the overall satisfaction of companies on the list 
and attenuates the overall results; that is, if these companies were included in the survey 
process, the overall results of my study would be even stronger. Therefore I do not believe 
the nonrandom selection process biases or inflates my findings. 
4.2 Independent variables 
Independent ratings of company corporate social responsibility performance are 
measured using the Kinder, Lydenberg, and Domini (KLD) dataset, now owned and 
maintained by MSCI Inc. Over time, the KLD dataset has expanded the number of firms 
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covered and now includes over 3,100 of the largest U.S. companies. This dataset is one of the 
most widely used and reputed sources in CSR research (Wagner, 2010), and its quality, 
reliability, and validity have been vetted by prior scholars (Benson & Davidson, 2010; 
Szwajkowski & Figlewicz, 1999). Previous studies have established the KLD database as the 
“standard for quantitative measurement of corporate social actions” (Mattingly & Berman, 
2006; Y. Kim, Park, & Wier, 2012). The KLD database has also been identified as a 
particularly promising source of data to reveal the differing effects of various aspects of CSR 
(Barnett, 2007).  
4.2.1 KLD ratings 
KLD collects information on companies and rates them on seven qualitative issue 
areas and six controversial business issues ranging from corporate governance to firearms. I 
use only the qualitative issue areas, which are divided into areas of strength and areas of 
concern and correspond to the seven dimensions of CSR discussed above. Within each 
qualitative issue area, KLD rates a firm on multiple individual measures—for instance, 
within the dimension “employee relations,” firms are rated on work/life benefits, union 
relations, retirement benefits, etc. A firm is assigned a binary score in each of these 
individual measures according to whether or not it exhibits the criteria described in the 
measure. Not all firms are rated on all variables in all years, and a firm is only rated on a 
measure if enough information is available. Additionally, some variables were introduced or 
dropped over the twenty-plus-year history of the dataset. Data points that are missing or not 
rated are omitted from the sample. 
I use the dataset in two ways: First, I create fourteen measures of social responsibility 
across the seven issues covered by KLD by separately summing the strengths and concerns in 
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each qualitative issue area. Several prior studies using KLD have subtracted a firm’s concern 
scores from its strength scores to create a single variable (Goss, 2009; Goss & Roberts, 2007; 
Turban & Greening, 1997). However, as discussed above, other researchers have emphasized 
a distinction between “good” versus “bad” social responsibility performance (Delmas, 
Etzion, & Nairn-Birch, 2012; Mattingly & Berman, 2006; Strike, Gao, & Bansal, 2006; 
Minor & Morgan, 2011). I do not sum positive strengths and negative weaknesses, but retain 
each as a separate variable. 
The second way I use the KLD dataset is by retaining each individual measure in 
each CSR dimension as separate variables. This approach allows us insight into what aspects 
of the environmental dimension determine employee satisfaction. The individual measures 
that make up the KLD dataset have changed over the lifetime of the database. I include only 
variables that are available at least between 2002 and 2009. Additionally, I omit the item 
“ENVconF,” which essentially measures a firm’s involvement in the utilities sector and is 
already controlled for with industry fixed effects. I also omit the catchall “other” categories 
due to a lack of clarity about what constitutes a strength or concern in these areas. For 
transparency, I adopt the variable names used in the KLD dataset. A complete list of variable 
names and brief descriptions is included in the appendix (Table 3.A.1). 
4.2.2 Actual vs. perceived CSR performance 
In my view, KLD should not be viewed as a complete or accurate assessment of a 
firm’s true CSR performance; developing an accurate assessment of a firm’s CSR 
performance would require significantly more and different data than those used by KLD, 
and complex modeling methodologies such as life cycle assessment and social cost-benefit 
analysis. However, my goal in this study is not to measure the effect of true CSR 
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performance, but rather how a company’s CSR performance is perceived by its employees. 
Since most employees presumably do not have the knowledge or resources needed to 
develop scientifically rigorous assessments of their companies’ CSR, I can assume that these 
are not the types of information on which employees base their perceptions. Rather, 
employees must construct their perceptions about a firm’s CSR based on more basic 
information, such as public disclosures on toxic emissions and greenhouse gas releases, 
company reports and policies, legal cases, labor disputes, and news stories. These are also 
precisely the kinds of data from which the KLD ratings are drawn, making KLD an excellent 
proxy for employee perceptions of CSR performance. 
4.3 Control variables 
I obtain financial and size data for each firm from the Compustat database. Employee 
satisfaction is likely to be related to firm size and profitability, though existing theory is 
mixed about the expected direction: Larger firms are expected to have better human 
resources support and promotion opportunities (Atkinson & Storey, 1994; Grolleau, 
Mzoughi, & Pekovic, 2012); on the other hand, with more employees comes increased 
competition for resources and more rigid work structure, which have been shown to decrease 
employee satisfaction (Idson, 1990). More profitable firms are likely to have better 
reputations (Turban & Greening, 1997; B. Brown & Perry, 1994), though it is not clear that 
this will directly affect satisfaction. Other authors have shown that while employee 
satisfaction affects firm performance, firm performance does not affect employee satisfaction 
(Koys, 2001), so the expected directions for profitability and size are unclear. Nonetheless, 
prior research has shown size and profitability to be important control variables. Therefore, I 
follow other authors in this area and control for size using the number of employees, and 
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profitability using return on assets (ROA; defined as net income before interest and taxes 
divided by total assets) (Turban & Greening, 1997; Grolleau, Mzoughi, & Pekovic, 2012), 
but remain agnostic on their effects.30 
Additionally, it is important to control for average firm salary, as higher salaries are 
expected to improve employee satisfaction (Grolleau, Mzoughi, & Pekovic, 2012; Phelps, 
1968) and because employees may be willing to accept lower pay to work for more altruistic 
companies or accept a pay premium to work for companies with poor CSR performance 
(Grolleau, Mzoughi, & Pekovic, 2012; Frank, 2003). Because I do not have access to average 
salary data for the majority of companies in the sample, I approximate the amount of money 
paid to employees using available data in the Compustat database. The Compustat item 
“XLR: staff expense – total” is likely to be a close approximation of wages; unfortunately, 
this item is unavailable for 84% of firms in the sample. However, the income statement item 
Selling, General, and Administrative Expense (SG&A) in the Compustat database is 
available for over 70% of the firms included in KLD. This item is a useful approximation 
because it reflects salaries and wages of officers and employees, including pension and 
employee benefits. It is not an exact measure, as it also includes furniture and equipment 
rental cost and servicing. Nonetheless, it is highly correlated to the more desirable measure of 
“staff expense” ሺݎ ൌ 0.86, ݌ ൏ 0.0000ሻ and is preferable to including no control for salary.31 
                                                 
30 Based on its growing popularity as a measure of firm financial performance, I also considered using Tobin’s 
Q as a measure of profitability (Ambec & Lanoie, 2007; Chung & Pruitt, 1994). However, I prefer the 
straightforward interpretation of ROA and the fact that it is more likely to reflect profitability that is visible to 
employees, rather than investors. Ultimately, the choice between ROA and Tobin’s Q turns out to be 
inconsequential, as it does not appreciably change any other coefficient estimates. 
31 Using a per-employee measure of SG&A spending was also considered. However, since I also include a 
measure for size using the number of employees, untransformed SG&A spending represents spending holding 
the number of employees constant. Nonetheless, I tested model specifications using SG&A divided by the 
number of employees, which yielded qualitatively unchanged results. 
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All of the estimated models include industry fixed effects at the one-digit SIC-code 
level, following the industry breakdown of Cheng, Ioannou, and Serafeim (2013), to control 
for unobserved variation between sectors. Additionally, year fixed effects are included to 
control for annual variations in actual CSR performance as well as methodological 
inconsistencies over time in the KLD dataset. Finally, because firms that have applied for and 
been listed on the Great Place list in the past should be more likely to know about the list and 
apply for membership in subsequent years, and to eliminate endogeneity concerns discussed 
in the appendix, I include a dummy for one-year lagged list membership. 
4.4 Sample and matching 
4.4.1 Dataset matching methodology 
Because the Great Place list did not include company identifiers, matching was 
performed manually based on company name. A semiautomated process was used to match 
the KLD and Compustat databases based on company name, using CUSIP as an additional 
check for accuracy, where available. This process also included manually researching 
company name change histories and matching individual observations that, for a variety of 
reasons, were not automatically matched. Company name was used because ticker symbols 
can change over time and nine-digit CUSIP information is only available for 58% of the 
KLD dataset. Matching by name resulted in an initial match between Compustat and KLD of 
31,876 matched observations, out of a total of 33,511 KLD observations (95% matched). The 
percentage of matched observations is considerably higher than previous studies using 
automated methods (e.g., Benson & Davidson, 2010) and comparable to other studies using 
manual matching (Benson et al., 2011; Y. Kim, Park, & Wier, 2012; Goss & Roberts, 2011). 
Some of these matched firms were dropped from the final sample due to missing data. 
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4.4.2 Sample 
The sample consisted of all firms in the KLD dataset that have the minimum number 
of employees required to be eligible for the Great Place list (at least 1,000). The KLD dataset 
has expanded in scope since its inception in 1991, now covering over 3,100 public and 
private companies. I constructed an unbalanced matched panel dataset over the period 1998–
2012, collected from the datasets described above. 
Observations were omitted if any required financial information was missing. 
Additionally, companies in SIC industry 9 had no variation across in the dependent variable 
and were dropped (thirty-eight observations). The final sample consisted of 3,121 firms with 
an average of 1,643 observations per year and a total of 20,966 firm-year observations. A 
subset of this sample consists of firms on the Great Place list. Although the list includes 100 
firms each year, many are privately held with no financial or KLD information available, and 
were dropped. The final sample included 124 firms listed on the Great Place list with an 
average of 36 firms per year and each firm appearing in the dataset an average of 4.3 times 
(538 firm-year observations). 
Table 3.2 shows the percentage of firms in each one-digit SIC code industry, and 
Figure 3.1 shows how this breakdown differs by list membership. The difference in makeup 
between nonlisted companies and companies on the Great Place list is apparent: Firms in 
mining and construction, transportation, communication and electricity, and finance, 
insurance, and real estate are underrepresented on the Great Place list; firms in services and 
sales are overrepresented on the Great Place list. These differences highlight the need for 
industry fixed effects, as certain industries are more likely to be included on the Great Place 
list. 
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Figure 3.2 shows distributions of the financial variables by list membership. The log-
transformed variables exhibit normal distributions, and clear differences can be seen between 
listed and nonlisted firms in terms of size and employee compensation: Overall, firms on the 
Great Place list tend to be larger (more employees) and have higher employee compensation 
expenditures (as measured by SG&A). Bonferroni pairwise mean comparisons confirm that 
the observed differences are significant (adj.	݌ ൏ 0.000). Additionally, listed firms also have 
significantly higher ROA than nonlisted firms (Δߤ ൌ 0.0364, adj. ݌ ൌ 0.008). 
Firms not only differ by list membership on financial metrics but also by KLD CSR 
scores. Table 3.3 shows mean KLD scores by list membership. Overall, it can be seen that 
listed firms tend to score higher on strength variables, though there is no clear pattern in the 
concern variables. 
As an example of the distribution of the number of KLD strengths and concerns, 
Table 3.4 tabulates the summed environmental strength and concern scores, ENVstr and 
ENVcon. Over 1,200 observations in the sample include at least one environmental strength, 
and over 900 include at least one environmental concern. The number of observations with 
more strengths and concerns drops off precipitously above the first, and only a handful obtain 
a score of 3 or higher in either variable. 
5 MODELS AND ESTIMATION 
Because membership on each list is distributed binomially (a firm is either on the list 
or not), I use the logit link function to explain likelihood of inclusion on a list. Specifically, 
the probability of a firm appearing on the Great Place list is given by the logistic function 
 
ܲሺݕ ൌ 1|࢞ሻ ൌ ܩሺ࢞ࢼሻ, where ܩሺݖሻ ൌ ݁
௭
1 ൅ ݁௭ , (5.1)
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and the logit function is the inverse of the probability, or the log of the odds of a firm 
appearing on the Great Place list: 
 
logitሺܲሻ ൌ log ൬ ܲ1 െ ܲ൰. (5.2)
I estimate each model with maximum likelihood estimation in Stata version 12.0 with 
heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors. All continuous variables are standardized to 
facilitate interpretation. 
I test the hypotheses using a number of variations on a base model. The model 
explains the log odds of a firm being listed on the Great Place list as a function of its CSR 
performance as measured by its KLD scores, controlling for financial variables and industry 
and year fixed effects as well as a dummy variable indicating one-year lagged list 
membership: 
 
log ൬ ௜ܲ௧1 െ ௜ܲ௧൰ ൌ ߣܮܫܵ ୲ܶିଵ ൅ ߙ௝ ൅ ߛ௧ ൅ ࣐′ࢆ࢏࢚ ൅ ࢼ
ᇱࢄ࢏࢚ ൅ ݑ௜௧ (5.3)
where ௜ܲ௧ is the probability of firm ݅ being included on a best places list in year ݐ, ܮܫܵ ௧ܶିଵ 
takes a value of 1 if the firm was on the Great Place list the previous year and 0 otherwise, ߙ௝ 
is the time-invariant unobserved industry effect, ߛ௧ is the firm-average unobserved year 
effect, ࢆ is the vector of control variables, ࢄ is the vector of explanatory variables, and ݑ௜௧ is 
mean-zero error. 
I test sixteen versions of eq. 5.3, all of which differ on the explanatory variables 
included in ࢄ. Model 1 tests only the control variables (i.e., explanatory variables are 
omitted) to ensure they are behaving as expected. Model 2 tests all of the KLD strength and 
concern variables together, allowing us to test Hypothesis 1 and each of the dimension-
specific hypotheses (2–8). Models I1–I7 test strengths and concerns in each CSR dimension 
individually, allowing us to determine if individually estimated models are likely to be 
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biased. Models 3–9 test the disaggregated components of each CSR dimension, respectively, 
while including the strength and concern totals from all other dimensions. These last models 
are not specific to particular hypotheses, but provide insight into what specific aspects of 
each dimension are most important to employees. 
Additionally, I test whether the various dimensions and individual measures of CSR 
can interact by introducing an interaction term to eq. 5.3: 
 
log ൬ ௜ܲ௧1 െ ௜ܲ௧൰ ൌ ߣܮܫܵ ୲ܶିଵ ൅ ߙ௝ ൅ ߛ௧ ൅ ࣐′ࢆ࢏࢚ ൅ ࢼ
ᇱࢄ࢏࢚ ൅ ߣሺ ଵܺ௜௧ ൈ ܺଶ௜௧ሻ ൅ ݑ௜௧ (5.4)
I test a number of variations of eq. 5.4, which differ on the items ଵܺ and ܺଶ. Since 
there are over seventy-one pairwise comparisons among the seven dimensions alone without 
including the individual measures, I do not present results for every possible interaction pair. 
Rather I will present graphical results that exemplify the kinds of interactions that can occur 
generally. 
In the appendix, I discuss at length potential study design issues of possible reverse 
causality and rare-events bias and conclude that neither is a concern for my study. Also in the 
appendix, I discuss interpretation of coefficients under a logit model, explain my use of 
marginal effects reported at the sample average observation, and discuss my model 
diagnostic criteria and their interpretation. 
6 RESULTS  
The results of estimating each of the sixteen models are presented in Table 3.6 
through 3.14. Estimates for Model 1, showing only the control variables, are presented in 
column 1 of Table 3.6. Estimates for Model 2, the KLD strength and concern totals estimated 
collectively, are presented in column 2 of Table 3.6. Estimates for Models I1–I7, each CSR 
dimension estimated individually, are presented in the remaining columns of Table 3.6. Table 
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3.7 shows chi-square statistics for Wald tests of coefficient equality for Model 2 vs. the 
individually estimated models. Tables 3.8–3.14 show the estimates for Models 3–9, the 
disaggregated components of each CSR dimension. In this section I discuss each model in 
turn. 
6.1 Control variables (Model 1) 
In Model 1, I include only the control variables, and I find that the controls affect 
employee satisfaction in unsurprising ways. Conflicting theories left us agnostic about the 
effect of firm size and profitability, and I find that while profitability is not a significant 
predictor of employee satisfaction, larger firm size negatively impacts membership on the 
Great Place list. My proxy for employee compensation, SG&A, significantly and positively 
affects list membership, which is evidence that this measure is an effective approximation. 
The marginal effect of a one standard deviation increase in SG&A on the log-odds of Great 
Place list membership is 0.0105 (݌ ൏	0.000). As expected, lagged list membership is also a 
significant positive predictor of current list membership across all models, showing that there 
is “stickiness” or momentum gained by listed firms that helps them appear on the list in 
subsequent years. The direction and significance of the controls variables are consistent 
across all of the other models. I tested the joint significance of year fixed effects and industry 
fixed effects using F-tests and found that both were highly significant in all models. 
6.2 CSR strength and concern totals (Model 2) 
Model 2 includes all fourteen strength and concern variables. These results first allow 
us to test Hypotheses 1a and 1b, that any aspects of CSR influence employee satisfaction. I 
find that at least some CSR strengths and concerns significantly predict whether a firm is 
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included on the Great Place list, and therefore significantly influence employee satisfaction. 
Thus, Hypotheses 1a and 1b are supported. 
Environmental strengths are not significant, meaning that Hypothesis 2a is not 
supported, but environmental concerns are significant and negative, as predicted by 
Hypothesis 2b. The effect of environmental concerns is larger than any other concern 
variables; the marginal effect on the probability of appearing on the GP list of a one standard 
deviation increase in environmental concerns is -0.003 (݌ ൌ 0.011). Employee relations 
strengths and concerns are each significant in the expected direction, supporting Hypotheses 
3a and 3b. The positive effect of employee relations strengths is more than twice as large as 
any other variable, with a marginal effect of 0.004 (݌ ൏ 0.000). 
Also significant in the positive direction are diversity strengths (marginal effect ൌ 
0.001,	݌ ൌ 0.110), community relations (marginal effect ൌ	0.002, ݌ ൌ 0.007), product-
related strengths (marginal effect ൌ 0.001, ݌ ൌ 0.013), and, to a lesser degree, human rights 
strengths (marginal effect ൌ 0.001, ݌ ൌ 0.025). These findings support Hypotheses 4a, 6a, 
8a, and 7a, respectively. Diversity concerns, community relations concerns, and human rights 
concerns are negative and nearly significant at the 90% level (݌ ൌ	0.132, ݌ ൌ 0.197, ݌ ൌ 
0.123, respectively), providing very weak support for Hypotheses 4b, 6b, and 7b. 
Corporate governance strengths are estimated at nearly zero and are not significant. 
However, the coefficient estimate for corporate governance concerns is positive and 
significant, which is the opposite direction than predicted by Hypothesis 5b. The marginal 
effect of a one standard deviation increase in corporate governance concerns is to increase 
the probability of being included on the Great Place list by 0.2% (݌ ൌ 0.028). This finding 
suggests that more information is needed about the underlying components that make up 
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each CSR dimension than can be learned from the strength and concern totals alone. Models 
3–9 provide deeper insight into each dimension. 
In sum, the results of Model 2 strongly support seven of the sixteen hypotheses tested 
by this model and provide weak support for three additional hypotheses. 
6.3 Individual vs. collectively estimated CSR dimensions (Models I1–I7) 
Models I1–I7 estimate the effects of each CSR dimension separately in order to 
attempt to replicate results of prior studies that study a single dimension (Heneman, 2007; 
Sutton, 1985; Walsh & Sulkowski, 2010; Bernardi, Bosco, & Vassill, 2006; W. G. Kim & 
Brymer, 2011; Schwepker, 2001) and determine if such an approach may artificially inflate 
the importance of the studied dimension. The results of Models I1–I7 confirm the results of 
previous studies and show that in every dimension except human rights, the coefficients in 
the individually estimated models are significant in the expected direction. 
However, looking at the results of the individually estimated models compared to 
Model 2, which estimates all seven dimensions at once, it is immediately clear that the 
individual models appear to be biased and that studies investigating only one aspect of CSR 
will likely overstate the impact of studied dimension. In nearly every case, the coefficient 
estimates of the individual models are larger in absolute value than in the collectively 
estimated model. In many cases, such as environmental strengths, diversity strengths, 
diversity concerns, and community concerns, estimates of the individual models appear 
significant when they are nonsignificant when estimated in the larger model. Most striking is 
the difference in the estimates of environmental strengths between Model I1 and Model 2. 
When estimated collectively, the results are nonsignificant and slightly negative. When 
estimated individually, however, the estimate is significant and positive. 
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To formally test the differences between the individually and collectively estimated 
models, I performed Wald tests of coefficient equivalence for the estimates in Model 2 vs. 
those in each of the individual models I1–I7. The results of these tests are presented in Table 
3.7. In eight of the fourteen tests, the null hypothesis of equivalence between the coefficients 
is rejected with 90% confidence. 
6.4 Disaggregated CSR measures (Models 3–9) 
In this section I present results for each of the disaggregated models 3–9, shown in 
Tables 3.8–3.14. The tables provide brief descriptions of each component variable, and more 
detailed descriptions are provided in the appendix (Table 3.A.1). 
6.4.1 Environmental CSR 
Included in the environmental dimension are measures of beneficial products, 
pollution prevention, recycling and packaging, clean energy, regulatory compliance, Toxics 
Release Inventory emissions, and agricultural chemicals. Of these components, only 
ENVconD, emissions reported to the U.S. EPA Toxics Release Inventory, was significant. 
The marginal effect was -0.010 (݌ ൌ 0.023), meaning that firms with high toxic emissions 
are 1% less likely to be listed on the Great Place list. None of the environmental strength 
variables were significant. 
6.4.2 Employee relations CSR 
In employee relations, I measured union relations (positive and negative), employee 
cash profit sharing, employee ownership plans, retirement benefits (positive and negative), 
health and safety conditions (positive and negative), and recent workforce reductions. The 
only employee relations strength that was significant was employee ownership plans; the 
marginal effect of employee ownership plans was 0.018 (݌ ൏ 0.000), meaning that adopting 
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an employee ownership plan increases a firm’s probability of appearing on the Great Place 
list by 1.8%. In terms of employee relations concerns, only recent workforce reductions were 
significant (marginal effect ൌ -0.010, ݌ ൌ 0.065). 
6.4.3 Diversity CSR 
In terms of diversity, I included measures of women and minority representation in 
executive and line positions and on the board of directors, quality of family benefits, 
contracting with women and minorities, employment of disabled people, and progressive 
policies toward gay and lesbian employees, such as providing health benefits to employees’ 
same-sex partners. Both family benefits (marginal effect ൌ 0.010, ݌ ൌ 0.001) and 
progressive gay and lesbian policies (marginal effect ൌ 0.006, ݌ ൌ 0.012) were significant. 
Neither of the diversity concerns was significant. 
6.4.4 Corporate governance CSR 
Corporate governance measures included both limited and high executive pay, 
ownership of subsidies with high or low CSR scores, and reporting transparency. Of these, 
only high executive pay was significant (marginal effect ൌ 0.006, ݌ ൌ	0.002). The effect is 
positive, meaning that higher executive pay is associated with higher employee satisfaction. 
As no other variables were significant, I can see that this variable was what drove the 
previously puzzling result in Model 2, where it appeared that higher corporate governance 
concerns led to higher employee satisfaction. However, looking at the disaggregated results, 
the result is less alarming: The debate over high executive pay is far from settled (e.g., 
Faulkender et al., 2010; Florin, Hallock, & Webber, 2010; Bebchuk & Fried, 2006), so a 
finding that suggests employees value well-paid leadership or, conversely, that the most 
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talented, best-paid executives are more effective at creating a culture with high employee 
satisfaction, is understandable. 
6.4.5 Community relations CSR 
Included in community relations are measures of charitable giving, support for 
housing and education, controversial investments, a firm’s negative economic impact on the 
local community, and tax disputes. Of these, only charitable giving was significant (marginal 
effect ൌ 0.008, ݌ ൌ 0.003). The distinction between KLD’s definition of “charitable giving” 
and “innovative giving” is somewhat vague, so I tested a specification with these variables 
combined, which produced qualitatively unchanged results. 
6.4.6 Human rights CSR 
Human rights issues consisted of only three measures: positive labor rights, negative 
labor rights, and operations in Burma.32 The labor rights variables measure a firm’s 
relationship with its overseas supply chain, including transparency, relations with overseas 
labor unions, and recent labor disputes or controversies. Measures for both positive labor 
rights (marginal effect ൌ 0.025, ݌ ൌ 0.013) and negative labor rights (marginal effect ൌ  
-0.006, ݌ ൌ	0.042) were significant in the expected directions. 
6.4.7 Product-related CSR 
Product-related CSR was measured in terms of product quality and safety, research 
and development (R&D) spending, marketing and contracting practices, and recent antitrust 
issues. Of these, only R&D spending was significant (marginal effect ൌ 0.010 ݌ ൌ 0.034), 
although the measure of questionable marketing and contracting practices approaches 
significance (݌ ൌ 0.179). The measure for R&D spending includes companies that bring 
                                                 
32 KLD periodically introduces measures of a firm’s involvement in areas of the world that are in conflict or that 
are controlled by oppressive regimes. Many of these measures are active for only two or three years; operations 
in Burma is the only such measure that has been active over the entire sample period. 
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notably innovative products to market; the results show that employees derive satisfaction 
from the opportunity to work with cutting-edge products. 
6.5 CSR interactions 
Myriad variations of eq. 2, using different combinations of pairwise interactions, were 
estimated. They are too numerous to present here, but taken as a whole several common 
patterns emerge. I will illustrate these patterns as using specific interactions that exemplify 
the kinds of dynamic relationships that can occur. 
The first general type of interaction concerns CSR strengths, and is what I term the 
“saturation effect,” exemplified with an interaction between community strengths and 
employee relations strengths in Figure 3.4. From the figure it is apparent that for companies 
with the lowest levels of community strengths (community strength = 0; the blue line), higher 
performance in employee relations results in higher probability of appearing on the Great 
Place list. For companies with moderate community strength (community strength = 4; the 
red line), this effect is attenuated. For companies with the highest levels of community 
strengths, higher performance in employee relations can actually lead to slightly lower 
employee satisfaction. This effect is not only seen in aggregate CSR strengths, but also in 
individual strength measures: Figure 3.5 shows an interaction between work/life benefits and 
progressive gay and lesbian policies. Companies without gay and lesbian policies experience 
a benefit from adopting work/life benefits, and companies without work/life benefits are 
more likely to appear on the Great Place list if they adopt gay and lesbian policies. However, 
for companies that already have work/life benefits, adopting gay and lesbian policies 
decreases the probability of appearing on the Great Place list very slightly (albeit 
insignificantly). 
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In contrast, in some limited cases, synergies between strengths can exist. Figure 3.6 
shows an interaction between human rights strengths and community relations strengths. For 
companies with low community relations strengths (blue and red lines in Figure 3.6), higher 
performance in human rights strengths have no effect on employee satisfaction. However, 
companies with high community relations strengths (the green line) do benefit from higher 
community relations strengths. Thus, there is a synergy between community relations 
strengths and human rights strengths in that the impact of each alone is negligible, but higher 
performance in both can increase employee satisfaction. 
A similar effect can also be seen in reverse in the case of two CSR concerns creating 
a “negative synergy.” Figure 3.7 shows an interaction between environmental concerns and 
employee relations concerns. For firms with no employee relations concerns, higher 
environmental concerns decrease the probability of appearing on the Great Place list, as 
expected. However, for firms with higher levels of employee relations concerns (the blue 
line), this effect is magnified. Not only is the baseline probability for these firms lower, but 
the negative effect of additional environmental concerns is even greater (i.e., the slope is 
steeper on the red and green lines). The effect is so severe that for companies with a score of 
8 in employee relations concerns and 4 in environmental concerns, there is essentially no 
possibility of appearing on the great places list. 
7 DISCUSSION 
This study explored the relationship between employees’ perceptions of their 
employers’ CSR performance and employee satisfaction. I drew on social psychology and 
economics and based my theoretical framework on social identity theory and loss aversion. 
Based on these theories, prior authors have suggested that better CSR performance should 
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increase employee satisfaction and therefore lower labor costs by making talented employees 
easier to attract and retain (e.g., Ambec & Lanoie, 2008). 
I discussed a number of previous studies that have empirically tested the connection 
between CSR and factors related to employee satisfaction. Some of these found evidence for 
a connection between a general concept of CSR and employee identification, commitment, 
and perceptions of employer attractiveness. Other authors divided CSR into components and 
studied one or more of these, finding evidence for a link between CSR and job satisfaction, 
job offer acceptance, and lowered recruitment difficulty. All of these studies used cross-
sectional data, and many sampled few firms or used surveys. Thus, the results were 
insufficient to inform generalized strategy theory. Additionally, studies that examined more 
than one dimension of CSR conflicted with studies that examined only one dimension, 
suggesting that there may be overlap or shared variance between the dimensions. For these 
reasons, Turban and Greening (1997; 2000) called for a panel data analysis of this question 
looking at a wide range of CSR dimensions. 
To my knowledge, this study is the first to employ a matched panel data approach 
looking at multiple dimensions of CSR to test the link between CSR and employee 
satisfaction at the firm level. Generally, I was interested in answering the question, “Do 
employees value the social and environmental performance of their companies?” I also went 
deeper, asking, “If so, which aspects of CSR are the most important to employees?” Based on 
theoretical arguments and prior studies I predicted that positive CSR performance in each of 
seven CSR dimensions is positively related to employee satisfaction, whereas negative 
performance in each dimension is related to lower employee satisfaction. 
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To test these predictions I created a novel dataset and studied 3,121 U.S. firms 
spanning a fifteen-year period, measuring both their CSR performance and their employee 
satisfaction. I measured employee satisfaction using the list of the “100 Best Places to Work 
in America,” which is based on more than 100,000 employee satisfaction surveys each year. I 
measured companies’ CSR performance using data from KLD, which represents a robust 
picture of employees’ perceptions of companies’ CSR performance. I controlled for industry 
classification and various financial measures, and employed logistic regression to determine 
the effect of seven different dimensions of CSR on the probability of a firm’s employees 
rating it as one of the most desirable places to work in the U.S. 
I then estimated a series of models that express the probability of a firm appearing on 
the Great Place list as a function of its CSR performance and financial control variables. I 
first found that these financial variables are important predictors of employee satisfaction and 
should be included in subsequent studies. My results show that studies that omit financial 
controls (e.g., Walsh & Sulkowski, 2010) are likely to report biased estimates. 
I then turned to a model that includes firms’ strength and concern scores for seven 
different dimensions of CSR. Results from this model largely confirmed my predictions and 
found that employee relations, community relations, and product-related strengths are the 
strongest predictors of higher employee satisfaction, whereas high environmental and 
employee concerns are the strongest predictors of lower employee satisfaction. My results 
support social identity theory in that companies’ higher CSR strengths seem to contribute to 
employees’ pride and identity, manifested in their workplace satisfaction ratings. 
Of my sixteen hypotheses, nine were supported and seven were not. However, of the 
seven hypotheses that were not supported, three (4b, 6b, and 7b) were nearly supported at the 
230 
90% confidence level. Additionally, although 5b was not supported, the fact that corporate 
governance concerns had the opposite sign than expected led to interesting results about the 
relationship between employee satisfaction and high executive pay. 
Not only did I unpack the corporate governance dimension, I also examined the 
individual measures that make up the other six dimensions. Two results from these 
disaggregated models stand out. 
First, in terms of environmental CSR, I found that none of the environmental strength 
variables seem to be important to employees. However, employees’ perceptions of 
environmental concerns are primarily driven by toxic releases reported to the U.S. EPA’s 
Toxics Release Inventory—information that is freely available to the public. Thus, my 
findings also support loss aversion theory (Kahneman & Tversky, 1984; Standifird, 2001; 
Doh et al., 2009): Whereas environmental damages are the most important CSR concerns to 
employees, environmental strengths do not significantly contribute to employee satisfaction. 
Thus, employees seem to view a company’s environmental initiatives and damages 
asymmetrically, and, as predicted by loss aversion theory, find the negative, embarrassing 
effects of environmental damages more important than positive environmental initiatives. In 
other words, even if employees do not value their employers’ positive environmental 
initiatives, they are very concerned about being associated with a visibly harmful company. 
Second, disaggregating the diversity dimension, I found that a company’s progressive 
policies toward gay and lesbian employees were a significant predictor of employee 
satisfaction, with an effect nearly as large as a company’s family benefits. Considering that in 
July 2013, roughly half of Americans supported gay marriage, and especially considering 
that only 35% of Americans supported gay marriage in 1999 (Saad, 2013), this is a surprising 
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finding. Why should gay and lesbian policies be such an important driver of employee 
satisfaction when less than half of employees supported gay marriage for the majority of the 
study period? To test whether it was the result of outlier observations—perhaps of a small 
group of pro-gay/lesbian companies that consistently appear on the Great Place list for other 
reasons—I looked in depth at companies who received positive ratings in this measure. There 
are 547 firms that receive a score of 1 in DIVstrG (gay/lesbian policies) with a total of 4,349 
observations, or 17.5% of the entire dataset. Of these 547 firms, 69 are listed on the Great 
Place list at least once. Although these 547 firms tend to have higher mean KLD scores (in 
both strengths and concerns), their industry makeup is nearly identical to that of the entire 
sample. Inspection of the companies on this list does not suggest any pattern or common 
characteristics. Thus, with the current data I see no direct evidence to suggest that this 
finding is the result of outliers or nonrepresentative companies. Nonetheless, it remains an 
intriguing result and would be an interesting focus for a subsequent study.  
In terms of potential interactions between dimensions and individual measures of 
CSR, I demonstrated three general effects that can occur. First is what I call the “saturation 
effect,” where higher performance in one area of CSR strength is less effective if the firm is 
already performing well in another area. This effect may be due to decreasing returns on CSR 
to satisfaction: Employees may have a threshold for the total amount of satisfaction that they 
can derive from their employer’s CSR, and as the company reaches that point, each 
additional investment in CSR provides less satisfaction. Above that point, the employee 
receives no further benefit from additional CSR performance. If the company invests in CSR 
well beyond that point, employees may actually see these investments as wasteful of firm 
resources, and satisfaction may be lower. For example, Timberland Company has long held a 
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tradition of charitable giving and community service. However, in the mid-1990s when the 
company was suffering financial hardship, some within the company called for less 
charitable involvement in order to put resources to more productive use (Austin, Leonard, & 
Quinn, 2004). 
The second general interaction effect was that of synergy, where investment in one 
area of CSR strength is more effective with higher performance in another area. This was 
exemplified in the case of community relations and human rights. Firms that have low 
community relations strengths will not see a benefit from higher human rights strengths, but 
those with high community relations strengths will. This perhaps reflects employees’ 
preferences for the well-being of their own community over those abroad. Only once the 
home community is secured and thriving will employees value their impacts on people in 
other countries whom they will likely never meet or interact with. 
The last general interaction effect is a “negative synergy,” in which higher levels of 
poor performance in two areas of CSR concerns can compound and be even more damaging 
to employee satisfaction than poor performance in either area alone. This finding supports the 
combination of social identity theory and loss aversion. While people may experience gains 
in satisfaction through their association with a well-performing company, being associated 
with a company that is not only performing badly, but performing badly in multiple areas of 
CSR, drastically decreases employee satisfaction. 
7.1 Implications for researchers 
7.1.1 Methodological contributions 
There are several methodological contributions of this research that can improve 
future empirical work. The first is to suggest the value of the 100 Best Places to Work in 
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America list as a reputable source of employee satisfaction data at the firm level. Thus far, 
this dataset has been underutilized: I am aware of only three other authors who use this data 
(Edmans, 2012; Bernardi, Bosco, & Vassill, 2006; Filbeck & Preece, 2003). Considering the 
methodological rigor with which the survey process is conducted and the high sample size of 
employees, it is a valuable source. Additionally, data from 2006 to 2012 are freely available 
online, and prior data can be obtained from the authors of this study. 
Another methodological contribution is to demonstrate the importance of including 
multiple dimensions of CSR as opposed to single measures. Some prior studies have 
examined single measures (e.g., Walsh & Sulkowski, 2010; Bernardi, Bosco, & Vassill, 
2006), whereas others have examined multiple dimensions (e.g., Turban & Greening, 1997). 
To test the importance of including multiple measures of CSR, I estimated my model with 
each dimension of CSR individually and compared these to the collectively estimated results. 
I found substantial evidence to suggest that focusing on individual dimensions of CSR and 
excluding others will artificially inflate the importance of the studied dimension. Because the 
other dimensions are important to the CSR-satisfaction relationship, excluding them in 
single-dimension models will introduce omitted variable bias and the results will likely be 
incorrect. Although my study found this result in the context of employee satisfaction, it may 
exist with other outcome variables as well. I therefore argue that future research should, as 
much as possible, incorporate a wide range of CSR measures to avoid introducing omitted 
variable bias. 
The final methodological contribution for future studies is to suggest the importance 
of matching the KLD and Compustat databases by company name, using a combination of 
automated and manual matching. These two databases are commonly matched in CSR 
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research (e.g., Mattingly & Berman, 2006; Benson & Davidson, 2010), and maximizing the 
number and accuracy of matches is important for the accuracy and generalizability of the 
results. Using automated matching based on CUSIP or stock ticker is unreliable as ticker 
symbols can change over time, and nine-digit CUSIP information is unavailable for much of 
the KLD database. Such approaches are also ultimately less successful: Using automated 
methods I was only able to match 88% of KLD observations, similar to prior studies (Benson 
& Davidson, 2010); using name matching, I was able to match 95% of KLD observations. 
7.1.2 Limitations 
While I believe the presented results are robust, there are ways this study could be 
improved. First, because I am unable to see the entire list of companies that applied for 
membership in the Great Place list, my measure of employee satisfaction is truncated. 
Furthermore, since there are roughly only forty observations per list per year, I was unable to 
use a linear model to predict satisfaction. While this limitation does not affect the accuracy of 
the study, a source of continuous satisfaction data over a larger pool of companies would 
allow for more nuanced analysis. 
Second, there is some concern about endogeneity in the model specification. As 
discussed in the appendix, if it is the case that firms adjust their CSR performance in 
response to employee satisfaction, the estimates may be biased. To fully account for this, one 
would need to utilize an instrumental variables approach. In this study, I argued that to the 
extent that firms do adjust their level of CSR in response to employee satisfaction, this effect 
takes time and can be captured by including a lagged dependent variable. Thus, I believe I 
have satisfactorily accounted for potential endogeneity. However, I would caution future 
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researchers in this area to be wary of potential endogeneity and to consider identifying a 
valid set of instruments to reduce this possibility. 
7.1.3 Suggestions for future research 
Several fruitful lines of inquiry stem from this work. First, although I scratched the 
surface of disaggregating what precise aspects of CSR employees do or do not value, there is 
much more to be done in this area. The specific factors measured in the KLD database are 
not the totality of CSR activities that may be important to employees. For instance, there is 
no measure in the database for company-sponsored volunteerism, which may improve 
satisfaction. Looking into this activity specifically, but also looking at more CSR activities 
generally, would be a worthwhile inquiry. 
Along these lines, research is direly needed to improve the measurement of CSR 
performance in a meaningful way at the firm level. KLD has long been the standard in 
scholarly work, but as my understanding of the complexities of CSR develop, the limitations 
of KLD are beginning to show. MSCI, the current owner of the database, has started making 
changes that may eventually improve KLD’s utility, but during this transition the changes in 
methodology make longitudinal studies more challenging—at present it is not completely 
clear how to incorporate variable changes that MSCI has implemented since acquiring the 
dataset in 2010. In general, a transparent, consistent, and more accessible (ideally university-
led) database of CSR impacts would be of great value to the scholarly community. 
7.2 Implications for managers 
Managers realize that increasing employee satisfaction is an important goal to 
increase firm value. One of the ways companies have tried to improve employee satisfaction 
is by engaging in corporate social responsibility. However, until now, whether these 
236 
investments were effective has been an open question. This research establishes that some, 
but not all, dimensions of CSR are likely to be effective at improving employee satisfaction. 
In general, managers should strive to improve employee relations, community relations, 
company diversity, and product strengths while reducing their environmental damages and 
avoiding poor employee relations. 
However, by unpacking each CSR dimension and examining the disaggregated 
results, I am able to provide much more specific and useful direction to managers. Looking at 
the disaggregated results, I found that in every dimension, employee satisfaction was driven 
by usually one, and at most two, significant variables. Although I tested forty-four individual 
measures of CSR, I determined that only ten are significant predictors of employee 
satisfaction: six in which companies should increase their performance and four in which to 
minimize impacts. The significant positive components of CSR are: 
- Employee ownership plans 
- Family benefits 
- Progressive gay/lesbian policies 
- Charitable giving 
- Conscientious labor rights 
- Innovative products 
 
The significant negative components of CSR are: 
- Visible toxic emissions 
- Recent workforce reductions 
- Poor labor rights 
- Deceptive marketing and controversial contracting 
 
Not only does this list point to ways that are likely to be effective at improving 
employee satisfaction, but by omission it also highlights many other ways that are not likely 
to be effective. Environmental initiatives, investments in product safety, and local housing or 
education investments, for instance, are not likely to be effective at improving employee 
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satisfaction. Of course, there may be other sound financial reasons to pursue such 
investments, but strictly in terms of improving employee satisfaction, CSR investments are 
better spent elsewhere. 
Managers also must be aware that the positive components can interact to produce 
decreasing returns to satisfaction on higher CSR performance. In the most extreme cases, 
excess investment may be seen as wasteful of firm resources by employees and can reduce 
satisfaction. Therefore managers must select from among them the aspects of CSR that are 
most closely tied to the firm’s core business and core competencies in order to maximize the 
return on investment. 
This study stops short of being able to prescribe in which positive aspects of CSR a 
firm should invest. Whether increasing CSR performance in each area is cost-effective is 
highly firm-dependent: What is cheap for one firm may be expensive for another. However, 
it was outside the scope of this research to attempt to establish the monetary costs and 
benefits of these CSR investments. Executives should use the above list as a menu of the 
most effective CSR measures, and from them choose those that are the least costly and most 
aligned with the firm’s existing core competencies and core business. A major contribution 
of this study is that we now know which aspects of CSR are most effective at improving 
employee satisfaction in general, and thus where to focus a cost-benefit analysis in the future. 
Furthermore, even though selecting among the positive aspects of CSR is firm-
dependent, higher levels of poor performance in the four significant negative components of 
CSR can compound and be even more damaging to employee satisfaction than poor 
performance in one area alone. Therefore, managers should strive to reduce their impacts in 
all four of these areas as much as possible. 
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8 CONCLUSION 
In conclusion, I performed a novel study of the effects of CSR on employee 
satisfaction. I found that some aspects of CSR are clearly important to employees, such as 
employee relations, community relations, and diversity, while others, such as positive 
environmental initiatives and product-related concerns, are not. Consistent with theories of 
loss aversion and social identity theory, I found evidence that employees are more concerned 
about the negative environmental impacts of their firms, particularly with respect to toxic 
emissions, than they are about their firms’ positive environmental initiatives. 
I also determined that employee satisfaction was affected by only ten specific CSR 
measures out of forty-four that I studied. This suggests that random or blanket investments in 
CSR are unlikely to be effective at improving employee satisfaction. However, targeted 
investments in the ten key areas I have identified, and that are closely aligned with a 
company’s core competencies, are likely to improve employee satisfaction and therefore 
increase firm value. 
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TABLES AND FIGURES 
Year 
Count: 
CPS 
Count: 
KLD 
Count: 
GP 
Matches: 
KLD-CPS 
Matches: 
KLD-CPS-GP 
1998 6803 655 100 454 38 
1999 6729 659 100 455 36 
2000 7516 658 100 470 29 
2001 7382 1105 100 744 32 
2002 7057 1107 100 778 36 
2003 6810 2960 100 1726 43 
2004 6695 3032 100 1787 41 
2005 6675 3013 100 1845 45 
2006 6678 2960 100 1848 40 
2007 6573 2934 100 1816 34 
2008 6413 2920 100 1832 34 
2009 6122 2910 100 1857 33 
2010 5926 2962 100 1832 30 
2011 5855 2845 100 1763 34 
2012 5706 2791 100 1759 33 
Total 98940 33511 1500 20966 538 
KLD: Kinder, Lydenberg & Domini; CPS: Compustat; GP: Great Place list 
Table 3.1: Observations in each dataset and matched datasets by year 
 
SIC code Industry descriptiona Obs. Percent 
0xxx Agriculture, fishing, and forestry 61 0.29 
1xxx Mining and construction 1,183 5.64 
2xxx Manufacturing of food, textile, lumber, publishing, chemicals, and 
petroleum products 3,461 16.51 
3xxx Manufacturing of plastics, leather, concrete, metal products, machinery, 
and equipment 6,146 29.31 
4xxx Transportation, communications, electric, gas, and sanitary services 1,346 6.42 
5xxx Trade 2,815 13.43 
6xxx Finance, insurance, and real estate 2,371 11.31 
7xxx Personal, business, and entertainment services 2,750 13.12 
8xxx Professional services 833 3.97 
9xxx Public administration (omitted due to lack of variance) 0 0.00 
 Total 20,966 100 
a Industry descriptions adapted from Cheng, Ioannou, and Serafeim (2013). 
Table 3.2: Sample industry breakdown 
 
240 
Not listed On Great Place list 
Mean s.d. Mean s.d. 
ENVstr 0.119 0.388 0.303 0.619 
ENVcon 0.142 0.465 0.125 0.440 
EMPstr 0.213 0.504 0.978 0.842 
EMPcon 0.324 0.560 0.308 0.561 
DIVstr 0.450 0.868 1.798 1.466 
DIVcon 0.366 0.491 0.165 0.389 
CGOVstr 0.140 0.349 0.233 0.444 
CGOVcon 0.224 0.421 0.560 0.510 
COMstr 0.133 0.420 0.622 0.767 
COMcon 0.066 0.260 0.084 0.292 
HUMstr 0.001 0.034 0.022 0.147 
HUMcon 0.030 0.172 0.059 0.237 
PROstr 0.071 0.266 0.244 0.455 
PROcon 0.163 0.462 0.354 0.709 
Table 3.3: Descriptive statistics of KLD strength and concern scores by list membership 
 
ENVcon 
ENVstr 0 1 2 3 4 Total 
0 17,321 954 408 33 10 18,726 
1 1,267 292 169 12 1 1,741 
2 267 87 59 7 2 422 
3 44 15 12 6 0 77 
Total 18,899 1,348 648 58 13 20,966 
Table 3.4: Tabulation of environmental strengths and concerns 
 
 
 Variable Mean sd 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 
1) ENVstr 0.004 1.03  
2) ENVcon 0.018 1.03 .27  
3) EMPstr -0.001 1.00 .26 .31  
4) EMPcon 0.025 1.03 .16 .06 .14  
5) DIVstr -0.007 0.97 .26 .25 .42 .10  
6) DIVcon 0.011 1.16 .06 .03 .08 .07 .06  
7) CGOVstr 0.027 1.05 .22 .22 .18 .03 .16 -.01  
8) CGOVcon -0.005 1.00 .25 .22 .12 .02 .13 -.01 .07  
9) COMstr 0.029 1.03 .10 .10 .13 .07 .03 .02 .04 .21  
10) COMcon 0.013 1.01 -.05 -.09 -.18 .04 -.11 -.01 -.07 -.06 .06  
11) HUMstr 0.024 1.02 .04 .20 .29 -.08 .13 .05 .05 .14 .16 -.05  
12) HUMcon -0.009 0.98 .13 .15 .15 .06 .12 -.01 .02 .29 .12 -.01 .10  
13) PROstr 0.039 1.12 .03 .04 .16 .02 .08 .19 .01 .06 .08 -.02 .12 .05  
14) PROcon -0.017 0.99 .19 .17 .31 .04 .24 .01 .09 .30 .13 -.05 .20 .20 .08  
15) No. employees, logged 8.193 1.85 .25 .24 .37 -.08 .32 .04 .18 .29 .18 -.17 .27 .15 .16 .35  
16) ROA, logged 0.631 0.36 .02 .01 .02 -.09 -.03 .03 .02 .03 .09 -.02 .05 -.10 .09 .03 .37  
17) SG&A, logged 5.314 1.58 .29 .30 .48 -.07 .41 .05 .22 .27 .14 -.20 .34 .17 .16 .41 .82 .24  
18) Year 2005.29 5.21 -.02 -.13 -.06 .03 -.19 .01 -.09 -.19 .00 .16 -.09 -.01 -.03 -.06 -.28 -.12 -.19
N = 20,966. Correlations above .01 are significant at the <.05 level. 
Table 3.5: Descriptive statistics and correlations 
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DV: GP list Model 1 Model 2 Model I1 Model I2 Model I3 Model I4 Model I5 Model I6 Model I7 
ENVstr  -0.0569 0.0946*       
  (0.0599) (0.0556)       
ENVcon  -0.258** -0.254***       
  (0.101) (0.0891)       
EMPstr  0.371***  0.374***      
  (0.0527)  (0.0477)      
EMPcon  -0.157*  -0.136*      
  (0.0817)  (0.0727)      
DIVstr  0.110   0.241***     
  (0.0685)   (0.0609)     
DIVcon  -0.115   -0.127*     
  (0.0766)   (0.0746)     
GCOVstr  0.00210    0.221***    
  (0.0745)    (0.0615)    
CGOVcon  0.156**    -0.117*    
  (0.0708)    (0.0686)    
COMstr  0.174***     0.125**   
  (0.0648)     (0.0618)   
COMcon  -0.105     0.190***   
  (0.0811)     (0.0668)   
HUMstr  0.0522**      0.0535  
  (0.0232)      (0.0358)  
HUMson  -0.0967      -0.0747  
  (0.0627)      (0.0584)  
PROstr  0.138**       0.173*** 
  (0.0556)       (0.0524) 
PROcon  -0.0450       -0.0904 
  (0.0731)       (0.0732) 
Lagged GP list 5.815*** 5.429*** 5.770*** 5.598*** 5.708*** 5.746*** 5.801*** 5.798*** 5.769*** 
 (0.157) (0.163) (0.158) (0.161) (0.159) (0.156) (0.157) (0.157) (0.158) 
Log of employees -0.463*** -0.397*** -0.433*** -0.469*** -0.533*** -0.509*** -0.495*** -0.445*** -0.490*** 
 (0.144) (0.147) (0.145) (0.150) (0.146) (0.144) (0.142) (0.144) (0.145) 
Log of ROA 0.0667 0.119 0.0782 0.107 0.0860 0.0787 0.0850 0.0533 0.0560 
 (0.0804) (0.0820) (0.0812) (0.0828) (0.0808) (0.0800) (0.0788) (0.0807) (0.0819) 
Log of SG&A 0.937*** 0.548*** 0.941*** 0.790*** 0.764*** 0.840*** 0.851*** 0.936*** 0.950*** 
 (0.129) (0.139) (0.127) (0.129) (0.130) (0.128) (0.131) (0.129) (0.134) 
Year FE Included Included Included Included Included Included Included Included Included 
Industry FE Included Included Included Included Included Included Included Included Included 
Observations 20,966 20,966 20,966 20,966 20,966 20,966 20,966 20,966 20,966 
Number of firms 3121 3121 3121 3121 3121 3121 3121 3121 3121 
߯ଶ (df) 1815 (26)*** 1709 (40)*** 1814 (28) 1717 (28) 1770 (28) 1779 (28) 1787 (28) 1807 (28) 1791 (28) 
McFadden pseudo ܴଶ 0.578 0.602 0.580 0.591 0.582 0.582 0.580 0.579 0.581 
Area under ROC curve 0.953 0.966 0.953 0.960 0.956 0.954 0.955 0.954 0.954 
Robust standard errors in parentheses.  *** ݌ ൏ 0.01,	**	݌ ൏ 0.05,	*	݌ ൏ 0.10 (two-tailed test).  
Table 3.6: Estimates of Great Place to Work list membership: KLD strength and concern totals 
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Null hypothesis: Variable ߯ଶ
Model 2 = Model I1 ENVstr 31.63*** 
Model 2 = Model I1 ENVcon 0.01 
Model 2 = Model I2 EMPstr 0.02 
Model 2 = Model I2 EMpcon 0.83 
Model 2 = Model I3 DIVstr 18.53*** 
Model 2 = Model I3 DIVcon 0.33 
Model 2 = Model I4 CGOVstr 4.16** 
Model 2 = Model I4 CGOVcon 0.12 
Model 2 = Model I5 COMstr 10.34*** 
Model 2 = Model I5 COMcon 3.57** 
Model 2 = Model I6 HUMstr 0.00 
Model 2 = Model I6 HUMcon 1.58* 
Model 2 = Model I7 PROstr 4.62** 
Model 2 = Model I7 PROcon 5.3** 
*** ݌ ൏ 0.01,	**	݌ ൏ 0.05,	*	݌ ൏ 0.10 (one-tailed test). 
Table 3.7: Wald tests of coefficient equality, 
Hypothesis 2 
 
DV: GP list Model 3 
ENVstrA: Beneficial products -0.0963 
 (0.288) 
ENVstrB: Pollution prevention 0.0114 
 (0.431) 
ENVstrC: Recycling / Packaging -0.213 
 (0.572) 
ENVstrD: Clean energy -0.290 
 (0.405) 
ENVconB: Regulatory compliance -0.240 
 (0.386) 
ENVconD: TRI emissions -0.935** 
 (0.409) 
ENVconE: Ag. chemicals -0.0853 
 (0.731) 
EMPstr 0.400*** 
 (0.0543) 
EMPcon -0.175** 
 (0.0814) 
DIVstr 0.150** 
 (0.0713) 
DIVcon -0.138* 
 (0.0820) 
CGOVstr 0.0276 
 (0.0756) 
CGOVcon 0.171** 
 (0.0681) 
COMstr 0.140** 
 (0.0684) 
COMcon -0.0898 
 (0.0804) 
HUMstr 0.0546** 
 (0.0212) 
HUMcon -0.104* 
 (0.0593) 
PROstr 0.142** 
 (0.0609) 
PROcon -0.0191 
 (0.0746) 
Lagged GP list 5.115*** 
 (0.179) 
Log of employees -0.366** 
 (0.162) 
Log of ROA 0.215** 
 (0.0857) 
Log of SG&A 0.496*** 
 (0.156) 
Year FE Included 
Industry FE Included 
Observations 15,576 
Number of firms 2826 
߯ଶ (df) 1359 (41)*** 
McFadden pseudo ܴଶ 0.581 
Area under ROC curve 0.962 
Robust standard errors in parentheses. 
*** ݌ ൏ 0.01,	**	݌ ൏ 0.05,	*	݌ ൏ 0.10 (two-tailed test). 
Table 3.8: Effect of disaggregated 
environmental factors on GP list 
membership 
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DV: GP list Model 4 
EMPstrA: Union relations -0.620 
 (0.558) 
EMPstrC: Cash profit sharing 0.235 
 (0.408) 
EMPstrD: Employee ownership plans 1.600*** 
 (0.267) 
EMPstrF: Retirement benefits 0.371 
 (0.427) 
EMPstrG: Health & safety 0.00723 
 (0.494) 
EMPconA: Union relations 0.0143 
 (0.608) 
EMPconB: Health & safety 0.00912 
 (0.343) 
EMPconC: Workforce reductions -1.545* 
 (0.849) 
EMPconD: Retirement benefits -0.264 
 (0.268) 
ENVstr -0.0498 
 (0.115) 
ENVcon -0.173 
 (0.164) 
DIVstr 0.147 
 (0.0993) 
DIVcon -0.234** 
 (0.115) 
CGOVstr -0.0401 
 (0.106) 
CGOVcon 0.183* 
 (0.102) 
COMstr 0.199* 
 (0.113) 
COMcon -0.0163 
 (0.113) 
HUMstr 0.0619** 
 (0.0241) 
HUMcon -0.0780 
 (0.0618) 
PROstr 0.117 
 (0.0963) 
PROcon -0.205* 
 (0.123) 
Lagged GP list 5.522*** 
 (0.239) 
Log of employees -0.190 
 (0.215) 
Log of ROA 0.291** 
 (0.122) 
Log of SG&A 0.399* 
 (0.207) 
Year FE Included 
Industry FE Included 
Observations 12,711 
Number of firms 2685 
߯ଶ (df) 946.6 (39)*** 
McFadden pseudo ܴଶ 0.654 
Area under ROC curve 0.965 
Robust standard errors in parentheses.  
*** ݌ ൏ 0.01,	**	݌ ൏ 0.05,	*	݌ ൏ 0.10 (two-tailed test). 
Table 3.9: Effect of disaggregated employee 
relations factors on GP list membership 
DV: GP list Model 5 
DIVstrB: W/M CEO/line representation 0.0777 
 (0.170) 
DIVstrC: W/M Board representation -0.231 
 (0.239) 
DIVstrD: Family benefits 0.724*** 
 (0.226) 
DIVstrE: W/M Contracting -0.261 
 (0.315) 
DIVstrF: Employment of disabled -0.335 
 (0.386) 
DIVstrG: Gay/lesbian policies 0.505** 
 (0.200) 
DIVconA: Diversity controversies -0.339 
 (0.273) 
DIVconB: W/M Nonrepresentation -0.254 
 (0.233) 
ENVstr -0.0762 
 (0.0689) 
ENVcon -0.258*** 
 (0.0946) 
EMPstr 0.389*** 
 (0.0551) 
EMPcon -0.170** 
 (0.0819) 
CGOVstr 0.0386 
 (0.0758) 
CGOVcon 0.155** 
 (0.0682) 
COMstr 0.114* 
 (0.0685) 
COMcon -0.0895 
 (0.0792) 
HUMstr 0.0482** 
 (0.0210) 
HUMcon -0.0900 
 (0.0575) 
PROstr 0.150** 
 (0.0583) 
PROcon -0.0331 
 (0.0711) 
Lagged GP list 5.005*** 
 (0.180) 
Log of employees -0.246 
 (0.159) 
Log of ROA 0.241*** 
 (0.0873) 
Log of SG&A 0.444*** 
 (0.160) 
Year FE Included 
Industry FE Included 
Observations 15,612 
Number of firms 2826 
߯ଶ (df) 1329 (43)*** 
McFadden pseudo ܴଶ 0.584 
Area under ROC curve 0.962 
Robust standard errors in parentheses. 
*** ݌ ൏ 0.01,	**	݌ ൏ 0.05,	*	݌ ൏ 0.10 (two-tailed test). 
Table 3.10: Effect of disaggregated diversity 
factors on GP list membership 
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DV: GP list Model 6 
CGOVstrA: Limited exec. compensation 0.400 
 (0.279) 
CGOVstrC: Ownership of high CSR subs. -0.460 
 (3.428) 
CGOVstrD: Reporting transparency -0.351 
 (0.377) 
CGOVconB: High executive compensation 0.469*** 
 (0.178) 
CGOVconF: Ownership of low CSR subs. -0.435 
 (0.858) 
ENVstr -0.0324 
 (0.0716) 
ENVcon -0.289*** 
 (0.106) 
EMPstr 0.385*** 
 (0.0573) 
EMPcon -0.187** 
 (0.0883) 
DIVstr 0.158** 
 (0.0752) 
DIVcon -0.167* 
 (0.0852) 
COMstr 0.160** 
 (0.0704) 
COMcon -0.0797 
 (0.0805) 
HUMstr 0.0568*** 
 (0.0220) 
HUMcon -0.105* 
 (0.0597) 
PROstr 0.155** 
 (0.0609) 
PROcon -0.0535 
 (0.0801) 
Lagged GP list 5.264*** 
 (0.188) 
Log of employees -0.255 
 (0.164) 
Log of ROA 0.196** 
 (0.0930) 
Log of SG&A 0.474*** 
 (0.165) 
Year FE Included 
Industry FE Included 
Observations 15,157 
Number of firms 2825 
߯ଶ (df) 1261 (39)*** 
McFadden pseudo ܴଶ 0.654 
Area under ROC curve 0.963 
Robust standard errors in parentheses. 
*** ݌ ൏ 0.01,	**	݌ ൏ 0.05,	*	݌ ൏ 0.10 (two-tailed test). 
Table 3.11: Effect of disaggregated 
corporate governance relations factors on 
GP list membership 
 
DV: GP list Model 7 
COMstrA: Generous giving 0.596** 
 (0.262) 
COMstrB: Innovative giving 0.174 
 (0.294) 
COMstrC: Housing support -0.214 
 (0.410) 
COMstrD: Education support 0.219 
 (0.291) 
COMconA: Investment controversies -0.185 
 (0.473) 
COMconB: Negative economic impact -0.402 
 (0.535) 
COMconD: Tax disputes -0.460 
 (0.573) 
ENVstr -0.0653 
 (0.0696) 
ENVcon -0.280*** 
 (0.107) 
EMPstr 0.383*** 
 (0.0551) 
EMPcon -0.188** 
 (0.0830) 
DIVstr 0.149** 
 (0.0721) 
DIVcon -0.132 
 (0.0816) 
CGOVstr 0.0168 
 (0.0759) 
CGOVcon 0.168** 
 (0.0684) 
HUMstr 0.0514** 
 (0.0211) 
HUMcon -0.0973 
 (0.0594) 
PROstr 0.136** 
 (0.0599) 
PROcon -0.0268 
 (0.0727) 
Lagged GP list 5.106*** 
 (0.180) 
Log of employees -0.395** 
 (0.163) 
Log of ROA 0.206** 
 (0.0870) 
Log of SG&A 0.545*** 
 (0.162) 
Year FE Included 
Industry FE Included 
Observations 15,612 
Number of firms 2826 
߯ଶ (df) 1366 (41)*** 
McFadden pseudo ܴଶ 0.581 
Area under ROC curve 0.962 
Robust standard errors in parentheses. 
*** ݌ ൏ 0.01,	**	݌ ൏ 0.05,	*	݌ ൏ 0.10 (two-tailed test). 
Table 3.12: Effect of disaggregated 
community factors on GP list membership 
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DV: GP list Model 8 
HUMstrG: Labor rights 1.734** 
 (0.683) 
HUMconC: Ops. in Burma -0.360 
 (0.695) 
HUMconF: Labor rights -0.783** 
 (0.382) 
ENVstr 0.0242 
 (0.0931) 
ENVcon -0.342** 
 (0.145) 
EMPstr 0.398*** 
 (0.0749) 
EMPcon -0.210** 
 (0.102) 
DIVstr 0.150* 
 (0.0901) 
DIVcon -0.176* 
 (0.0987) 
CGOVstr -0.0730 
 (0.0994) 
CGOVcon 0.175* 
 (0.0916) 
COMstr 0.226** 
 (0.0953) 
COMcon -0.0746 
 (0.0993) 
PROstr 0.0806 
 (0.0889) 
PROcon -0.0986 
 (0.105) 
Lagged GP list 5.623*** 
 (0.215) 
Log of employees -0.160 
 (0.201) 
Log of ROA 0.159 
 (0.119) 
Log of SG&A 0.398** 
 (0.197) 
Year FE Included 
Industry FE Included 
Observations 13,489 
Number of firms 2705 
߯ଶ (df) 1034 (33)*** 
McFadden pseudo ܴଶ 0.645 
Area under ROC curve 0.966 
Robust standard errors in parentheses. 
*** ݌ ൏ 0.01,	**	݌ ൏ 0.05,	*	݌ ൏ 0.10 (two-tailed test). 
Table 3.13: Effect of disaggregated human 
rights factors on GP list membership 
 
DV: GP list Model 9 
PROstrA: Product quality 0.360 
 (0.327) 
PROstrB: R&D 0.698** 
 (0.330) 
PROconA: Product safety -0.000959 
 (0.376) 
PROconD: Marketing / Contracting practices -0.327 
 (0.244) 
PROconE: Antitrust 0.321 
 (0.325) 
ENVstr -0.0589 
 (0.0693) 
ENVcon -0.290*** 
 (0.0998) 
EMPstr 0.394*** 
 (0.0548) 
EMPcon -0.167** 
 (0.0810) 
DIVstr 0.148** 
 (0.0714) 
DIVcon -0.130 
 (0.0816) 
CGOVstr 0.0256 
 (0.0754) 
CGOVcon 0.169** 
 (0.0679) 
COMstr 0.129* 
 (0.0711) 
COMcon -0.0936 
 (0.0782) 
HUMstr 0.0522** 
 (0.0210) 
HUMcon -0.0950* 
 (0.0565) 
Lagged GP list 5.108*** 
 (0.177) 
Log of employees -0.354** 
 (0.163) 
Log of ROA 0.227*** 
 (0.0870) 
Log of SG&A 0.506*** 
 (0.156) 
Year FE Included 
Industry FE Included 
Observations 15,612 
Number of firms 2826 
߯ଶ (df) 1339 (39)*** 
McFadden pseudo ܴଶ 0.581 
Area under ROC curve 0.962 
Robust standard errors in parentheses. 
*** ݌ ൏ 0.01,	**	݌ ൏ 0.05,	*	݌ ൏ 0.10 (two-tailed test). 
Table 3.14: Effect of disaggregated product-
related factors on GP list membership
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APPENDIX 
This appendix contains supporting information not included in the main text. It 
includes a discussion of potential study design issues and resolutions, interpretation of logit 
models and model diagnostics, as well as descriptions, descriptive statistics, and correlations 
for all variables in the study. 
A.1  Potential study design concerns, model interpretation, and diagnostics 
A.1.1 Endogeneity and lagged list membership 
The models presented are designed to examine the effect of employees’ perceptions 
of their companies’ CSR performance on their level of satisfaction. I approximate 
employees’ perceptions of CSR using KLD ratings, and I approximate employee satisfaction 
using the Great Place list. However, there may be some concern with potential endogeneity 
in this specification: If firms adjust their CSR performance by increasing or decreasing 
investment in CSR-related areas in response to their employees’ satisfaction, then the 
causality of the models is reversed, the models are misspecified, and estimates will be biased. 
The bias could be particularly misleading in this case, because firms with the least satisfied 
employees would invest the most in CSR, and would thus be seen to have the highest levels 
of CSR performance. 
However, in contrast to previous studies that were cross-sectional, the panel design of 
this study allows us to eliminate this problem. Suppose a firm participates in the survey 
process for a “best places” list in period ݐ, but does not, in fact, make the top 100 list. The 
firm then determines that its employees are dissatisfied and responds by increasing its levels 
of CSR investment in period ݐ ൅ 1. In a one-year cross-section of period ݐ ൅ 1, it would 
appear as if this company had both low employee satisfaction and high CSR performance. 
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With panel data, however, I can observe whether the investment in period ݐ ൅ 1 causes 
higher levels of employee satisfaction in period ݐ ൅ 2. Specifically, by including a dummy 
variable for lagged list membership, as shown in the model specifications above, I can 
control for the level of past employee satisfaction and partial out the effect of past 
satisfaction, leaving the pure effect of the improved CSR performance in period ݐ ൅ 2. 
This solution does rely on an assumption of lag time between a firm learning about 
levels of employee satisfaction, adjusting levels of CSR performance, and employees 
updating their satisfaction ratings. However, I believe this assumption is justified. Employee 
satisfaction assessment and CSR investment are processes that necessarily take time. 
Moreover, if a firm’s source of employee satisfaction data is the Great Place survey, this 
information arrives at most once per year, limiting the speed with which the company can 
react. 
A.1.2 Rare events bias 
Firms appearing on the Great Place list comprise only 2.1% of the sample. It might 
seem that this fact is of some concern for the analysis. The problems associated with 
modeling so-called “rare events” such as these have been recognized in econometrics 
literature for some time (Manski & Lerman, 1977). 
King and Zeng (2001) provide a very thorough explanation of how samples with 
large numbers of zeros (“failures,” or “nonevents”) and few ones (“successes,” or “events”) 
can give rise to biased estimates when using logit models. In essence, because the 
distribution of the zeros is very precisely estimated, but that of the ones is imprecise, the 
“cutting point”—the value of an explanatory variable that maximally distinguishes zeros 
from ones in the dependent variable—will be estimated too high since little information is 
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available about the “tails” of the success data (see King & Zeng, 2001, figure 1). The authors 
go on to present simulation results that show the estimation bias as a function of the total 
sample size and the percentage of ones. The evidence is quite convincing that with a small N 
and a small percentage of events, the bias can be large—up to 500% in the extreme case. 
However, the simulation data show that with a sample of 20,000 observations, 2% of 
which are ones, the absolute estimate bias is less than 5% (see King & Zeng, 2001, figure 3). 
In my case, with nearly 21,000 observations and event probabilities above 2%, the risk of 
rare events bias is minimal. 
Nonetheless, King and Zeng offer two methods for bias correction: prior correction 
and weighting. Both of these methods involve correcting the estimated probabilities based on 
the difference between the sample event probability and a known population event 
probability. In my case, the population probability is known: Although some firms on each 
list had to be excluded from the sample because of nonmatches or missing information, the 
full set of firms on each list divided by the matched sample of firms in KLD represents the 
proportion of events in the population. To test the potential bias introduced in my sample, I 
estimated several of the smaller and larger models discussed above using the corrected 
methods presented by King and Zeng. In all cases, the difference in estimated coefficients 
and standard errors between corrected and uncorrected models was negligible. Therefore, I 
conclude that rare events bias is not a problem in the present study and proceed using 
standard logit specifications. 
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A.2  Interpretation of coefficients and model fit 
A.2.1 Interpretation and marginal effects 
Interpretation of effect sizes in logit models is not straightforward, certainly as 
compared to linear models such as ordinary least squares (OLS). Hoetker (2007) provides a 
well-cited guide for the use of logit models in management research, the recommendations of 
which I incorporate in my analysis. As recommended by Hoetker, I report untransformed 
estimates from the logit model in results tables. While the sign, significance, and relative size 
of these coefficients can be determined by inspection, the magnitude of the coefficients is 
presented in units of “changes in log-odds,” a measure without intuitive meaning. In various 
cases I therefore facilitate interpretation by presenting marginal effects. 
Unlike in OLS, however, where the marginal effect of ݕ on ݔ in the equation 
ݕ ൌ ߚݔ ൅ ߛݖ ൅ ݑ	is given by ߚ and is constant for all values of ݔ and is independent of 
values of ݖ, in logit estimation this is not the case. In the logit model, the marginal effect of ݔ 
on the probability of a positive outcome ܲሺݕ ൌ 1ሻ depends not only on the level of ݔ, but 
also on the level of all other explanatory variables (for a thorough explanation, see 
Wooldridge, 2010). In order to report the ceteris paribus effect of any given variable, 
therefore, it is necessary to hold both ݔ and all other explanatory variables constant at some 
prescribed value. Following Hoetker’s recommendations, I report marginal effects by 
computing predicted values for each observation and then averaging across predictions. This 
method provides a picture of the marginal values as they are actually observed in the data. 
Because all continuous variables are standardized, the marginal effects of continuous 
variables represent the effect on the predicted probability of inclusion on a list of a one 
standard deviation increase in the explanatory variable; in the case of binary variables, the 
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marginal effect is the change in predicted probability from changing the explanatory variable 
from zero to one. 
A.2.2 Model performance diagnostics 
In each results table, I also present McFadden’s “pseudo” ܴଶ statistic (McFadden, 
1974), which compares the likelihood statistic of the model as specified to the likelihood of 
the model with only a constant (i.e., if the only proportion of successes in the dataset were 
used to predict the probability of success for each observation). Unlike the usual ܴଶ in OLS, 
McFadden’s pseudo ܴଶ does not describe the proportion of variance explained by the model. 
Specifically, it is computed as 
McFadden pseudo ܴଶ ൌ 1 െ ln൫ܮ෠௎൯ln൫ܮ෠ோ൯ 
where ܮ෠௎ and ܮ෠ோ are the likelihood of the model as specified and with only a constant, 
respectively (Hoetker, 2007). Thus, if a model has a McFadden pseudo ܴଶ of 0.58, the 
likelihood of the model is 58% higher than the constant-only alternative. The real meaning of 
this information is, as Hoetker argues, unobvious; as with many model criteria, it is most 
useful as a means to compare models rather than as stand-alone information. 
Along with pseudo ܴଶ, each results table also displays the area under the Receiving 
Operator Characteristic (ROC) curve, which is widely used in medical diagnostic test design 
and is a very useful metric for binary-outcome models (Zweig & Campbell, 1993). The ROC 
curve measures the ability of a model to accurately distinguish true positive outcomes 
(ݕො ൌ 1	|ݕ ൌ 1, where ݕො is the predicted value of the dependent variable) from false positive 
outcomes ሺݕො ൌ 1|ݕ ് 1ሻ. The curve is drawn by plotting the true positive rate (called the 
“sensitivity”) against the false positive rate (1 – the “specificity,” or the true negative rate) 
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for various “success cutoff points” between 0 and 100.33 A sample is shown in Figure 3.3, 
which displays the ROC curve for model 3. 
The curve shows a number of useful pieces of diagnostic information. First, it shows 
how much better the model is at distinguishing between true and false positives as compared 
to a naïve 50/50 guess, represented by the diagonal line. The closer the plot is to the upper-
left corner, the more accurate the model predictions; a model that perfectly predicts positive 
and negative outcomes would touch the corner. 
Second, it gives the area under the curve, which quantifies the ability of the model to 
distinguish between positive and negative outcomes. The naïve 50/50 guess has an area of 
0.5, whereas a perfect model has an area of 1. The interpretation of the value of the area is 
surprisingly straightforward: It represents the probability that a randomly selected true-
positive observation will have a higher predicted ݕො than a randomly selected true-negative 
observation. So, in the case of model 3, with ROC area of 0.976, a randomly selected firm-
year observation that, in reality, appears on the Great Place list (i.e., has GP_dummy=1) will 
have a higher predicted value ሺݕොሻ than 97.6% of the firm-year observations that, in reality, do 
not appear on the Great Place list. 
 
 
                                                 
33 The cutoff point is the predicted value of the model above which is deemed a success. Thus, if the cutoff 
point is 50%, any ݕො ൐ 0.5 will be labeled as a success. As the cutoff point increases, the probability of false 
positives falls, but the ability to predict true negatives also diminishes. 
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Variable Source Description 
GP list Great Place to 
Work Institute 
Dummy variable denoting membership on the Great Place to Work 
Institute’s 100 Best Places to Work in America list. See above for 
complete description. 
ENVstr KLD Sum of environmental strengths, including measures of proactive 
investment, strong waste management, climate change initiatives, 
and green energy. 
ENVcon KLD Sum of environmental concerns, including measures of poor 
regulatory compliance, toxic releases, greenhouse gas (GHG) 
emissions, and involvement with harmful products and services. 
EMPstr KLD Sum of employee relations strengths, including measures of good 
union relations, cash profit sharing, employee involvement, health 
and safety, and protection of employee rights throughout the supply 
chain. 
EMPcon KLD Sum of employee relations concerns, including measures of poor 
union relations, health and safety issues, and supply chain 
controversies. 
DIVstr KLD Sum of diversity strengths, including measures of representation by 
women and minorities in line positions and on the board of directors, 
work/life benefits, gay and lesbian policies, and employment of 
underrepresented groups. 
DIVcon KLD Sum of diversity concerns, including measures of controversies, 
history of fines due to diversity issues, and lack of representation of 
women and minorities. 
CGOVstr  KLD Sum of corporate governance strengths, including measures of CSR 
reporting quality and GRI adherence, and limited executive 
compensation. 
CGOVcon KLD Sum of corporate governance concerns, including measures of CSR 
reporting quality and GRI adherence, and high executive 
compensation. 
COMstr KLD Sum of community strengths, including measures of charitable 
giving, community engagement, and programs to benefit 
disadvantaged communities. 
COMcon KLD Sum of community concerns, including measures of the severity of 
controversies involving land use, negative community impacts, or 
criticism by third parties. 
HUMstr KLD Sum of human rights strengths, including measures of relations with 
indigenous peoples, policies, and initiatives. 
HUMcon KLD Sum of human rights concerns, including measures of complicity in 
killings, abuse, and freedom of speech violations, and operations in 
Burma or Sudan. 
PROstr KLD Sum of product strengths, including measures of quality, benefits to 
the economically disadvantaged, and commitment to microfinance 
and community development. 
PROcon KLD Sum of product concerns, including measures of product safety 
concerns, false or misleading marketing, antitrust problems, or 
customer relations legal cases. 
ENVstrA KLD Environmental Opportunities – Proactive investment in products and 
services that address issues of resource conservation and climate 
change, and pursue green building certifications. 
ENVstrB KLD Waste Management – Strong programs and track records of reducing 
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emissions and waste, including well-managed product recovery and 
recycling programs for electronic products. 
ENVstrC KLD Packaging Materials and Waste – Proactive reduction of 
environmental impact of packaging, including use of recycled 
content material and establishment of take-back and recycling 
programs. 
ENVstrD KLD Climate Change – Strong initiatives in renewable energy generation, 
comprehensive carbon policies including process improvements, 
carbon capture equipment, and cleaner energy sources, efficiency 
improvements, and supply chain carbon measurement and reduction. 
ENVconB KLD Regulatory Compliance – Fines or sanctions for causing 
environmental damage or violations of operating permits. 
ENVconD KLD Toxic Spills & Releases – History of involvement in land or air 
emissions-related legal cases, widespread or egregious impacts due 
to hazardous emissions, resistance to improved practices, and 
criticism by NGOs or other third parties. Information for this 
variable is derived from the Toxics Release Inventory (TRI) 
prepared by the US Environmental Protection Agency (EPA), 
including comparisons with a firm’s industry peers. 
ENVconE KLD Agricultural chemicals – Substantial producer of agricultural 
chemicals 
EMPstrA KLD Union relations – Exceptional steps to treat unionized workforce 
fairly 
EMPstrC KLD Cash profit sharing – Has a cash profit sharing program and has 
recently made distributions to its workforce 
EMPstrD KLD Employee ownership plans – Strongly encourages worker 
involvement and ownership through stock options, gain sharing, or 
participation in decision making 
EMPstrF KLD Retirement benefits – Notably strong retirement benefits program 
EMPstrG KLD Health and safety – Strong health and safety programs 
EMPconA KLD Union relations – History of notably poor union relations 
EMPconB KLD Health and safety – Recently paid fines for willful health and safety 
violations or otherwise involved in health and safety controversies 
EMPconC KLD Workforce reductions – Significant reductions in workforce in recent 
years 
EMPconD KLD Retirement benefits – Substantially underfunded benefit pension plan 
or inadequate retirement benefits program 
DIVstrB KLD CEO/line representation – CEO is a woman or minority, or notable 
progress in promoting women and minorities to line positions 
DIVstrC KLD Board representation – Women, minorities, or the disabled hold four 
seats or more on the board of directors 
DIVstrD KLD Work/life benefits – Outstanding employee benefits or other 
programs addressing work/life or family concerns, including child 
care, elder care, or flextime 
DIVstrE KLD Women and minority contracting – At least 5% of subcontracting is 
done with women- or minority-owned businesses 
DIVstrF KLD Employment of the disabled – Innovative hiring programs or other 
innovative resource programs for the disabled 
DIVstrG KLD Gay and lesbian policies – Notably progressive policies toward gay 
and lesbian employees, including providing benefits to domestic 
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partners 
DIVconA KLD Diversity controversies – Paid substantial fines as a result of 
affirmative action controversies or has otherwise been involved in 
diversity controversies 
DIVconB KLD Nonrepresentation – No women or minorities on the board of 
directors or line positions 
CGOVstrA KLD Limited executive compensation – The CEO earns total 
compensation less than $500,000/year, and outside directors earn 
less than $30,000/year 
CGOVstrC KLD Ownership strength – Owns between 20% and 50% of another 
company that KLD has rated as having high CSR scores 
CGOVstrD KLD Transparency – Effective at reporting on a wide range of social and 
environmental performance measures, including the use of the 
Global Reporting Initiative (GRI) guidelines 
CGOVconB KLD High executive compensation – The CEO earns total compensation 
more than $10 million/year, or outside directors earn more than 
$100,000/year 
CGOVconF KLD Ownership concern – Owns between 20% and 50% of another 
company that KLD has rated as having low CSR scores 
COMstrA KLD Charitable giving – Consistently has given over 1.5% of trailing 
three-year net earnings before taxes to charity 
COMstrB KLD Innovative giving – Notably innovative giving programs that support 
nonprofit organizations, or nontraditional federated workplaces 
drives 
COmstrC KLD Support for housing – Prominent participant in public-private 
partnerships that support housing initiatives for the economically 
disadvantaged 
COMstrD KLD Support for education – Notably innovative in its support for primary 
and secondary school education, particularly those programs that 
benefit the economically disadvantaged, or job-training programs for 
youth 
COMconA KLD Investment controversies – The company is a financial institution 
whose lending or investment practices have led to controversies 
COMconB KLD Negative economic impact – The company’s actions have resulted in 
major controversies concerning its impact on the community, 
including environmental contamination, water rights disputes, or 
activities that affect property values or quality of life 
COMconD KLD Tax disputes – Recently involved in tax disputes or is involved in 
controversies over tax obligations to the community 
HUMstrG KLD Labor rights strength – Outstanding transparency on overseas 
sourcing disclosure and monitoring, or particularly good union 
relations overseas 
HUMconC KLD Operations in Burma – Operations or direct investment in, or 
sourcing from Burma 
HUMconF KLD Labor rights concerns – Recent major controversies primarily related 
to labor standards in its supply chain 
PROstrA KLD Quality – Has a long-term, well-developed, companywide quality 
program 
PROstrB KLD R&D/innovation – Leader in its industry for research and 
development and brings notably innovative products to market 
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PROconA KLD Safety – Recently paid substantial fines or is involved in 
controversies or regulatory actions relating to the safety of its 
products 
PROconD KLD Marketing/contracting concern – Recently involved in major 
marketing or contracting controversies relating to advertising 
practices, consumer fraud, or government contracting 
PROconE KLD Antitrust – Recently paid substantial fines for antitrust violations 
such as price fixing, collusion, or predatory pricing 
lnemp Compustat Number of employees; log transformed 
lnROA Compustat Return on Assets, defined as net income before interest and taxes 
divided by total assets; log transformed 
lnxsga Compustat Selling, general, and administrative expense; log transformed. 
Includes salaries and wages of officers and employees (including 
pension and benefits), furniture and equipment rental cost and 
servicing. 
SIC code Securities and 
Exchange 
Commission 
(SEC); 
Compustat 
Standard Industrial Classification at the one-digit SIC level. See 
Table 3.2 for more detail. 
Source for KLD descriptions: (MSCI Inc. 2013) 
Table 3.A.1: Variable descriptions 
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Mean s.d. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17
1 ENVstrA 0.039 0.19 
2 ENVstrB 0.027 0.16 .09 
3 ENVstrC 0.023 0.15 .02 .08
4 ENVstrD 0.047 0.21 .18 .24 .10
5 EMPstrA 0.017 0.13 .04 .05 .02 .07
6 EMPstrC 0.078 0.27 .10 .10 .09 .10 .02
7 EMPstrD 0.102 0.30 .08 .08 .06 .10 .02 .17
8 EMPstrF 0.055 0.23 -.01 .05 .05 .10 .05 .07 .03
9 EMPstrG 0.038 0.19 .10 .24 .17 .26 .12 .11 .08 .14
10 DIVstrB 0.241 0.43 -.03 .05 -.01 .04 .00 .05 .11 .00 .05
11 DIVstrC 0.077 0.27 .03 .09 .03 .11 .04 .05 .07 .01 .11 .23
12 DIVstrD 0.075 0.26 .05 .25 .10 .21 .03 .13 .20 .11 .24 .16 .25
13 DIVstrE 0.049 0.22 .09 .20 .17 .32 .07 .11 .13 .10 .25 .13 .21 .34 
14 DIVstrF 0.018 0.13 .03 .14 .09 .08 .06 .10 .12 .06 .17 .08 .13 .26 .31 
15 DIVstrG 0.155 0.36 .06 .17 .05 .25 .06 .14 .21 .05 .20 .20 .27 .38 .30 .20 
16 COMstrA 0.054 0.23 .07 .15 .09 .17 .02 .11 .12 .09 .21 .09 .13 .24 .20 .12 .20
17 COMstrB 0.055 0.23 .09 .18 .08 .27 .06 .06 .10 .05 .14 .11 .14 .29 .28 .13 .24 .23
18 COMstrC 0.039 0.19 -.02 .01 .00 -.01 .00 .00 .02 .09 -.02 .06 .08 .12 .08 .02 .05 .08 .10
19 COMstrD 0.042 0.20 .05 .20 .06 .10 .01 .14 .15 .06 .19 .11 .14 .35 .28 .21 .25 .21 .21
20 CGOVstrA 0.137 0.34 -.02 -.06 -.05 -.04 -.03 -.06 -.05 -.07 -.09 -.01 -.05 -.08 -.07 -.03 -.10 -.05 -.06
21 CGOVstrC 0.002 0.05 .01 .02 -.01 -.01 -.01 .01 .03 .01 .00 -.01 .01 .07 .03 -.01 .00 .01 .02
22 CGOVstrD 0.040 0.20 .18 .35 .15 .44 .09 .12 .13 .07 .33 .08 .18 .33 .38 .24 .29 .28 .32
23 HUMstrG 0.002 0.05 .03 .07 .01 .13 -.01 .01 .00 .04 .05 .02 .05 .12 .03 .07 .08 .07 .18
24 PROstrA 0.057 0.23 .10 .17 .06 .18 .11 .12 .10 .04 .15 .02 .10 .13 .16 .12 .13 .09 .18
25 PROstrB 0.030 0.17 .06 .15 .05 .10 -.01 .16 .16 .03 .09 .05 .00 .18 .09 .12 .08 .09 .07
26 ENVconB 0.063 0.24 .07 .15 .14 .12 .07 .07 .03 .10 .27 -.02 .04 .11 .11 .09 .04 .08 .04
27 ENVconC 0.003 0.06 .00 .05 .00 .03 .05 .03 .02 .05 .12 .01 .02 .07 .03 .07 .02 .01 .01
28 ENVconD 0.083 0.28 .06 .22 .16 .17 .06 .08 .04 .12 .37 -.02 .04 .15 .15 .10 .08 .12 .06
29 ENVconE 0.011 0.10 .01 .10 -.01 .08 .00 .01 .01 .05 .12 -.01 .02 .07 .02 .03 .00 .01 -.01
30 EMPconA 0.026 0.16 .03 .03 .03 .09 .02 .00 -.01 .01 .06 .01 .08 .03 .09 .04 .07 .07 .08
31 EMPconB 0.085 0.28 .09 .09 .08 .19 .14 .00 .00 .07 .22 -.03 .07 .06 .15 .05 .12 .07 .08
32 EMPconC 0.058 0.23 -.01 .02 -.02 .02 .00 .06 .07 .00 .00 .02 .00 .03 .02 .02 .07 -.01 -.01
33 EMPconD 0.230 0.42 .01 -.01 -.01 .00 .01 -.03 -.04 -.03 .05 .02 .02 -.03 -.01 -.01 .01 -.02 -.03
34 DIVconA 0.042 0.20 .02 .05 .02 .07 .06 .02 .02 .01 .11 .04 .14 .11 .17 .16 .14 .06 .07
35 DIVconB 0.355 0.48 -.03 -.08 -.03 -.05 -.01 -.06 -.08 -.04 -.12 -.33 -.17 -.15 -.11 -.08 -.16 -.11 -.07
36 COMconA 0.023 0.15 -.02 -.02 -.02 -.02 -.02 .00 -.01 .05 -.03 .00 .05 .02 .02 .00 -.01 .00 -.02
37 COMconB 0.031 0.17 .08 .11 .04 .14 .07 .07 .01 .08 .23 .00 .05 .09 .14 .10 .07 .08 .06
38 COMconD 0.025 0.16 .02 .05 .05 .14 .00 .04 -.01 .11 .15 .02 .04 .10 .11 .06 .11 .07 .05
39 CGOVconB 0.304 0.46 .03 .07 .03 .07 .02 .10 .13 .05 .17 .13 .14 .19 .19 .12 .28 .07 .06
40 CGOVconF 0.009 0.09 .06 .01 .01 .03 .06 .02 .02 .04 .06 .00 -.02 .03 .03 -.01 .00 .04 .06
41 HUMconC 0.005 0.07 .01 .01 -.01 .06 -.01 .02 -.01 .03 .06 .00 -.01 .03 .02 .00 .01 .03 .01
42 HUMconF 0.041 0.20 -.01 .03 .04 .06 .02 .02 .00 .00 .07 .08 .10 .14 .11 .10 .12 .10 .16
43 PROconA 0.058 0.24 .06 .15 .02 .16 .07 .05 .04 .07 .18 .03 .08 .17 .14 .08 .12 .10 .12
44 PROconD 0.077 0.27 .00 .11 .02 .09 .03 .01 .04 .04 .15 .07 .14 .21 .21 .16 .21 .13 .09
45 PROconE 0.039 0.19 .02 .11 .03 .13 .03 .04 .05 .05 .19 .06 .08 .18 .15 .10 .16 .13 .11
46 lnemp 8.193 1.85 .10 .19 .13 .18 .09 .13 .13 .07 .24 .11 .22 .28 .31 .20 .30 .20 .25
47 lnROA 0.631 0.36 .04 .01 .03 -.03 .03 .03 .00 -.07 .04 .01 .04 -.03 .01 .01 .01 .03 .05
48 lnxsga 5.314 1.58 .10 .23 .10 .24 .07 .15 .19 .12 .26 .17 .25 .38 .37 .24 .43 .23 .32
49 year 2005.29 5.21 .00 -.07 -.07 .11 .07 -.11 -.06 -.02 .02 .02 .03 -.04 .07 -.04 .15 -.11 -.02
Table 3.A.2: Summary statistics and correlations for individual KLD indicators 
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Mean s.d. 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 30 31 32 33 34
19 COMstrD 0.042 0.20 .10 
20 CGOVstrA 0.137 0.34 .01 -.08
21 CGOVstrC 0.002 0.05 .02 .01 .00
22 CGOVstrD 0.040 0.20 .03 .21 -.06 -.01
23 HUMstrG 0.002 0.05 -.01 .04 -.02 .00 .23
24 PROstrA 0.057 0.23 .01 .08 -.05 .00 .21 -.01
25 PROstrB 0.030 0.17 .00 .13 -.04 .00 .08 -.01 .07
26 ENVconB 0.063 0.24 .01 .10 -.10 .02 .17 -.01 .04 .04
27 ENVconC 0.003 0.06 .01 -.01 -.02 .00 .01 .00 .03 .06 .09
28 ENVconD 0.083 0.28 .02 .15 -.11 .03 .23 -.01 .05 .06 .48 .12
29 ENVconE 0.011 0.10 -.01 .00 -.04 -.01 .08 .00 -.01 .04 .20 .39 .21
30 EMPconA 0.026 0.16 -.01 .01 -.03 .01 .09 .03 .08 -.02 .12 .02 .11 .01 
31 EMPconB 0.085 0.28 -.03 .05 -.08 .00 .20 .01 .10 -.02 .26 .04 .25 .06 .17 
32 EMPconC 0.058 0.23 -.02 .04 -.01 .00 .01 -.01 .00 .04 .00 -.01 .01 -.02 .00 -.02 
33 EMPconD 0.230 0.42 -.07 -.02 .03 -.01 .01 .01 -.02 -.01 .02 -.01 .03 .01 .03 .08 -.01
34 DIVconA 0.042 0.20 .04 .10 -.07 -.01 .11 .03 .05 -.01 .11 .02 .12 .00 .14 .13 .00 .03
35 DIVconB 0.355 0.48 -.08 -.12 .13 -.03 -.09 -.03 -.05 -.05 -.10 -.01 -.11 -.03 -.03 -.04 .00 .08 -.11
36 COMconA 0.023 0.15 .08 .01 .08 -.01 .00 -.01 -.03 -.02 -.04 -.01 -.04 -.02 -.02 -.04 -.03 -.03 .00
37 COMconB 0.031 0.17 .00 .08 -.07 -.01 .18 -.01 .06 .01 .28 .07 .33 .15 .09 .20 .02 .02 .13
38 COMconD 0.025 0.16 .02 .10 -.06 .00 .09 -.01 .02 .00 .13 -.01 .14 .03 .05 .11 .01 .01 .06
39 CGOVconB 0.304 0.46 .00 .16 -.20 -.01 .13 .05 .07 .06 .09 .02 .11 .02 .06 .13 .03 .03 .14
40 CGOVconF 0.009 0.09 .03 .06 -.03 .03 .01 .00 .01 .01 .10 .00 .08 .03 .00 .04 .00 .00 -.02
41 HUMconC 0.005 0.07 .00 .02 -.03 .00 .02 .00 .00 .04 .09 .00 .10 .05 .02 .02 -.01 .00 .01
42 HUMconF 0.041 0.20 -.03 .06 -.05 .02 .13 .21 .01 .02 .03 -.01 .03 .01 .05 .05 .02 .03 .09
43 PROconA 0.058 0.24 .01 .08 -.08 .03 .18 .01 .10 .03 .16 .07 .25 .13 .07 .16 -.01 .00 .14
44 PROconD 0.077 0.27 .06 .19 -.09 .01 .17 .01 .04 .03 .11 .02 .14 .07 .10 .11 .00 -.02 .19
45 PROconE 0.039 0.19 .05 .14 -.07 -.01 .16 -.01 .03 .04 .19 .06 .23 .13 .07 .12 .01 .01 .10
46 lnemp 8.193 1.85 .08 .26 -.28 .03 .25 .07 .18 .07 .22 .06 .29 .07 .18 .24 -.04 .01 .27
47 lnROA 0.631 0.36 -.19 .00 -.13 -.01 .01 .04 .02 .01 .03 .00 .02 .01 .06 .08 -.03 .07 .07
48 lnxsga 5.314 1.58 .12 .34 -.30 .03 .30 .07 .20 .12 .20 .06 .27 .09 .15 .20 .03 -.03 .24
49 year 2005.29 5.21 -.11 -.12 .13 -.06 .08 .02 -.01 -.11 -.15 -.06 -.13 -.06 -.01 .10 -.02 .15 .00
Table 3.A.2: Summary statistics and correlations for individual KLD indicators (continued) 
Mean s.d. 35 36 37 38 39 40 41 42 43 44 45 46 47 48 
36 COMconA 0.023 0.15 -.03 
37 COMconB 0.031 0.17 -.05 -.03
38 COMconD 0.025 0.16 -.03 -.02 .11
39 CGOVconB 0.304 0.46 -.11 -.03 .09 .06
40 CGOVconF 0.009 0.09 -.03 -.01 .05 .08 .00
41 HUMconC 0.005 0.07 -.03 -.01 .06 .12 .02 .04
42 HUMconF 0.041 0.20 -.07 -.03 .03 .02 .09 .00 .03
43 PROconA 0.058 0.24 -.09 -.04 .17 .07 .09 .06 .01 .03
44 PROconD 0.077 0.27 -.14 .03 .11 .10 .19 .00 .00 .07 .23
45 PROconE 0.039 0.19 -.10 -.02 .13 .14 .14 .05 .08 .08 .18 .18
46 lnemp 8.193 1.85 -.32 -.02 .15 .10 .30 .03 .08 .19 .22 .28 .21
47 lnROA 0.631 0.36 -.06 -.21 .00 -.02 .05 -.02 .01 .13 .02 .03 .00 .37 
48 lnxsga 5.314 1.58 -.33 .00 .15 .14 .40 .04 .07 .19 .24 .34 .26 .82 .24 
49 year 2005.29 5.21 .23 .02 .01 .04 .12 -.06 -.05 -.03 .00 -.05 -.07 -.28 -.12 -.19 
Table 3.A.2: Summary statistics and correlations for individual KLD indicators (continued) 
